WE have already given some account of that part of
Dr. Ward's= argument which is directed to the proof that a priori assump- tions are imposed by the mind itself on all its dealings with the. exterior and interior world, some of which result in giving shape to mathematical and physical science, and others to logical and moral truths. We must now pass to that part of the book om which Dr. Ward has probably most successfully impressed the stamp of his original mind and character,—the defence of free-will, and the argument derived from the phenomena. of free-will for the existence of God. There is no part of Dr. Ward's work which has been more effective than his argument for human freedom. The phrase which be first, introduced into this controversy,—" anti-impulsive effort," —has certainly scored more for the libertarian view than any amount of argument, however lucid, could have done without it,, and for this very excellent reason, that it sets a distinctive mark on just that unique phenomenon of which the determinists lose sight,—a mark which will not permit them to lose sight of it any longer. It must be admitted that all the phenomena of effort do not necessarily exclude determinism, though the present writer, at least, believes that if there were no such reality as "anti-impulsive effort" at all, the meaning which we attack to painful effort when it is not anti-impulsive,—when it goes, with and not against the resultant of all the attractions- that act upon us,—would be very different. For we can hardly imagine true effort at all without true volition, and volition could not be what it is,—could not addi something definite to the various forces of which our nature disposes,—if it were the mere equivalent of impulse in
a conscious form. We do not believe that the words. "will," "volition," "resolve," would ever have been evolved in any human language, if we had had no power of resisting the- resultant of all our spontaneous attractions and repulsions ; for it is this power of resisting that resultant, which gives clearness. and meaning to that power of co-operating with the resultant of all the attractions acting on us at the moment, on which determinists chiefly fix their gaze. When a man, sud- denly pricked by a pin or stabbed by a sword, leaps up, as a hare leaps when she sees the dogs almost -upon her, there is,. properly speaking, no effort ; there is nothing but muscular recoil, in which the will has no share. If we had no power to resist doing what we should like to do, we should have no- power to assist ourselves in doing what we should like to do the automatic impulse would be the beginning and end of the matter, and effort to do what we wished to do,—that is, the- strenuous exertion of force in aid of our spontaneous impulse,-- would be as non-existent as strenuous exertion of force in re- sistance to our spontaneous impulse. The explanation of effort given by the determinist is that it describes the hanging-back which some weaker impulse inspires against the overwhelming force of some stronger impulse,—the over- coming of some positive disinclination, by some more positive stimulus to action. Thus some people, when they feel pain, have a tendency to groan, who yet, if they felt no pain, would naturally prefer passiveness ; in that case, even if they groan, they overcome some slight disposition to be inert ; and that,. the determinists say, is the initial stage of effort. We should_ deny this, and assert that there is never any effort, properly
• Essays on the Philosophy of Theism. By the late William George Ward,. Ph.D. Reprinted from the Dublin Review. Edited, with an Introduction, by, Wilfrid Ward. 2 vole. London Began Paul, Trench, and Co. speaking, where the resultant of all our various impulses is simply allowed to take its way. We may be fully conscious that we are not gratifying all our wishes, but only the most importunate of them, and that we are disappointing others ; but that does not give the sense of effort. Dr. Ward's illustration of heroic effort in aid of the spontaneous impulse of our nature,— the case, namely, when a courageous officer strains every nerve almost to cracking in battle, to pursue the foe,—is a case of real effort, though not any adequate evidence of free-will. Still, it is the existence of will which makes -such effort possible. And there would be hardly any such idea as will, if there were no free will. If the human will could never resist the resultant of all our spontaneous impulses, it would hardly have been suspected as existing, only to explain our co-operation with them. The man without a will, even if he had the fiercest combative instincts in him, would not be able to put on any additional strain beyond the fighting-power which his automatic combativeness compelled him to display. The man with a will could put on that strain in the opposite direction. The combatant who strains himself beyond his natural strength is the combatant with will, not the com- batant without will. However, Dr. Ward does not discuss this point. He does not dispute with the determinists the true analysis of the case of effort in aid of the spontaneous impulse of the moment, but only the case of effort in resistance to the spontaneous impulse of the moment. And that, no doubt, is the critical point of the whole controversy. He ridicules the notion of the determinists that because a man who makes a great effort to resist the resultant of his own spontaneous im- pulses, must, of course, have some reason, or, as they call it, motive, for so doing, therefore, that reason or motive must have been the force which actually turned the scale against the opposing and conflicting impulses, and that any assumption of a free will to give the casting-vote in the struggle, is gratuitous and false. And he states the