Arma virumque
RICHARD BRETT-SMITH
History of the Second World War: editor-in- chief Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, editor Barrie Pitt, Parts 1-12 (Purnell in cooperation with the Imperial War Museum 3s 6d weekly) The Virus House David Irvine (William Kimber 50s) An, illustrated weekly history of the last war presents its editors with formidable problems, some of which have to be solved at the expense of others. Let it be said at once that broadly this venture succeeds. Obviously such a project should not be too learned, else many potential buyers, especially at newsagents, will be scared away; equally it must not be facile, or pros- pective long-term subscribers (the whole will take ninety-six issues) will not think it worth their considerable financial outlay. Ideally each part should stand on its own, yet the con- tinuity and interest of the series be main- tained, and this is a hard thing to achieve.
These first dozen -issues cover the period from the outbreak of war until September 1940 and the Battle of Britain (the last very well done by Denis Richards). Moreover, in the chapters that bulk largest—those concerning the Battle of France—while there are contribu- tions of the high standard one expects from Alastair Home (Sedan) and Christopher Hib- bert (Dunkirk), for me it was the foreign writers who really brought new life to an old
story. There are the Germans, General Nehring and Oberst Witzig, on Guderian's Blitzkrieg
and the spectacular capture of Fort Eben Emael; the Dutchman, Lieutenant-Commander van Oosten, on the air and airborne attacks.
that put Holland out of the war; the Belgian,' Jean-Leon Charles, on the invasion of the Low Countries as a whole; and the Frenchman,
Colonel Goutard, on the fall of France. All,
these vindicate the decision to show us the war not only, if mainly, through British eyes. Other rewarding contributions are Major- General Moulton's account of the Norwegian disaster; and the descriptions, thrilling even today, of the Graf Spee's marauding and of her bitter end, by Kapitan zur See Bidlingmaier' and Dudley Pope respectively. Omissions? More could have been made of the glaring home front contrasts between victor and van- quished.
Histories of this kind stand or fall to a large extent on their illustrations. With all the resources of the Imperial War Museum and intelligent use of German photographs, many in spectacular colour, to aid them, the picture and art editors have done brilliantly. Maps,_ tables, diagrams, as well as photographs, are first-class, and I must mention John Batche- lor's coloured depictions of tanks and aircraft.. Yet the attribution of the illustrations, especi- ally the German photographs, is very hap- hazard. There may be no strict obligation to do so, but it seems churlish not to acknowledge all the many brilliant action photographs from German sources. I am thinking particularly of the wartime propaganda magazine Signal, from which I spotted several •unacknowledged photo- graphs. If Raymond Schall, who produced A Paris sous la botte des Nazis in 1944 when there was strong feeling against the Germans, could acknowledge Signal amongst its sources, I do not see why Purnell cannot, rather than occasionally crediting the house of 'Ullstein.'
The issues raised in the above history lead us to the question, Why did Germany fail to make an atomic bomb during the last war? It was, after all, a distinguished German chemist, Otto Hahn, who discovered nuclear fission in 1938; and despite the references of Keitel's scientific adviser to 'atomic poppy- cock,' it was only Germany that possessed an office devoted to the military applications of that discovery in 1939. In The Virus House (the nickname of the Dahlem uranium pile laboratory) David Irvine provides most of the answers, and when not too scientific his narrative is quite compelling.
In a nutshell, the Germans failed because they had no equivalent of the us Manhattan Project. Their scientists, certainly not behind by 1942, were thus not directly responsible to a military commander. Sometimes too retiring, too wrangling, too dedicated to pure research, too inhibited by previous persecutions, they failed to convince Albert Speer and Field- Marshal Mitch of the vital practicality of their task. For the Nazis this was both tragic and ironic, since either man possessed more initial Power than General Groves in the us and equal drive and both enjoyed the ear of Hitler. This was the crux of the failure, though the sheep-like acceptance by German scientists of - Professor Bothe's fatal calculations regarding graphite did not help. While the Americans under Fermi's guidance were making history With the graphite process, the Germans relied.' solely upon heavy water. Brilliantly executed " operations by SOE'S Norwegians, followed up by American bombing, destroyed the bulk of heavy-water sroduction in Norway and put an end to German hopes of completing an atomic reactor, let alone the bomb.
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