LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
RUSSIA AND INDIA.
[TO THE Ersrran OF THE 'EPECTATCIR.1 Sra,—As you have so consistently and cogently urged of late the desirability of Russia and England coming to an understand- ing in regard to all outstanding differences, I hope you will allow me to advert briefly to the opinion which, in discussing this question, the Novae Vremya has quite lately expressed,— viz., that Russia " has no need for India," and that " she has already too much to do to improve the economic condition of her own territory, and particularly the central districts, to desire to assume charge of India." With a condition of chronic famine staring her in the face, from the exhaus- tion of her once famous black soil, the absolute honesty of the above contention must be patent to even the least informed; but when the question of a possible rapprochement between the two countries is raised " the man in the street " almost invariably replies, " Yes ; but how. can you possibly place any reliance on Russian pledges ? " This he advances quite honestly, accompanied by abundant illustration and well-grounded facts, but forgetful that even this country has not infrequently, under the over- mastering stress of circumstances, been compelled to go back on her plighted word ; and, further, that self-interest is after all a much more potent factor in dealing with all such matters than any proclivities, whether honest or dishonest. So long as England remains mistress of the " seven seas," how would it pay Russia first to conquer, and then to maintain, India 14 That is the question truly, clearly, and emphatically answered by the Novae Vremya. To the great majority of those who, dike the writer, took part in the last Afghan War the emphatic answer to the question as to whether Russia, even under the most advantageous, circumstances, could push her advance beyond the line of the Helmund, say seventy-five nines west of Kandahar, would be that, owing mainly to the difficulties and immense outlay inseparable from the supply of the baggage animals to meet the require• meats of the large army indispensable for the conquest of India, in connection with which pretty nearly the whole re- sources of Asia would have to be drawn upon, the Russian advance would come to a standstill within six months from the inception of the campaign. Assuming, however, that no impediments whatever existed as regards a Russian advance, and that India from Himalaya to Cape Comorin fell an easy prey to the armies of the White Czar, how would India be administered and worked so as not to prove an eternal drain on the resources of Russia, assuming, of course, that England's maritime supremacy remained unchallenged ? To all who are acquainted with the economic conditions under which India has hitherto lived and prospered, one supreme factor stands out. India is from a happy combination of soil and climate enabled to produce a special brand of opium which cannot be grown elsewhere, and owing to this circumstance, has placed China, where the drug takes the place of champagne at home, practically under a tribute of from eight to nine millions sterling per annum, To this tribute the Government of India has been indebted for the means which have enabled it to carry out the existing splendid irrigation works (quite the finest in the world), the railways, and other great under- takings, which as the years advance are rendering the revenues more elastic and allowing India to pay its way. It may be said, without fear of contradiction, that without having first obtained command of the sea the Dossession of India, far from proving remunerative, would spell absolute ruin to Russia. She would simply bleed to death. This truth, which is evidently present to the mind of the writer whose words I have quoted from the Novae Vremya, as it must be to all hat statesmen, is, I fear, by no means manifest to the general public here, While fully recognising and rejoiced to see the admirable tone pervading the majority of the speeches it the debate in Parliament on Wednesday week about Russia and the Persian Gulf, I nevertheless fear that unless the general public can be convinced of the fact that the possession of India would not only be useless but ruinous to Russia, and can therefore form no part of her actual policy, suspicions of her =Lila fides must remain as a barrier against that full and frank understanding which is of such vital consequence at the present moment. I am, Sir, &c.,
R. H. S.
[Our correspondent is, we hold, entirely right in regard to India and the command of the sea. The command of the sea gave us India, and will keep it for us; and we shall far better secure India by maintaining the Fleet than by indulging in a jealousy of Russia so senseless that it induces us to help and foster the Power that is challenging our command of the sea. As to the charge of bad faith in the past against Russia, we admit that a good case can be made out. We believe, too, that Russia will continue to break faith whenever we induce or force her Government to enter into diplomatic engagements which run contrary to her essential aspirations. If, however, we give up insisting on the maintenance of the status quo in Asia, which in plain terms means the exclusion of Russia from the open water, we shall find it quite possible to make binding agreements with the Government of the Czar.—ED. Spectator.]
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