THE SITUATION IN MOROCCO

• BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. C. E. ntiDICIN - (late Royal Artillery). THE apparent lack of success of the Spaniards in their efforts to subdue and pacify the Moors and Riffs originally produced, I imagine, in British minds the impression that this was due to Spanish military incom- petence, and that, had the French been in control, the problem would not have proved so difficult. There was a tendency to compare the outward prosperity and success with which the French zone was administered to the constant turmoil and generally unsettled condition of the Spanish zone. Now that the French are evidently not finding it easy to put a stop to Abd-el-Krim's aggres- sions, there is considerable surprise.

All along British public opinion has not been quite fair to Spain. The totally different character of the terrain in the two zones has been lost sight of. In the Riff country especially, and elsewhere in the Spanish zone to a less degree, the country is mountainous and rugged, and approximates very closely in character to the North-West Frontier of India, where we have found to our cost that it is extremely difficult to capture positions, and almost impossible to hold them afterwards. For this reason, the British Government makes no attempt to occupy permanently these regions, and the Spanish Government has very wisely decided to adopt a similar policy as regards Morocco. The country in the French zone is, on the other hand, for the most part plain and desert, easy to fight over, and to control and administer. The Moors and Riffs in the Spanish zone are warlike and proud races, far more skilled in fighting, and infinitely better armed than the North-West Frontier Pathans, to whom in character, habits, and appearance they approximate most closely. This struck me very much when I first visited the Riff country. Their villages are built in exactly the same way, their animals look similar and are used similarly, and the whole alpect of the country is just as rugged and forbidding. The tribes in the French zone, on the contrary, have not the same fighting characteristics, and are indifferently armed.

Under the wise policy of General Primo de Rivera, the Spaniards have recovered lost ground that was essential to them and have re-established their prestige. The line they now occupy is securely held, and Abd-el-Krim has been able, therefore, to turn his attention to the French, who are having at least as much difficulty in withstanding his onslaughts as did the Spaniards. In crises such as these the loyalty of the native troops and the subjected tribes is a heavy consideration, and I have no doubt this causes more anxiety to the French administration than the actual Riff attacks. It is presumable that defections from these sources are mainly responsible for Fez being now threatened.

It is interesting to recall an incident of my visit in 1919, which may account in some degree for the remarkable success Abd-el-Krim has met with. I was visiting an advanced post with General Aizpuru near the Moulouya River, which is for some distance the boundary between the French and Spanish zones. The General was most anxious that I should meet the commander of this garrison, as he was a Moorish officer in the Spanish Army.

He was a captain, very smart, well educated, and intelligent. He had been brought up in Spain, had passed with honours through the Military College at Toledo, which corresponds to our Sandhurst. and held a regular commission in the army, and was doing extftmely well. He was a younger brother of Abd-el-Krim, deserted with all the other native troops when Abd-el-Krim first struck, and is now Commander-in-Chief of the Riff armies and is, as has already been proved, a remarkably capable leader. The Spaniards must have somewhat bitter recol- lections of this product of their civilization and education, of whom they were once so proud.

The following incident is also typical of the Riff character. General Monte Verde and his wife adopted several years ago a little Rifi girl of seven. Her father, a chief, had been killed in some severe fighting near Melilla in which Monte Verde's battalion was concerned, and as her mother was also dead, Monte Verde took her back to Melilla, where she was treated as one of his own daughters. She was baptized a Christian, and travelled with the Monte Verdes in Europe and America (Monte Verde had been Military Attache in the Spanish Embassy at Washington). She grew up just like a Spanish girl, and spoke Spanish and English fluently. When Monte Verde was promoted General to command the Melilla garrison, this girl, of course, returned there with his family.

Soon afterwards she said she wished to go back to her people. The Monte Verdes were much distressed, as they expected the Riffs would kill her because she had become a Christian. But she insisted and went back. She then married a Moor, but used to make a practice every three months of undertaking a long journey into Melilla and staying with the Monte Verdes for a few days. She would arrive just as dirty in her clothing and appearance as any Moor, but would immediately ask for a bath, after which she would dress in Spanish clothes and be one of the family again for her stay. At the end of her visit she would put on her Moorish apparel and depart. A very real case of "The Call of the Blood."

One cannot but have sympathy with the Moors, since it is a natural aspiration for them to defend their own country against the invading Spaniards and French and to drive them out. They have a great history (at one time they had conquered the whole of Southern Spain), and they have a civilization of their own. It would surely be better for Spain and France to come to terms with Abd-el-Krim, but his terms are still too exacting for this to be possible.

