THE NEAR EAST.
TN the Paris Conference, which met to modify the Treaty of Sevres, Lord Curzon was fighting with one hand tied behind his back. Directly it was known, five months ago, that the French had made a secret Treaty with the Kemalist Turks. it was clear that the Treaty of Sevres 'was done for. The only question that remained was how muck could be saved from the wreck. For our part we have never lost the traditional British feeling that when the Turks have been dislodged from a territory where they have been guilty of persecutions and where they have no right of possession by virtue of racial preponderance, they should not be allowed to return. Although we hoped that this common British feeling might somehow be respected 'in spite of the Angora Treaty, we have sadly to record that Lord Curzon has been unable to prevent a considerable part of Thrace going back to Turkey. Again, we must .express our dissatisfaction with the proposals for securing the safety of the Armenians and with the arrangements -for preserving the neutrality of the Dardanelles. It is something that France and Britain have been able to agree at all,, for some people thought the gulf between `them too wide to be bridged. Of course, identity of po is indispensable if any terms whatever are to be impose upon Turkey. Everybody knows that for generations the one strong diplomatic suit of the Turks was to play- off one Power against another. For that reason the old -Concert of Europe became an object of ridicule. Although 'the very name of the Concert of Europe has disappeared, the Turks ever since the Armistice have been playing the old game with fewer cards. They have been setting off Britain against France and Italy. It was obvious, then, that the Near East could never be quieted unless the Euro- pean Powers spoke with one voice, and that is why Lord 'Curzon had to make the sacrifices necessary to produce One voice. We much regret, however, that the sacrifices are as great as they are, and we can only hope that there May yet be an opportunity to reduce them when the new proposals are put into the form of a Treaty after discussion at Constantinople or elsewhere. Let us congder the main proposals point by point. The Greeks are to evacuate Asia Minor. It is understood that they have already agreed to do this though, of course, their attitude may change if the Turks make trouble. It is past conceivable that if the Turks hold out for better terms than they are actually being offered—if, for instance, they demand the whole of Thrace—the Greeks may make a desperate effort to send their Smyrna army to Thrace in order to fight for what they regard as inalienable Greek soiL When the Greeks have left Asia Minor the whole of AnatOlia, including Smyrna, will again be Turkish. All this has become inevitable. In Smyrna, however, there is to be a special regime to secure the safety of Greek life and property. Next, there are to be provisions for protecting minorities elsewhere in the Turkish Empire, and these are to be counterbalanced by an arrangement under which Moslem minorities under Greek rule are also to be protected. As for the Armenians, Lord Curzon is said to have tried to obtain for them a territorial reserve. In this he failed, and for want of a better plan he consented to an arrangement which makes the League of Nations respon- sible for their interests. We are afraid that this is only a further example of using the League of Nations to cover up the faults of the Powers. The League of Nations is in instrument for expressing the united decisions of civilized countries, and if these countries are unable—as they clearly are—to agree when their reapeotive Governments consult together, how can it be hoped that the League of Nations has much chance of success in the same field I The new frontier in Thrace is drawn from a point near Rodosto to Midia on the Black Sea. It runs through Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse. The point, of course, is to give the Turks a large area of safety on the flank of Con- stantinople. But in our opinion the Turks are being given too much. Rodosto is Greek ; Kirk Kilisse is Bulgarian. In both eases " self-determination " breaks down simply because events have made it necessary to follow a policy more Turcophile than the merits of the case- warrant. Adrianople, which the Turks claim as a Holy City, is -to remain in Greek hands ; but, just as there is to be a special regime for Greeks in Smyrna, so there is to be a special regime for Turks in Adrianople. The Greeks are also to have Gallipoli, though their occupation is to be- under Allied control.
We need not go into the question of Turkish reparations, and we come now to the question of the Straits. Here there has been what we can only regard as an unnecessary weakening of the Treaty of Sevres. The Straits are, of course, to be- neutralized, but the doubt arises whether the neutralization will be satisfactory. The southern shore of the Straits will be in the possession of Turkey. It is true that it is to be " demilitarized,' but we fear that the Turks will find it easy enough to bring mobile artillery into action there. The neutrality of the Straits will, in theory, be guaranteed by an inter-Allied Commission under a. Turkish President, and further, there will be Allied troops in Gallipoli, on the northern shore of the Straits, as over-seers of the Greeks, but these things are not enough. The only satisfactory- principle for ensuring the freedom of such a waterway as the Dardanelles is that the owners of the water should also be- the owners of both shores.
We cannot end without remarking that the comparatively quiet circumstances in which the representatives of France, Italy and Britain met in Paris were greatly- to be preferred to the rampaging publicity with which diplomacy has been conducted for the past three years. We have no doubt that Lord Curzon did all that he• could in a cool and effective way. The pity is that he was tied partly by promises which the French had alrea-dymadeto the Turks and partly by the policy .of the Government, who, assume that Moslem opinion in India has to be appeased. It would be useless to go into this Indian question again, and we- shall content ourselves with saying that to do what we hold to be justice, irrespective of the demands of racial or religious sections, is the only safe principle for the British Empire. It is a mistake to suppose that by our present policy we are really making things easier in India. A comparatively few people have worked up specious political arguments, but the feeling, or rather, we might say, the ignorance or the indifference, of most Moslem Indians remains as it. was. It should never be forgotten that in the Crimea we carried on an arduous and expensive war in the interests of Turkey and that it was immediately followed by the Indian Mutiny.
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