THE EFFECT OF CONSCRIPTION ON LITTLE WARS.
IT is often said, and generally believed, that the enormous Standing Armies which in these days Continental States deem it expedient to maintain tend to render wars more frequent, and peace less secure. The correctness of this view is, however, open to very grave question. There can be little doubt that universal military service, whereby alone great standing armies can be raised, especially when associated with universal suffrage, makes aggressive war- fare less probable, and distant expeditions more diffi- cult. Only those who have lived in countries where military service is universal can form any adequate idea of the terrible memories left by the most glorious of wars, and of the unspeakable horror with which the bare possibility of future wars is regarded. It was the lot of the present writer to spend two years in Germany shortly after the war of 1870-71, and he saw and heard enough to convince him that only under pressure of the sternest neces- sity will this or the rising generation of Germans engage in another contest. For universal military service is all- devouring. Once the Army is mobilised, every valid man between twenty and twenty-eight must go to the front. Should the struggle continue, and the Landwehr be called out, the limit of age is extended to thirty-three. The only son of his mother, the rising physician, the popular advocate, the busy merchant, the spoiled darling of fortune, the newly- married workman,—all must shoulder the Maser, don the pickelhaube, fare as common soldiers fare, and face wounds, hardship, and death. Except among officers hungry for pro- motion, and young men eager for excitement and adventure, the mere idea of war is viewed in Germany with a repugnance which in England is hardly conceivable. A considerable pro- portion of the Germans who leave their country for the Far West, leave it less to better their condition than to avoid the incidence of military service. The two great wars in which Germany since 1815 has been involved were in both in- stances followed by a portentous increase of emigration. Ask an American-German, or his son sent to the old country for his education, which country he prefers,—that of his birth or of his adoption. The answer is invariably the same,—" America, of course. There is no military service there!" Nobody knows better than Prince Bismarck the wretchedness wrought by war, a wretchedness far more keenly felt by those who stay at home than by those who have to face the bullets of the foe. The survivors are always the greatest sufferers. His never- ceasing efforts to strengthen Germany by alliances arise far more from a desire to reduce the chances of war by a general understanding among the Military Powers than from fear of French revenge,—a fear for which there was never less war- rant than at the present moment, war being even more dreaded and universal military service more detested in France than in Germany. The system in France is comparatively new ; the people are more restive and rebellious, and by reason of the relative smallness of their families, the blood-tax is harder on the French than on their neighbours. The German peasant, with three or four sons—and most German peasants have three or four sons —can spare one at a time for military duty without serious inconvenience ; but when the French peasant parts with one of his two children (the regulation number) he loses his right-hand, and the mere hint of a possible war drives him positively wild. " What is the feeling of people in Savoy about the connection with France I" asked the present writer, a few days ago, of an intelligent Savoyard peasant. " We would rather be French than Italian," was the answer, " 80 long as there are no more wars."
The tendency of universal military service to make people more pacific is, indeed, too palpable to be denied. It arises from the nature of things. Citizen soldiers, who would fight cheerfully in defence of their country, would not easily be in- duced to risk their lives in an unprovoked attack on a neigh- bouring nation ; and in France and Germany, the right to vote and the liability to serve go together. The Tunisian war showed most significantly that universal military service is in- compatible with distant expeditions, except on a very small scale. The reason is obvious. A French reginient is com- posed of the men actually with the colours and of the reserv- ists. The latter have served their time, and nothing save imminent war with a great Power would justify their recall to the regiment. Of the men with the colours, some have only just joined and are not fit to serve, and some have so nearly completed their term of service that it would not be worth while to send them far from home. The residue— perhaps half, possibly only a third of the regiment—would consist of men who had two years to serve, and even they would not be seasoned soldiers, capable of sustaining the hardships of a campaign in such countries as Anam or Mada- gascar. These are the reasons which rendered the organisation of the expedition to Tunis so difficult, and which compel the French Government to send out reinforcements to Tonquin in driblets of 1,000 or 1,500 men at a time, most, if not all, of whom have either volunteered expressly for the occasion, or belong to the Foreign Legion or to the Infanterie and Artillerie de Marine, which are composed exclusively of volunteers, and constitute in effect the sole force of which the French Government can dispose for carry- ing out a policy of adventure. We have been at some pains to ascertain the strength of this force. The Foreign Legion numbers, at its full strength, 3,000 men ; but recruits are often. lacking, and its effective strength cannot safely be computed at more than 2,500. According to La Statistigne of Maurice Bloert, the Infanterie de Marine, including the transport service, consists nominally of 15,215 men. But the force is far below its proper strength ; it contains many non- combatants, and Elisee Reclus, in a recent communication to a friend, estimates the effective strength of the Marine In- fantry and Artillery at 16,000 men at the outside. We have thus something less than 20.000 men, all seasoned soldiers, theoretically available for distant expeditions, without dis- organising the regular army by breaking up regiments, or
creating discontent among the peasantry by sending their sons to perish in African jungles, or conquer colonies in the China Seas. But as some of these men must be retained for service in the Fleet, and several detachments are on duty in the West Indies, Cayenne, and elsewhere, the number actually available is probably not more than from 10,000 to 15,000. With so slender a force it is impossible to do much, and men in autho- rity, however much they may desire " to extend the influence of France," are compelled, in the main, to keep to the fireside policy which universal military service, by bringing home to every French citizen the unpleasantness of war, has imposed upon them. The same difficulty is experienced in other countries where a similar system prevails. During the debate on the Egyptian Question in the Italian Parliament, the
Minister frankly admitted that one of the reasons -why the
Government declined to join England in the suppression of Arabi's insurrection was the difficulty of organising a force for foreign service. And yet Italy has a standing army of 200,000 men, and a potential force of 1,400,000! The lesson of Tunis has not been lost. We owe the non-intervention of Franco in Egypt, as well as of Italy, more to the exigencies of universal military service than to deliberate policy. So long as that system obtains, peace is likely to prevail. When voters have to fight in person, they will not sanction wars the causes of which they do not clearly understand, and in defence of which they are not willing to lay down their lives. Sanction for the expedition to Tonquin was only obtained by official statements that there would be no war.
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