RUSSIA'S OBJECTIVES
By G. B. THOMAS
DANGEROUS as it is to speculate about the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy, I would nevertheless hazard the guess that the Kremlin has decided upon a change in tactics. The general campaign to make the world safe for Communism remains, of course, unchanged. What seems to have been altered is the tactical plan. Up to a few weeks ago the first objective was undoubtedly to scare Western Europe into passivity ; the objective now seems to be to tempt the Americans to relax into easy-going optimism, or rather to split the American national front by strengthening the hands of the appeasers.
Since that day in the summer of 1947 when M. Molotov declared his hostility to the European Recovery Programme, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda have been working overtime to create the sort of crisis atmosphere that would asphyxiate Western initiative. The Cominform was set up for the specific purpose of pinning down the forces of recovery by engaging them in a struggle to maintain internal order and economic stability in the face of Communist-inspired strikes and general industrial unrest. M. Zorin, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, was sent to Prague at the height of the Czech crisis, not to engineer the Communist coup—that could have been done unobtrusively by the men on the spot—but in order to publicise the relentless ubiquity of Soviet power. Strong-arm methods in Berlin and Vienna threw the limelight upon the spectre of war which Soviet propaganda reminded us was lurking in the wings, propped up by Fascists, imperialists and bankers. Vituperation at Lake Success and calculated rudeness in Korea led even optimists to the conclusion that no amount of negotiation could break the inter- national deadlock.
To some extent these Soviet tactics succeeded in their purpose. The economic and political recovery of Western Europe has un- doubtedly been retarded by the fear of war. Shaken by Soviet sabre-rattling, the French Government had second thoughts about the Six-Power Conference on Germany and decided that they must have certain guarantees against Russian aggression before they could co-operate in the building of a West German political unit. The debate in the French National Assembly on the outcome of the con- ference shows how deep-seated French fears are. Soviet propaganda kept the Danish Government from asking for an invitation to these German talks. It drove Hr. linden, the Swedish Foreign Minister, into a panic-stricken neutrality, and he is now urging his Danish and Norwegian colleagues to join him in his retreat. Most serious of all are the effects of Soviet propaganda upon the Brussels Pact. Its territorial extension is for the moment blocked by the fear of what Russia may do if countries outside the immediate Brussels circle show signs of wanting to. enter it. Soviet propaganda has undoubtedly scored some notable successes in those parts of Europe to which its barrage has been directed.
In the United States Soviet tactics had an altogether different effect. They roused the Americans. As Europe wilted, America became bolder and more purposeful. The Marshall Plan, which on June 5th, 1947, looked more like a pious hope than a bold plan
for recovery, was quickly licked into shape. Talk of-an American guarantee for Western Europe failed to arouse the usual storm of isolationist opposition. Help to Greece and Turkey was stepped up. Soviet propaganda did not generate fear. Nor did it paralyse initiative. On the tontrary, it so stimulated American anger and resentment that the Administration was able to pursue a more active foreign policy than any other peace-time Government in the history of the United States. Against the background of that fact we need see nothing paradoxical in the assertion that M. Molotov is the architect of the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg Resolution. So the Kremlin may well have wondered whether it stood much chance of winning the tactical battle of economic attrition on the lines worked out by the Cominform generals. Perhaps the same result could be achieved by other and subtler means.
It seems to me that the turning-point came when the Russo- Finnish alliance was signed. There is good reason for saying that the Kremlin at first, considered imposing much more onerous terms than those the Finns finally obtained. For reasons that are unknown to us the terms were relatively lenient, and not dishonourable to the Finns. My own guess, as I have already explained, is that the Kremlin decided that European paralysis could best be assured, not by a frontal attack upon European morale, but by a sapping opera- tion against American national unity and the American national will. If these are undermined and weakened, American vigilance will be relaxed, with disastrous consequences for European resistance and recovery. The "diplomatic victory" that the Finns won in Moscow undoubtedly had a soothing effect upon a section of American opinion. After the signature of the alliance there came the Finnish internal crisis which led to the dismissal of M. Leino, the Communist Minister of the Interior. The compromise which put an end to it led to the inclusion of Madame Leino in the Government as Minister without Portfolio. It led also to the confirmation of the provisional appointment of M. Kilpi as Minister of the Interior, in spite of protest strikes, and in spite of a Communist threat to call a general. strike if the appointment was maintained. Now the Czech coup was precipitated on just that issue—on the powers and functions of the Minister of the Interior. How different were the Russian reac- tions to these two analogous incidents.
In other fields also there has been a sudden outburst of Russian reasonableness. Reparations due to the Soviet Union by Finland, Rumania and Hungary have been halved. Finland has been granted a loan of five million dollars at two per cent. interest, with the con- cession that repayment may be made " in a currency other than dollars." Other friendly States have been offered Soviet help. In Greece Markos has hinted at the possibility of a settlement tvith the Athens Government. Inspired rumours from the Balkans suggest that a Greek-Albanian agreement is not beyond the bounds of possi- bility, and that Bulgaria may be willing to restore diplomatic rela- tions with her southern neighbour. The Soviet shop-window (to vary the metaphor) has been rearranged. It is now designed to give the impression that the Western Powers could buy a compromise there on satisfactory terms.
The mistake made when Mr. Bedell-Smith, the American Ambas- sador in Moscow, talked about the open door, on instructions or otherwise, is being exploited to the full. The apparent Russian desire for a conference to settle outstanding differences is being used to throw into relief the unreasonableness of Mr. Marshall. It provides Mr. Wallace with a quiverful of election propaganda. A section of the American public has begun to doubt the rightness of the " policy of containment " which enjoyed such widespread support six months ago. Only the other day Mr. Byrnes told under- graduates at the University of Pennsylvania that he thought it un- fortunate "to refer to the objective of American policy as the con- tainment of Russia. We must not," he added, " let our fear of the charge of appeasement destroy all hope of conciliation." There is I no doubt in my mind that Russian propaganda and diplomacy are now concentrating all their efforts upon immobilising Mr. Marshall and his policy. They will try to show that he is rigid and unreason- able in the face of every Russian attempt to come to terms. In the confusion that is bound to exist between now and the date of the presidential electiOns they well count upon some temporary success.
Previous page
