SUAKIN. T HIS affair at Suakin is a worrying one, though
only of the second importance ; but we cannot see that the British Government has any alternative policy to pursue. The Red Sea port is held nominally by the Egyptians, really by ourselves,—firstly, in order to prevent any European Power from seizing it, and so making Egypt untenable by assisting the dervishes ; and secondly, to prevent the Mahdists from using it as their port of com- munication with Arabia. If they possesed it, they might rapidly develop their fanaticism among their co-religionists across the Red Sea, might obtain serious aid in men and munitions from Arabia, and might reinvigorate the slave- trade, to which they, like all Soudanese, are friendly. Moreover, the surrender of the place would be regarded. throughout both the Soudan and Arabia as a great defeat of the white man, and would unite all the Soudanese tribes under the banner of the Mahdi, who is, by the last accounts, conquering greatly on his Western border. While we hold Egypt, Suakin cannot be abandoned ; but its retention is unusually troublesome. The very reasons which make it imperative on us to guard the place, make it an object of permanent desire to the dervishes ; and they keep up the attack with the intermittent persistence, never energetic, but knowing nothing of time, which is charac- teristic of Arab warfare. A small army of dervishes, pro- bably two thousand strong, but increased when needful from the interior, keeps up a land-blockade rather than a siege of the city, and harasses its garrison with occasional attacks, regulated, we suspect, by the supply of ammunition, and with endless alarms. The Egyptians fire from their forts, killing every now and then a few men, and sometimes venture on a sortie, usually attended with no result except a slight diminution of their own numbers. The garrison, in the course of these operations, has become worn out, and probably, though this is not admitted, a little disheartened; and it has consequently been necessary to relieve and strengthen it with two regiments of com- paratively fresh black troops, who could perhaps maintain the defence for a long period. It is, however, necessary to do something more than this. There is no chance what- ever of tiring out the dervishes, who take no note of time, who cannot give up their project so long as hope remains— and when can hope fail in a religious war ?—and who may go on besieging, or rather blockading, for the next twenty years. It is not creditable that a city virtually under British protection should be permanently unsafe, and not right to keep on for years expending either British or Egyptian lives in an aimless and desultory, but end- less struggle. Even if the consumption of life is only five or six a week—and there are hospital returns to add— that cannot be justified ; and the dervishes must, therefore, be attacked and driven away. It is not good policy to rely wholly on Egyptian or even Negro troops for such work, and, consequently, a British regiment has been ordered to Suakin, with, we hope, a sufficient force of artillery. When all is ready, the attack will be made, and will, we may trust, end in a retreat of the dervishes, and such an encouragement to the friendly tribes that the blockade may not be renewed for some time to come. There will then for some months be what is called upon the shores of the Red Sea, a peaceful time. Unfortunately, the difficulty does not end there. The dervishes neither will nor can abandon their purpose, which is essential to the success of their great plans, plans which, being based on a religious idea, are hardly alterable ; and the moment the effect of defeat has worn off, and the British troops are withdrawn, the menaces will be renewed. The only permanent security for Suakin would be to hoist the British flag, and so deprive the dervishes of hope ; but there are endless obstacles in the way. Not to speak of international feeling, and of our promises to depart whenever Egypt is safe from attack, to waste a British garrison on a Red Sea port which we have not decided to be permanently necessary to us is most annoying. We have not a man to spare from the British Army, and there seems to be a reluctance to con- sider Suakin a second Aden, and leave its protection to the Government of India, which knows where to find acclimatised Asiatics ready to fight Soudanese. If, indeed, the Times' counsel were accepted, and Suakin declared a British port, and made the warehouse of the Soudan, it might be possible to make it self-supporting, and govern and garrison it from Bombay ; but the pro- -cess would be long ; it is not clear that we want a permanent station in the Red Sea which we have done without for a generation ; the policy of scattering our means so much is extremely doubtful ; and a de- cision before the fate of Egypt is determined would be absurdly premature. It is out of our unfortunate position in the Nile Valley that all these recurrent difficulties arise. We cannot hand over Egypt to Turkey. We are unwilling to retreat and lether manage for herself, intimating distinctly that France must leave her alone, under penalty of war; and we are unable in the present position of Europe, amidst our internal complications, and during the strange spasm of hesitation about all things which for the moment enfeebles all public action in Great Britain, to cut the knot by assuming direct resposibility for the Delta. The only alternative is to continue the burdensome military occupation until the way is clear, and even that course is hampered by uncertainties. If it were certain that we should go on with it, the British agent in Cairo might act as Resident, and a far-sighted policy would be possible ; but English parties are divided about Egypt as about everything else ; the electors, when they next vote, will not think of Egypt at all ; and the occupying authorities can do nothing except under the shadow of a fear that with a change of Government at home, they may cease to occupy. It is not possible, in such circumstances, to attempt far-reaching plans even in Cairo ; and Suakin, which belongs partly to Egypt, partly to Turkey, and partly to the Soudanese—who are now supposed to be independent —must follow the fate of Cairo. We must continue to occupy and defend the place the best way we can, as we do Egypt, without any settled idea in our own minds of what is to be the end..
We have never approved that position, and do not approve it now, and we do not suppose Lord Salisbury approves it any more than anybody else ; but there it is, and what is to be done ? Nobody that we know of suggests an alternative policy which would at once keep our engagements to Europe, secure our interests, which are vitally concerned in Egyptian independence of any rival European Power, and satisfy the taxpayers of this country. The Opposition suggests nothing, except occasionally a precipitate retreat, from which their leaders, if they were in power, would shrink just as much as the existing Govern- ment does. Europe suggests nothing, being very well content with an interregnum of which Great Britain has all the embarrassment, and foreign bondholders the largest share of the profit. And the publicists suggest nothing which is both sensible and attractive to the men responsible for affairs. We ourselves believe that the Egyptian Question ought to be settled between England and France, on the basis of restoring Morocco to civilisa- tion; but for reasons doubtless sufficient, though to us inexplicable, no statesman in England or France is pre- pared to accept that plan as a working solution. There is no other even discussed, and what can any Government do, under such circumstances, except meet the pressing evil of the moment and go on waiting ? Mr. Morley, it is said, means to make Suakin the text of a speech on the Esti- mates; and if he has anything practical to suggest, the world will hear it with pleasure ; but those who know the situation best have the least immediate hope. We must defend Suakin as part, and a disagreeable part, of the day's work.
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