THE MILITARY HISTORY OF GENERAL GRANT.*
[FIRST NOTICE.]
TuE great American struggle of the Civil War of 1861-1865 possesses one feature peculiar to itself. A. nation, organised for peace, and not for war, suddenly found itself confronted by all the needs of great campaigns, and called upon to extemporise at short notice the vast machinery which the Military Powers of Europe have built up on long and bitter experience. To raise, officer, equip, arm, feed, and transport a million of men ; to create an ironclad fleet; these were the problems which the Northern States had to solve. In any study of the war, the great initial difficulties with which both combatants had to contend must always be remembered, for they serve fully to explain the apparent lameness of some of the operations.
General Badeau was Grant's military secretary, and he has since had access to all papers preserved in the War Office. He brings, therefore, special qualifications to the work he has undertaken, and his three large volumes form a substantial contribution to military history. For the story of Grant's career is that of a great portion of the war ; and Grant himself, though not the greatest General it produced, is nevertheless one of its most prominent figures. Hiram Ulysses Grant—for the well-known initials "U. S." were given him by mistake—entered the Military School at West Point at the age of seventeen, and received his commission as second lieutenant in 1843. As a cadet, he seems to have won no special distinction, graduating twenty-first only in a class of thirty-nine. He served eleven years in the Army, was pre- sent at every battle but one of the Mexican war, and received two brevets for gallantry. In 1854, having gained the rank of captain, he retired to his farm near St. Louis, and in 1860 he entered the leather trade, with his father and brother, at Galena, Illinois. " Having never been brought in contact with men of eminence, he had no personal knowledge of great affairs, and he had never commanded more than a company of soldiers." Fort Sumter fell on April 13th, 1861, and the President's call for troops was made on the 15th. On the 23rd, Grant wrote to the Adjutant-General, volunteering his services. He received no reply, but five weeks later the State Governor offered bim the colonelcy of the 21st Regiment Illinois Infantry. Later, Fremont, then commanding the Western Department, gave him the district of South-East Missouri. Thus placed in a position of some responsibility, his first act was to seize Paducah, an important post commanding the months of the Tennessee and Ohio. At Belmont, on the Mississippi, opposite Columbus, Grant fought his first action with " the rebels," as General Badeau uniformly terms the Confederates. The attack was successful, but the enemy being reinforced, Grant was obliged to withdraw. Shortly afterwards the Confederates established a strong line, running east and west, from the Big Barren River to the Mississippi at Columbus ; but Halleck, Fremont's successor, always cautious and hesitating, would for some time sanction no operations against them. Not till January 30th, 1862, did Grant receive permission to attack Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, in co-operation with Commodore Foote's gunboats. The fort surrendered to the fleet, and Grant promptly telegraphed to Halleck, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." Donelson, a strong work on the Cumberland, twelve miles east of Fort Henry, had not pre- viously been mentioned between them ; but Halleck sent no reply, and Grant moved off with about 15,000 men, without waiting for reinforcements. On February 15th, the attack began, and was at first repulsed, the raw troops showing signs of demoralisation. Grant rallied them, however, and they pressed the defenders so hard, that in the night Floyd dis- gracefully abandoned his command, and Buckner, on whom it
devolved, surrendered, with nearly 15,000 men. This was Grant's first considerable success, and it must have been a keen satisfaction to him the following morning to receive a cautionary telegram from Halleck's chief of the staff, begging him " not to be too rash." The Federals, so far, bad won few real victories ; their operations in the eastern theatre of war had been a series of almost uninterrupted failures, and Grant found himself famous. Halleck, however, deigned no word of congratulation. Grant now received command of the new dis- trict of West Tennessee, with " limits undefined." From this period his friendship with Sherman began, a friendship which
• Military History of Ulysses S. Grant from April, ISSI, to Apr“, 18&S. By Adam Badean, Brevet Brigadier-General, United States Array. London: Sampson Low and Co.
never afterwards slackened, for in Sherman Grant found a loyal lieutenant, always ready to obey, and free from the taint of jealousy which showed itself far too plainly in many of the newly- made Generals. The capture of Donelson and Henry cut the Confederate line in two, and an attempt to isolate and destroy Johnston's force near Bowling Green might have been made. But the strategy of the Federals at this period is not very intel- ligible. The governing idea seems to have been to seize strategic points, so called, points which, when occupied at a heavy cost of time and men, frequently proved worthless in a military sense. It was not sufficiently recognised that the war could only be ended by capturing or destroying the Confederate armies. After a misunderstanding with Halleck, in which the latter seems to have been completely in the wrong, Grant concentrated his forces near Pittsburg Landing, on the Tennessee, with the object of " securing positions which would command the navigation of the Tennessee, and at the same time form bases for operations in Northern Alabama and Mississippi." Positions, not particularly specified, were thus to be acquired, in order that from them operations, not very clearly defined, might afterwards be undertaken. In the Western Depart- ment, at this time, the Federals seem to have been always " getting ready to begin." Near Pittsburg Landing, on April 6th and 7th, the battle of Shiloh was fought,—a battle for which Grant has been greatly blamed. Greeley states that not only had no provision for defence been made by earthworks and felled timber, but that the ordinary precautions in presence of an enemy were not observed. We do not think that General Badean completely disposes of these allegations. It was known that the enemy was in force at Corinth; skirmishing took place daily from April 2nd ; yet Grant's head-quarters were retained at Savannah, nine miles off, and when the battle actually began the General was preparing to ride off in search of Buell, who was moving up from Columbia with his customary deliberation. It does not appear, either, that