COMMERCIAL WARS.
MLEROY-BEAULIEU, writing in the De'bats of • Monday, seems to regard the system of Commercial Treaties, which he describes "as the most characteristic feature of the year," as calculated to increase international amity. Re appears to look upon them, in fact, as hopeful signs,—as something of which the age may be proud. We confess we find it difficult to take this view, and are rather inclined to believe that they mark a very ominous develop- ment in the political system of Europe. If the new Com- mercial Treaties were really conceived in the spirit of the treaties inaugurated by France in 1860—were, that is, genuine attempts to encourage free exchange between nation and nation—we should be ready enough to agree with M. Leroy-Beaulieu, and to hail the new Zollverein as the beginning of the end of Protection. Unfortunately, however, as it appears to us, the treaties are the beginning of something very different indeed,—the beginning of a political system in which commercial wars will be waged through tariffs, and nations will attetnpt to conquer each other by placing restrictions on the growth of com- merce. Up till now, one of two reasons has always been assigned, and, moreover, has in effect existed, for the imposition of duties on foreign goods. Either the motive has been to raise money, or to protect the home manu- facturer or producer from outside competition. Now, however, it looks as if a third reason, far more harmful, and in reality far more foolish than either, were to be introduced, and as if nations were going to impose duties, not to raise money or give a trade advantage to their own citizens, but directly to injure foreign nations. No doubt tariffs have often incidentally had this effect before ; but up till now, or more correctly, in modern times, there have been no deliberate attempts by one nation to strike another down by the use of high duties. That we are raising no mere phantom in taking this view, can be shown by recalling the words both of Lord Salisbury and of General von Caprivi. Both statesmen have declared that, in their opinion, the time is at hand when nations will regularly wage war by means of hostile tariffs. And their words show that they intended to mean, not wars of commerce,—that is, not mere attempts to check competition or to seize a trade advantage, but political wars. To manipulate tariffs in order to drive hard mercantile bargains, is one thing. It is quite another to prosecute a political quarrel by means of duties. It is this form of hostility—a commercial war with the ruin of the enemy, not the supposed enrichment of the nation imposing the duties, as its object—which we fear is about to break out in Europe. No doubt it will be said that there is as yet no indica- tion of any action of the kind we contemplate, and we shall be further told that the new treaties are in no way arranged to injure any special Power. Possibly there is no immediate sign of any design to use tariffs as weapons of offence. We contend, however, that the policy that dictated the new treaties is one which is pretty certain to end in attempts to injure certain nations in the very way in which they are injured in actual war. The mother-idea of the new treaties is not freer trade, or the benefit of the consumer. Rather it is an attempt to strike at France and Russia, and to weaken and ruin their financial and commercial position. The Central Powers dread France and Russia, and regard them as little more than enemies with whom there exists a prolonged armistice. But France and Russia will be far less formidable enemies when their treasuries are empty, and their trade and commerce is dwindling or destroyed. The three Powers, that is, rightly or wrongly, look upon Russia and France as natural enemies —countries which it would be madness not to injure whenever and however it may be possible—and accordingly they combine with each other, and with certain other Powers, to boycott them. No doubt the fact that Germany is pledged by the Treaty of Frankfort to accord France the most-favoured-nation treatment, renders it impossible to strike her very hard. Still, the idea of injury was, we believe, present in the minds of the negotiators, and may easily be developed. Perhaps, as we have said above, we shall be told that this is not so, and that the object of the treaty was in truth commercial and not political, and that any political results it may have are only incidental. That is a plausible view, and partly supported by the language used by General von Caprivi in the Reichstag. Unfortunately, however, for those who favour this view, the debates in the Vienna Chamber have rendered it utterly untenable. It was asserted there with the utmost distinctness, and with full official confirmation, that the object of the treaties was political. Referring to the treaties, Count Taaffe spoke of them as "treaties which, as everybody must see, are mainly prompted by political considerations of the highest moment." This leaves little doubt that the treaties were intended to embody the spirit which we have described. They are a form of hostilities without blood- shed which, if Lord Salisbury and the German Chancellor understand what they are talking of, is going to play a great part in the history of the world. Prince Bismarck talked of a war of horse, foot, and artillery, in which the winner would make the loser saigner a blanc. It looks as if the statesmen of the future would try to bleed the enemy white, not by arms, but by tariffs,—to get up a boycott against her rather than assault her openly.
If, as we fear, the world is going to witness an outbreak of war by tariffs, it may be worth while to consider what will be the result of such action. That such wars, if successfully prosecuted, will be accompanied by as much misery, and will be far more sordid than ordinary wars, cannot, we think, be doubted for a moment. A nation under punishment by a war tariff would suffer as Lancashire suffered during the cotton-famine, only much more severely, for if the injury were done, it would be to many trades, not one. That is, the nations—the injuries would, as a rule, be reciprocal—would suffer as in actual war, and yet would not receive that stimulus to the intelligence, and even to a certain portion of the moral nature, which a war sometimes produces. The victorious nation would feel that she had won, not by courage, discipline, and endurance, but by sitting still at home, and slowly poisoning the commerce and industry of her enemy. War of this kind would have the guilt of blood on it just as surely as the "red business" of battle. Nay, it would be worse, for there would be no non-combatants : cripples, old men, women, and children would be as much warred against and as much injured as men. Fortunately, however, the difficulty of making war successfully in the way we are considering would be very great. As a rule, a single Power could hardly do much harm to its enemy. It might, by a carefully arranged tariff, exclude all that enemy's goods, and refuse him its raw materials. The attempt, however, in most cases would not be enough. It might fine the enemy a large sum, but then it would pro- bably fine the attacking Power quite as much. Probably the only chance of success would be to organise an international boycott of the Power against whom the edict, Delencla est Carthago, had gone forth. Suppose the majority of the Powers of Europe were induced to refuse to take French goods, and in this way a definite attempt were made to strangle her commercial life. No doubt the misery caused would be very severe. We very much doubt, how- ever, whether any result worth achieving would be achieved. Napoleon, by the Milan and Berlin decrees, attempted very much the same thing against England. Yet he failed entirely to accomplish his object. Some one or two Powers would be certain to stand outside of such a pohti- cally inspired combination as we have conceived, and these would be enough to ruin it. Fren31 goods would go to the Powers outside the combination, and would be re- shipped thence as "native products." Besides, a contra- band trade would in all probability grow up between the boycotted and the boycotters which it would be impossible to check, and yet which would destroy the virtue of the com- bination. Within the boycotting circle, champagne and claret would soon go up to a pound a bottle, and then no Non-Inter- course Act in the world would prevent them from coming in. It is about as easy to keep air from rushing into a chamber from which it has been exhausted, after the communication with the outer world has been restored, as to keep out goods when a rapid rise in price produces a high state of commercial rarefication. Napoleon never succeeded in preventing, per- haps even did not try to prevent, his Army contractors from buying English boots, when everything English was nomi- nally tabooed from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. But though the system of war by tariff will never succeed in doing what those who may employ it will desire, it is quite possible—and, we fear, probable—that by its means a great deal of misery may be inflicted on mankind. Revenue and Protective tariffs already keep millions of men in material misery who, but for them, might be living in comfort ; and if tariffs for political objects are added, a dreary vista indeed of wrong and suffering for the poor of the world is opened out. The prospect is a gloomy one ; but though we would fain see light, there is no hiding the fact that international animosities do not tend to decrease. The Powers are savage with fear, and ready, like all those who are in dread, to rush into any mad course which they think may injure those they fear.
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