What Happened at Jutland : the Tactics of the Battle.
By C. C. Gill. (Hodder and Stoughton. 15e. net.)—Commander Gill of the American Navy has written a dispassionate account of the Battle of Jutland, based on the British and. German reports and narratives, and has illustrated it with numerous diagrams. It is unduly brief, and omits some significant details, but it is precise and lucid. Commander Gill notes, but does not criticize, Lord Jellicoe's policy of a " cautious offensive " and Admiral Scheer's policy of an " offensive-defensive." He thinks that Lord Beatty should have waited for Admiral Evan Thomas with his four battleships to come up before attacking Admiral Hipper's battle-cruisers. He does not peas judgment on Lord. Jellicoe's much criticized deployment to port. " Certainly, turning away from the enemy and slowing down cannot be characterized as highly aggressive tactics. But Admiral Jellicoe's plan of battle was not an aggressive offensive." He remarks later that a " cautious offensive " never gives decisive results. At the close Commander Gill rejects the argument that Jutland, though indecisive, gave us all the advantages to be derived from ai decisive victory. " The destruction of the High Sea Fleet at Jutland would have produced a change of far-reaching significance in the war situation " ; Russia might have been relieved, and the
'-boat campaign would have been " greatly hampered if not completely frustrated." To the author the action gave convincing proof of the supreme value of the big battleship with big guns. He quotes in an appendix the views of Rear-Admiral Taylor, Chief Constructor of the American Navy, who points out that the modern armoured ships, except the three British battle- cruisers, endured severe punishment without being disabled, and that the British 15-inch gun was, by general consent, the most powerful and accurate weapon employed in the action.
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