I feel that his chapter of success is by no means closed, and that the tale of French disasters may be more startling even than that of the Spaniards. Abd-el-Krim's prestige in every Mohammedan country is now at its zenith, and his performances with the small material originally at his disposal have been really wonderful. A re-estab- lished and independent Morocco is, of course, his aim, and, to him at any rate, this must now seem well within the bounds of possibility in the near future.

If France and Spain had a few years ago pulled together in their Moroccan policy, the present unfortunate situa- tion for both could not have arisen. It is only now, however, that France, finding herself in difficulties, desires to work with Spain, and it is distinctly doubtful, if it is not too late. Combined operations against Abd-el- Krim would give him an excuse to attack the international zone at Tangier, and this might draw Great Britain into the conflict, though presumably we would not go farther than to protect our own rights and subjects.

Tangier was and is still a place of international intrigue, jealousy, and bickering. The French and Spanish officials are not on the best of terms, and its present status and condition are quite impossible.One can hardly expect a place to be well governed with two or more Governors at the head of affairs. I do not imagine that General Primo de Rivera, having just established and consolidated his line, will reverse his policy and re-embark on land operations on a large scale to assist the French. It is rather too much to expect of him, and Spanish opinion would not consent to it. If, however, he were to carry through his projected' forced landing at Alhucemas, it would no doubt cause a big diversion and relieve the French situation very consider- ably.

Very few people can have seen the bay, of Alhucemas, and I will describe it. I have no hesitation' in saying that Alhucemas is destined to become by far the most important place in North-West Africa. I went there M 1919 in a Spanish gunboat, and have been all round the bay. The following is taken from my diary.

"This is a really wonderful natural harbour. Thirteen kilometres east to west and ten north to south ; absolutely sheltered, east, south, and west, by the mountains. Anchorage must be perfect almost everywhere in this bay. There is a broad flat plain along the south shore extending to the south for about fifteen kilometres where it rises abruptly into hills and then into mountains. All this plain looks very fertile. On the east and west sides very high cliffs rise sheer from the sea.

• " This is the place where it is intended to make a large town and shipping port, and it is an ideal site. It would of course be the direct route to Fez and Taza, and I can imagine that the French would rather like to have it.

"There is a small rock island about a mile from the southern and western shores of the bay, with a Spanish garrison of a battalion, with artillery. We anchored close to it, the Commandant came on board, and I then landed on the island.

"Later I was allowed to go round close to the shore in the electric launch, although I had some difficulty in getting permission since it was anticipated that the Moors would shoot at us, and we had to go armed with rifles and a machine-gun.

"The Moors were greatly interested in us, as we went in close and all round the bay. They waved and shouted, beckoning us to land, but this could hardly be done, since none of the Spanish garrison have ever landed there. On the south, a beautiful sandy beach and much cultivation. No river, but there are two dried-up river- beds. There is probably plenty of water in them during the winter. (This was in August.) But there must be plenty of springs in the mountains and hills, as the Moors have irrigation channels through their cultivations.

"In the mountains there is undoubtedly much mineral wealth, chiefly iron-ore of pie same type as in the mines near Melilla. This is very rich ore and they just shovel it off the sides of the• moun- tains and push : it into trucks. Abd-el-Krim has granted various mining concessions in his mountains, and so, I understand, have the Spaniards."

I believe a certain American banker has offered to finance the colonization and building of a large town and docks at Alhucemas if the Spaniards can establish them- selves there. This should not he 'a very difficult operation, if properly supported by an effective artillery barrage from their navy and the island. Of course, the Spanish prisoners are at Ajdir, about two miles from the shore, and the Riffs might make reprisals on them. Also, no doubt Abd-el-Krim has positioned many captured French and Spanish guns with the object of preventing such an attack. But I think it is essential to General Primo de Rivera's policy that the Spaniards should secure this zone.

There are no good harbours elsewhere in North-West Africa. On the West Coast the presence of a bar at every port effectually prevents any being made. Tangier, Ceuta, and Melilla can at best be only third-rate seaports, and the same applies to the places further east. Alhucemas must be the natural outlet for all trade in this part of the continent, and a railway to Taza could be easily constructed after agreement with Abd-el-Krim. The distance from Alhucernas to Taza is 'about 60 Miles, thence to Fez another 45 miles. Would not Abd-el-Krim agree to the whole position in • Moroe-eo being reviewed and arbitrated upon by 'a neutral convention ? I am sure his prestige would not thereby suffer, and the claims, which he has successfully established by his successes, would be fully taken into account. Would not France and Spain agree to this ? It would certainly save them very heavy expenditure and loss of life. -