THE SITUATION IN SPAIN.
THE attitude of. the Spanish Government is that of a man half foolish with fear lest he should be attacked in a dark street. Any one who is visible is a character to be sus- pected, any one who comes near is to be avoided, any one who whistles is a garotter to be seized instantly by the throat. Merely to be a Prince, or a General, or a city magnate, is in Spain to be an object of suspicion or a victim of official terrorism. The expulsion of the Duke and Duchess de Montpensier is an act scarcely to be explained on any ordinary theory of politics. Its motive, by all the received accounts, must have been to get rid of a danger, yet it would seem to outsiders as if the danger had been indefinitely increased by the precaution. No one not a Spaniard or belonging to the limited circle of diplom- atists who have made Spanish affairs a study ever thoroughly understands the forces at work in the Peninsula, or is safe in affirming that any leader, party, or section of a party represents the real sentiments of the people, or can directly influence the course of affairs. The distinction between town and country, citizens and peasantry, is deeper even than in France; the actors in the political drama never adhere to the play as written for them ; the agency employed is military, and acts instead of talking ; and the people are out of rapport with the rest of the European system. We get news from Central Asia more easily and in a more intelligible form than we get it from Spain. The most careful observers are the most constantly deceived, and ordinary newspaper readers, bewildered by the contrast between the results of events in Spain and any other country, doubt very often whether Spain has any politics at all. Still, there are one or two patent facts in the situation which can scarcely be overlooked or perverted. One is that there is discontent enough in Spain to make the throne unsafe, and revolution in its dynastic sense a possibility. Else why the reign of terror, the silencing of the journals, the virtual suppression of the Cortes? Another is that the Spanish Opposition, taught by experience, has resolved that insurrec- tion is useless unless it leads to a change in the occupancy of the throne. And the third is that a Republic, being incon- sistent with the national character, with the temper of the Army, and with the will of the Emperor Napoleon, Queen Isabella can be succeeded only by a new monarch. It is natural enough, therefore, that the Court should regard any possible pretender of the regal caste with suspicion ; but why it should fix on the Queen's sister as the most likely pre- tender, or why, if convinced of that fact, it should think it wise to increase her popularity, her freedom of action, and her means of communicating with the discontented by a sen- tence of exile, is to outsiders almost inexplicable. The natural choice of any General who headed a Spanish revolt would be the Queen's eldest son, the Prince of the Asturias, because as he is a child the General himself would be either nominally or virtually Regent. The questions raised abroad as to this Prince's right of succession are not raised in Spain itself, where the masses know nothing of the gossip of the Palace, there would be no change in the dynasty to affront the national sentiment, and Rome might hope for the education of a child. The choice of statesmen intent only on the good of the country, on the other hand, would be the head of the House of Braganza, who brings with him as his dowry the unity of the Peninsula, its best rivers, harbours, and alliances. The choice of the Legitimists and the Ultramontanes would, again, be the heir of Don Carlos, just readmitted to Spanish citizenship by the Queen. The very last person likely to be selected by any great party would be the Infanta, who belongs to the family detested by Republicans, yet who would in set- ting aside her sister's children be as much the head of a new dynasty as Louis Philippe ever was ; and who, as a member by marriage of the House of Orleans, would induce the Emperor of the French to exercise his veto. Already the Parisian papers have been told to affirm that the Duke de Mont- pensier is an ally of Prussia, a hint which, whether false or true, is especially exasperating to French soldiers, who see clearly enough that in a war between France and Prussia a strong Sovereign of Spain, having the magnificent Spanish infantry at his disposal, might be master of the situation. He could divert 150,000 French soldiers from the Rhine, and hold them imprisoned in the garrisons below the Pyrenees, 700 miles from the real scene of action. The power of the- Emperor as against an unanimous election might be slight, but as against election by a party it would be irresistible. Everything would seem to be against the chance of any strong party selecting the Duchess as the Pretender, yet it is upon her that the Court has fixed the eyes of Spain by an exile which, if she is ambitious, doubles her resources for in- trigue. In Seville she could be watched, in Seville her letters could be seized, in Seville she is within reach of the most unscrupulous Premier in Europe ; but in Lisbon she is free, the nearest person after the reigning family to the- throne, the one Spanish Bourbon who can be declared the choice of the Revolutionists without risk to herself. It is difficult to believe that an act of such folly can have been committed from its avowed motives, hard to avoid a suspicion that the Infanta has been banished not as the enemy of Queen Isabella, but as the only friend near enough to tell her the truth about the effects of the reign of terror which Gonzales Bravo and the priests alike wish to maintain. The expulsion of the Generals is a different matter. They- are powerless unless in contact with the soldiery, but the- expulsion of the Duchess can only increase her liberty of action, and create that impression of weakness which is so- dangerous in Spain.
It is useless, of course, to analyze the rumours which have- followed this event, or even to discuss the probability of• another and more successful insurrection. The one datum, without which all calculation about Spanish politics is vain is wanting alike to journalists and politicians. What are the- soldiers saying in the guard-rooms ? Nobody in London knows unless it be General Prim, and the opinions of an exile are always to be received with some distrust. If the soldiers, on the whole, are content, or prefer obedience to mutiny, the towns will be held down, and while they are securely held down no insurrection is possible in Spain. The peasantry, even if they felt the existing re'ginie as a grievance, which is doubtful, and cared to defy the clergy, which is more doubtful still, are in no position to resist a highly organized army, or to do more than trouble the Court with occasional outbreaks scarcely more important in a political sense than our own Northern riots. If, on the other hand, they are discontented or disposed to mutiny, the Queen's throne has no base, and any day may see a pronunciamento under which it will fall. The question is of the last importance to all Europe, for, as we have so frequently said, Spain with a settled and decently intelligent Government in accord with its people might at any moment become a great power, with influence in every quarter of the world, and with a direct weight in all Mediterranean affairs scarcely inferior to that of France. A country with seventeen millions of brave people, resources practically without limit, and the geogra- phical situation of Spain is, while paralyzed by its institu- tions, a direct and most serious loss to the general stock of reserved power in Europe. Her paralysis has lasted long, but it will, we believe, end the day the people and their Govern- ment come into harmony again, and every dmeute in the Peninsula is, therefore, of European importance. The mis- fortune is that as every eineute must originally be military, Europe can never estimate beforehand its object, its chances,_ or its probable result.
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