TOPICS OF THE DAY.
BRITAIN'S DUTY. THE British nation is always at its best in a war crisis. What is, or at any rate what appears to be, apathy or indifference in small things turns in great matters to cool- ness and steadiness. There are, of course, here as elsewhere, in all times of crisis, doubts, hesitations, anxieties, and con- fusion, but these are superficial. What is fundamental, what is the essential, the dominant note, is the determina- tion to keep at all costs a straight course. Translated into terms of the present crisis, this means that the British people are going to maintain the pledges which they have given to others by deed, if not by actual word. They are going to do what they have openly and clearly allowed others to expect they will do—they feel their obligation to be just as sacred as though it had been set down on paper and sealed with a hundred seals. Our duty is to stand by our friends, and we shall stand by them, be the burden never so heavy. But though duty is a sufficient consideration, it is not immaterial to remember that even if we were in no way bound in conscience and honour to stand by France and Russia, we must stand by them in the last resort merely from motives of self- interest. A war involving France and Russia in which we did not participate would bring on us greater perils than would participation in a war on the side of France and Russia, even though the latter war required us to put forth our whole strength and to stake our all in ships, men, and money. France and Russia might be beaten without our help, and Germany and her satellite Powers become the masters of Europe. With our help we can predict, as far as it is possible to predict anything, that they would not be beaten, for by our sea power we supply the link which would prevent them from being isolated and destroyed in turn.
To prove this we need only consider what would happen should we stand out and say that a war caused by Russia's refusal to allow Austria-Hungary to destroy Servia, had nothing to do with us. The first result must be intense bitterness on the part of Russia and France, who, whether they actually had warrant for such feeling or not, would consider themselves betrayed. In these circumstances suppose the German Government, before operations had begun, or even after the first skirmishes on the frontier, were to instruct their diplomatic agents to speak to Russia and France in the following terms : " Is it not madness for us five nations, three of the Alliance and two of the Entente, to tear each other's eyes out and involve all Europe in bloodshed and material loss beyond all computation, while selfish, perfidious England stands out and reaps the benefit? After we have fought for, say, a year, England, swollen with the commerce we have let slip, and with her sea power intact, will probably step in and fleece us all. Would it not be better to cease our quarrels and join together to strike down the rapacious tyrant of the seas and divide among us the inheritance she has misused ? We can do whatever we will, for Britain has no friends. If Russia takes India, if Germany and France divide Africa between them, and if the rest of the Colonial possessions of Britain are also fairly partitioned, everybody will have room for expansion and a place in the sun without any of the partitioning Powers having to make sacrifices. There is plenty for all in the British Empire." In these circumstances what answer could be expected from France and Russia, smarting from our desertion and offered the negative bribe of being relieved from the miseries of war and the positive bribe of the distribution of the British Empire ? They would not be human if they did not say Yes. Remember that this is no figment of our imagina- tion. The suggestion has been made in principle before, and it would certainly be made to-morrow if we took the line that France and Russia may fight over Servia if they like, but that it is no business of ours.
But suppose we are wrong, and that the French and Russians refused the Lerman bait and insisted on fighting without our help ? It is to be feared that in the end France would be beaten, and though Russia could not be invaded, her armies could be forced back as Japan forced them back, and the Empire of the Tsar would be left impotent for half a generation. What would happen in that case can easily be predicted. Germany would, of course, place France permanently hors de combat, and one of the demands to which the French might, in the given circumstances, yield willingly enough would be the handing over of the whole of the effective part of the French fleet to Germany. But such a transfer of naval power would at once give the Germans, who have plenty of men, a considerable naval predominance over this country. If we tried to prevent the transfer, then we should be placing ourselves in the ridiculous position of going to war with Germany single-handed when we might have gone to war with her with powerful allies. In any case, if the Triple Alliance were the victor, Germany would bestride the whole European continent, and have a position stronger than that of Napoleon at his greatest. But let no one suppose that she would be grateful or friendly to England because England had deserted Russia and France. The Germans would very naturally and very rightly from their point of view be intensely suspicious. What they would do, and small blame to them, would be to come to us and say in effect : "It is now your turn. We are tired of war and want to enjoy the blessings of peace, but we cannot do so while you hold the command of the sea. You must enter into the German European system. If you will do this in a friendly spirit we shall not interfere with you. If you are recalcitrant then we must have the fight out and at once. We cannot sit down in peace while you stand by holding the Empire of the sea." Thus, either by an arrangement between the Powers or by a victory of the Triple Alliance, Britain must be placed at a tremendous disadvantage.
But perhaps it will be said that France and Russia may win even without our aid. Let those who use this argument reflect upon its folly. If we are going to rely upon the chance of Germany and Austria-Hungary being beaten, is it not madness not to make that chance a, certainty by fighting on the side which we not only want to see victorious, but which must win if we are to be safe ? The truth is that neither from the point of view of honour and good faith nor from that of national safety is it possible for us to stand out of war if war comes. We will go further and say that, though things look very black as we write, the one chance of peace lies in Germany and Austria-Hungary being made to understand that we are going to stand by Russia and France absolutely and without restriction. At present they do not believe that, but think that we can be cajoled or bullied out of doing our duty. If it is known that there is no chance of such cajolery or bullying being effective, then there is a chance, even at the eleventh hour, that Germany may say to Austria-Hungary : "You have done enough to vindicate your honour and to humiliate Servia—you must withdraw before the final catastrophe. Armageddon is too uncertain to be worth fighting—just now."
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