The . flaws in proportional
representation
Two distinct impulses lie behind the growing call for electoral reform, especially as propounded in the columns of the Times and the Dally Express, and supported by the Liberal Party and a growing number of City businessmen. In the first place there is al conviction that the electoral system as it exists at the moment is unfair to smaller parties, and especially to the Liberals. In the second place it is widely believed — and this view has been most assiduously and effvctively put across by Mr Thorpe, often to those who have, in the past, been generous contributors to Conservative funds — that the introduction of an electoral system based on proportional representation would ensure the exclusion forever from office of extremists of the left and encourage the re-emergence of a dominant centre in British politics. It is no accident that those holding this point of view are usually also vocal supporters of the idea of a coalition, or national government.
In so far as the reform idea has won Conservative support the reason lies in the failure of the last Conservative government. More, perhaps, than the supporters of other parties, Conservatives are reasonably content when their leaders are in office, and exceptionally Put out when office is lost. But, in addition to these practical, and even base, considerations Mr Heath's humiliation convinced a substantial number of influential People of the impossibility of a Conservative government of radical hue ever again running the country successfully, especially given the likelihood of determined trade union opposition to its measures. In consequence they have moved to support the idea that, if Conservatism cannot win, then at least the extremism of the left can be prevented.
There are two very strong points against this argument. In the first place, Mr Heath's failure demonstrated nothing in Particular about either the vitality or the prospects of radical Conservatism. His defeat was brought about not as a result of his implementation of the distinctive Policies on which he was elected in 1970 but as a result of his attempts to impose quite different policies, in the teeth of trade union and Labour opposition. In the second place the policies he favoured at the time of his defeat are precisely those Which would be favoured by a centre or Coalition party, and there is no indication Whatever that such a party would enjoy More significant — as opposed to numerically stronger — national support than did the last Conservative administration.
Moreover, a system based on proportional representation is likely to produce a government that would be neither moderate nor efficient. As Mr Thorpe intelligently realises, it would have a predominantly left-of-centre character, and a substantial Liberal representation. Conservatives tempted to feel that this would mean moderation have only to look closely at the policies of the modern Liberal Party: there Is a substantial Trotskyist element among the young Liberals, and Mr Michael Fogarty, one of the party's senior policy makers, was to be found at an academic Fonference in London recently commending British imitation of the Hungarian incomes policy on the ground of its efficiency and without regard to the inhumanity of the state which nurtures it, and which alone could nurture it. In a host of fields other than the economic — and especially in the field of education — any Social Democratic government likely to emerge either through coalition or through reform of the system is most likely tO inculcate statist elitism, rather than either true democracy or the virtues of tradition. We consider all these points sufficiently weighty to discourage Conservative support for PR. But the Liberal case that the present system is mathematically inequitable needs to be answered from principle. Certainly, it seems unfair that so large a number of votes produces so few members. But the British system as unconsciously designed does not have as its central purpose the meting out of arithmetical justice to fringe parties. Rather, its purpose is to preserve stability and choice at the centre. In recent years it has not been the system that has produced bad government, but the individual parties and their cabinets. The decline in Liberal support between February and October of last year indicated quite clearly, however, that there is still much greater and deeper support for the two-party system than pundits had supposed; and that only a small proportion of the electorate wished to replace either the Labour or Conservative Party with the Liberals. The energy of a critical press, and of politicians as well, would be far better devoted to improving the party they favour, and encouraging it to be as distinct from its rivals as possible, than in pursuing a chimera more likely to result in ruin than acceptable reform.
MA. hostilities
There is every reason to take seriously the inspired threats of a renewed IRA offensive in Britain, following the likely ending of the truce in Ulster. According to the Provisional IRA such an offensive would be the consequence of the failure of the British Government to make any declaration of intent of the kind the IRA would favour regarding its future posture in Northern Ireland. And just as this terrorist threat is renewed it is becoming ever more likely that no resolution will emerge from the deadlocked Ulster convention. It can hardly be doubted that a final failure at the convention, if accompanied by renewed violence — especially in this island — would considerably weaken the will of the British people to stick it out in Northern Ireland.
In these circumstances Mr Rees and his fellow ministers find themselves in a most unenviable position: while in no way desirous of compromise with the IRA, they may perfectly reasonably question the merits of slugging it out with terrorism just at the moment when the so-called Loyalists in Ulster are refusing that full-hearted co-operation which Westminster requires of them; and when, even, increasing numbers of Loyalists are beginning to espouse the cause of independence. The Government would be best advised to make preparations for a siege by the IRA, but at the same time to make it abundantly plain to Northern Ireland Protestant politicians that the price of continued military support of their position will be their compliance with the British Government's broad political strategy.
Enough of Gough?
Although Mr Gough Whitlam has clearly strengthened his personal position in the Australian government as a result of his new Cabinet appointments, and of the election of a new deputy leader, the chaos to which he has reduced both his country's economy and her national politics remains. Mr Whitlam's has been a remarkable administration — remarkable alike for its incompetence and for its capacity to survive. Survival was for long, of course, a gift from the Liberal opposition, itself rent by internal differences over both policies and personalities. Nor, it must be said, has the result of the South Australian elections been so encouraging for the Liberals as to persuade them to use their strength in the Senate to force a dissolution on Mr Whitlam. However, in situations like these, boldness is often all; and the Liberals would be well advised to seize the opportunity now available to discharge Mr Whitlam and discover whether or not the country is prepared to end its tolerance of his government.
Previous page
