Battle of the Tanks
Our Armoured Forces. By Lieut.-General Sir, G. Le Q. Mane!. (Faber and Faber. 21s.)
IT seems probable that the battle of the tanks, about which we only heard rumours during the war, will now be fought in public. For this reason alone General Manel's book would be of great interest, for he has been connected with armoured warfare for many years and was Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps during a critical period of the war. During this period the technique of tank war- fare was worked out. It was developed on the analogy of the history of warfare in general, for "armies have always consisted of JANUARY x8, 1946
two types. The faster troops to pin the enemy and attack him where he is weak ; and the slower-moving, harder-hitting troops for defence or to attack him in strength." On this point- alone it seems likely there will be considerable discussion, for General Martel suggests that Montgomery did not like the infantry tank ; and, as he did not ask for this type to be developed, it is held that, for in- stance, the Battle of Mareth was more Costly than it might have been. There is much, however, to be said for Montgomery's attitude. As he did not look forward to any prolonged defensive battles, he was naturally more concerned with the cruiser tank ; and, of course, there is a general tendency to concentrate on the production of a single type. Indeed, in the Battle of the Ardennes, General Martel points out that the heavy German tanks, although they were responsible to some extent for the break through, were at the same time unsuited to exploit their own success. This is not to say that, as far as I can see, there can be any case against the two types of tank. But General Martel even suggests that Field-Marshal Brooke, in the early part of 1944, thought that "the power of the tank was on the wane and that the anti-tank gun had the measure of the tank." Clearly, then, the question of the role of the tank is very far from settled, in spite of the fact that in all the spectacular victories of the Allies in the West the tank was the chief agent.
The subject of this book, therefore, makes it extremely interest- ing, and the fact that it comes from an authoritative source makes it important. But it has a further interest and importance from the method which General Martel adopts. Under his guidance a technique of armoured warfare was evolved, and almost all the chief figures who worked under Field-Marshals Alexander and Mont- gomery were schooled in it. The main part of the book consists of a study of the various movements of the war in. the main theatres in the light of this technique. These accounts of the various battles, although slight, cannot fail to be extremely interesting ; for they show, also, the evolution of the armoured division. The further question of tank design is also discussed freely and franldy, and it is suggested that the failure to develop the best types of tank was due to doing away with the command which General Martel himself had used to such effect.
One section of the book deals with General Martel's visit to Russia as head of the Military Mission ; and here there is some very frank discussion of the ways and means of dealing with Russians. He found it most effective to be " tough " • and he maintains that through his attitude the Russians were prevailed upon to change their battle plans at a most critical turn of the war—at the time of the battle of the Kursk salient. In this section there is much against which parti pris will revolt. For instance, he states that warfare on the Russian front was of a " second-class " nature. The Russians lacked the equipment, and particularly the transport, to train their armies on the same level as ourselves ; and the Germans had diluted their army so that by May, 1943, they had "only 6o per cent. of their establishment and weapons."
It may be gathered from what has been said that General Marters book will be found provocative. It is, at the same time, in my opinion, both the most interesting and most important book on military affairs which the war has produced ; and it is likely to pro- vide the basis of much discussion.
STRATEGICUS.
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