case against Mr..Shad.worth Hodgson with so much of characteristic force and humour, that we must extract the following, passage as a specimen of this part of his argument :— " There is a terse and pithy sentence of Mr. Hodgson's which may be taken as summing up his view on this particular part of the subject ; and which, we think, conspicuously exhibits the necessary narrowness of a Determinist's psychological insight. When- ever we resist predominant impulse in order to comply with the dictates of virtue, what we most desire at the very moment of choice,' says Mr. Hodgson, 'is to do our painful duty.' We maintain that, in SO speaking, he mixes into one two fandamentally different classes of moral action ; and that he thereby throws a cloud of confusion and misconception over the whole body of relevant psychical phenomena. On many occasions, we heartily, admit, it is most certain that what men most desire under such circumstances is to do their painful duty ; but on many other occasions, we maintain, the opposite is equally certain. Let wit give an illustrative case under each head. I have a son, for whom I entertain the tenderest affection, and in whose pro- spects, here and hereafter' I feel the keenest interest. He has ex- hibited some very serious fault, and one on which it gives me special • pain to address him ; while, on the other band, I clearly see that his whole future may depend on my administering a severe rebuke. My spontaneous impulse, then, is quite intensely directed to so acting, though I distinctly bear in mind how exquisite will be my own suffer- ing on the occasion. In Mr. Hodgson's words, what I most desire is to do my painful duty. Now take an opposite case. I am a large landed proprietor, and I rejoice in my thereby assured income, as a meats of securely prosecuting my physical, or literary, or philosophical studies. Otherwise I am profoundly uninterested in my estate : I cannot distinguish wheat from barley ; I am quite indifferent to field sports ; I have no value whatever for my social position ; I have no tendency towards personal relation with my agricultural dependants. Information reaches me that my agent has been acting with gross injustice to various of my tenants, and is endeavouring to stifle their complaint. What is my spontaneous impulse ? Probably to invent some salve for my conscience as regards the tenants, and plunge myself afresh in my favourite studies. I have no particular affection for my tenants, any more than I have for any other farmers who may happen to live in my neighbourhood and pursue their (to me utterly unintelligible) avocations. I can easily persuade myself, if I choose, that I may conscientiously ignore the information I have received, and continue, without further inquiry, to repose trust in my agent. On the other hand, if I am really conscientious, I am able by means of due thought to see clearly where my duty lies. Accordingly, I put forth anti-impulsive effort. With sighing and weariness of heart, I bid adieu to my studies for the necessary interval of painful and laborious inquiry. I resolve to exercise herculean labour ; to inter- view the complaining tenants; to apprehend (1) the meaning and (2) the merits of the accusation they bring ; and, finally, to take such practical steps as I may judge necessary. What can be more un- meaning than to say, that during all this time what I most desire is to do my painful duty ? And what judgment shall be formed of a theory which mixes up under one bead two such fundamentally different kinds of moral action as those we have specified ?"
No doubt this last illustration was taken from Dr. Ward's own
experience, ana it was probably in his own mind that that disgust at the necessity of going into agricultural disputes. arose. But however this may be, we believe that no honest. student of his own heart would deny that the two instances cited are excellent specimens as well of the case in which the determinist has a good deal to say for his solution of the matter, as of the case in which the determinist has nothing satisfactory at all to say for his solution of the matter.
It is clear how Dr. Ward's solution of the free-will controversy was used by him in his contribution to the philosophy of Theism 'Here,' he virtually said,' we find man conscious of his responsi- bility to exert his conscious freedom in favour of the right, and conscious that if he does not do so, he will feel shame in the presence of some invisible power, which has imposed this law of righteousness upon him, and which judges him if he disobeys it. Of course, such a power must be conceived as a judge, and, of course, a judge must be a person and a spirit behind the visible order of the universe.' This stems to us unanswerable;. but there is another side of the argument, which Dr. Ward. did not live to press. If man is free, if he can exert a power which is not the resultant of all the mental and physical impulses pressing on him, then the atheistic conception of Nature as a mere evolution of force, is shattered at once. No web and woof of physical force could create a being able to eman- cipate himself from the power of that force. The break in the chain of determinants must augur a Creator who is himself more than a determinant, who is able to give to man a life above Nature,—a supernatural life of his own. This part of the argu- ment Dr. Ward never worked out. But doubtless, had he lived to elaborate his philosophy of Theism, he would have pressed it with all the power with which he has given us his general view of the problem before him.
Mr. Wilfrid Ward has done a very great service to philosophy by republishing these remarkable essays, which are destined, we believe, to take their place among the landmarks of English philosophy and psychology.
Previous page