any attempt was made to fortify the ground, though there was ample time for the work. The battle was not remarkable for generalship; there was little tactical ability displayed on either side, and a portion of Sher- man's and Prentiss's commands behaved badly. The issue of the first day was doubtful, and Grant, who had been heavily reinforced, wisely determined to take the offensive next day. The odds were now turned, and Beauregard was forced to retreat. Shiloh cost the Federals 9,195 men,—a heavy sacrifice for a small military result. Halleck now arrived, and under his halting leadership the victorious army moved on Corinth, fortifying itself at every step, and taking six weeks to cover less than fifteen miles. Corinth was occupied on the 30th, Beauregard having slipped quietly out, leaving wooden guns to impose on Halleck's imagination. A desultory and ineffective pursuit took place, under Pope and Buell, and in time the army was broken up. A little later, Pope went to Virginia, and Hailed( succeeded McClellan as commander-in-chief. Grant, with a greatly reduced force, remained at Corinth, watching Price and Van Dorn ; while Bragg, who had succeeded Beaure- gard, raided into Kentucky, making for Louisville and the Ohio. By opportune victories at Corinth and Inks, Grant saved Western Tennessee from immediate danger, and in October, having received reinforcements, he suggested to Halleck a move- ment on Vicksburg. Of the long operations round this import- ant place General Badean gives a most interesting account. Engineering on a grand scale was tried, and failed. In vain Porter's ironclads were driven through the dense tree-growth which blocked the eastern affluents of the Mississippi, in the hope of finding a passage for the army. Not till April 4th, 1863, did Grant finally abandon all other plans, and adopt the bold course of approaching Vicks- burg from the south. The army was safely transported across the Mississippi, and rapidly advancing, the Federals defeated the enemy near Raymond, and moved in force on Jackson, the State capital. Johnston, outnumbered, and un- supported by Pemberton, evacuated the town, and Grant was now able to close in on Vicksburg. In the movements round Vicksburg, Grant evinced generalship of a high order, but it is difficult under the circumstances to justify the assault of May 19th, and its wanton repetition on the 21st. In extenuation of the latter, General Badean says, "The only possible chance of breaking through such defences and defenders was in massing the troops, so that the weight of the columns should be irre- sistible." This, he expressly states, the ground did not admit, which, however, " could not be known in advance." But, surely, it was not beyond the powers of reconnaissance to have ascer- tained this fact, and Grant was not compelled to instant action P At any rate, the first failure must have conveyed some idea of the nature of the ground. On July 4th, Vicksburg fell, like Plevna, for want of provisions, and Pemberton, with more than 30,000 men, surrendered to Grant. Port Hudson fell to Banks on the 8th, and the Mississippi, in Lincoln's somewhat grandie- loquent words, now "rolled unvexed to the sea."
There has been, perhaps, a tendency to overrate the military, importance of the capture of Vicksburg, but this success, occur- ring within five days of the Federal victory at Gettysburg, must have greatly raised the morale of the Northern armies. Grant received a generous letter from Lincoln, and was made a major-general of Regulars. Eager for immediate action, he now proposed to move on Mobile, in the south-west corner of Alabama; but Halleck characteristically replied, " I think it will be best to clean up a little." Much valuable time was lost in the cleaning-up process, and, on September 13th, all Grant's available force was ordered to Memphis, and thence to reinforce Rosecrans, threatened by Bragg at Chattanooga. On Sep- tember 19th and 20th, Rosecrans was repulsed on the Chicka- mauga, and, his situation appearing critical, Grant, who was only just recovering from the effects of a severe fall from his horse, was placed in a newly-created command, termed the Mili- tary Division of the Mississippi, including the Departments of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio. On October 19th he started for Chattanooga, where he found the army of the Cum- berland almost invested, dispirited, and suffering from the want of supplies of all kinds. The situation was just one to bring out Grant's best qualities. By a well-planned movement he pressed back Bragg's left, and within five days secured possession of road and river communication with the railway at Bridgeport. Supplies were now assured, and the spirits of the army rose at once. It was only necessary to wait for Sherman, hurrying up from Memphis, before assuming the offensive. Meanwhile, on November 4th, Bragg detached Longetreet against Burnside, who, with the army of the Ohio, was already in difficulties near Knoxville. Sherman's force began to arrive on the 23rd, and on the 24th and 25th the battle of Chattanooga was fought and won. Grant at once ordered Sherman to relieve Burnside, and the former reached Knoxville on December 6th. Longstreet, how- ever, had been repulsed on November 28th, and had retired, in accordance with orders from Jefferson Davis. The designs of the Confederates on Eastern Tennessee were thus checked for a time, and Grant received the thanks of Congress. The battle of Chattanooga was well planned and well fought on the Federal side, but it is difficult to believe that a more effective pursuit of Bragg and Longstreet was not possible. Again, as on so many other occasions, the Confederates slipped quietly away. Their loss was over six thousand men, but the force as a fighting body was only temporarily crippled. Longetreet wintered in Ten- nessee, and for five months "all was quiet" in this portion of the theatre of war. Grant's active mind now recurred to the Mobile project, but the Government would not sanction it, and little was done till on the 3rd February, 1864, Sherman started on the celebrated meridian raid. The war had now reached a. critical stage. In Virginia no progress had been made, and the dauntless Lee maintained himself within eighty miles of Wash- ington. In the West, Johnston, Bragg's successor, "con- fronted the most formidable force that the Government could accumulate," while Longstreet.even "occasionally threatened to assume the offensive in Eastern Tennessee." Halleck had clearly failed, and on the 1st March the President approved a. Bill intended to give the command of all the forces to Grant, and reviving the rank of Lieutenant-General in his favour. On the 9th, Grant received his commission, and entered upon the crowning period of his career.
Previous page
