BOMBS ON KOREA
But there is no hard evidence that the Communists have become more reasonable because the United Nations attacks have become more deadly. And although General Collins is right to stress the political intention which partly explains the military offensive there is not the slightest _reason to con- clude that the sole object of the bombing is to bring the negotiators to reason. The need to prevent the vast increase in the Communists' forces in North Korea from developing into the greatest offensive of the war—which it certainly would be if the one million Communist troops began a concerted attack—is in itself a sufficient reason for the stepping-up of the United Nations bombing attacks. Indeed, so serious is the potential threat from the forces which the Communists have built up under cover of the armistice, that it is only remarkable that bombers did not get to work on a large scale at an, earlier date. Probably they would have done, if aircraft had been available. And now they are available. A genuine contribu- tion by the Communists to progress at Panmunjom would make it possible to delay their use. A reduction of the Communist forces might make it possible to refrain from using them at all.
