THE ALLIES AND FOES OF BRITAIN.
THE "jack-boot policy" of the German Emperor, as the Kladcleradatsch approvingly calls it, is forcing Englishmen to consider the question of alliances very earnestly, and there is none more difficult within the whole field of politics. It is not only hard to find an ally whom we can trust, and who will accept our alliance, but we have to overcome the reluctance of our own people, who distrust prophetic politics, hate " entanglements," A and like doing things by syndicate rather than through partnerships,—that is, through arrangements intended to last only until a definite end is accomplished. We do not really care much for any nation unless it is suffering, and are wholly indisposed to marry any nation,—a state of mind which produces in all who court us a feeling that the English are either treacherous or fickle. There is neither fickleness nor treachery among us, only a morbid pride and reserve, but we succeed very often in creating the false impression. Still, whatever the difficulties, the cir• cumstances of the hour point to an alliance, or at least to a new friendship; and it is worth while to think for a moment with whom it ought to be contracted. A month ago half England, perhaps the larger half, would have replied that Germany must be the friend ; but William II. has for this generation contrived to render that answer impossible. No Englishman will trust him again while he lives, or believe that he entertains any feeling towards this country, except the one expressed in Blucher's celebrated saying about London :—" Lord, what a place to plunder !" The new enmity which his Majesty, in his overweening self-confidence and military i;t9prs, has been pleased to create, forbids our turning to Germany, and from Austria there is as little to hope as to fear. She will remain friendly, as she has always been, and England will welcome her advance to Salonica, and the addition of Macedonia to the long list of federated Kingdoms under the House of Hapsburg; but Austria cannot abandon Germany, and except in the Balkans, has no immediate power of aiding British policy. With Italy we have always alliance, and we are glad to believe that the Italian prayer for right to pass through Zeila is about to be granted ; but Italy, though much stronger for one campaign than most people believe, is scarcely to be reckoned as yet among the first-class Powers. She can hardly keep independent both of Germany and France, and outside the Mediterranean could yield us no valid assistance at all. The- English like Italy, and would regard any violent wrong inflicted on her with deep resentment; but when the question is of serious battle, they ask for a stronger friend. That friend must, in fact, be either America, Russia, or France, and we may examine for a moment the feelings and arguments which impel us towards a rapprochement, a friendship, or in certain contingencies even an alliance, with either of the three.
The English would prefer a permanent alliance with the United States to any other that could be suggested, and many of the wisest among them believe that such an alliance is among the certainties of the future. The two countries have no conflicting interests ; they are not divided either by race, religion, or political ideals ; and they have a profound reliance on each others' strength, endurance, and fidelity. The time, however, is not ripe. The two nations have few common interests, they are divided by traditional antipathies which produce distrust, and one of them dislikes and repudiates the idea of being involved in European complications. Neither the anti- pathies nor the isolation of the Union will last, America growing fast out of her seclusion ; but for the present she could offer us nothing except neutrality, and with that we must perforce remain contented. That is enough to secure our hearty goodwill; but for a working alliance available for the next few years, we shall be compelled to turn else- where,—that is, in practice, either to Russia or France, or it may even chance to both.
Many interests draw Great Britain towards Russia, one being the fact that each has so very much to give. On the one hand, the chance of Russia obtaining her favourite objects, the acquisition of Constantinople and the utilise- tion of her amazing Empire in Northern Asia, would be doubled or tripled by the mere withdrawal of British opposition. It is nothing to us who holds Constantinople if it is held by a friend, and if Russia can turn Siberia into a Canada, so much the better for us and for the world. We do not believe there is an Englishman alive who, but for his suspicion of ulterior designs, would object to Russia, owning Port Arthur and Manchuria, or exercising a pre- dominant influence over Northern China and Japan. We seek nothing up there except trade, and dread nothing except the rise of an unfriendly Power, who might practically deprive us of our markets, or even compel us to abandon the North Pacific. On the other hand, Russia can set us at our ease in India, can help us to make our- selves secure in South China and the Archipelago, and can in the Near East arrange with us for that transforma- tion of the Turkish Empire which, whether we like it or not, will be the great external work of the first quarter of the next century. Once on a footing of cordial agreement with Russia, we could relieve Europe from the presence of the Turk, who is now acting as an enemy of the human race, and could secure from Constantinople to Canton not only the peace, but the good government of the whole of Asia, including not only the Armenians but the Persians and the Arabs. Not a shot could be fired in the most populous quarter of the world without our joint permis• sion, and we see no reason whatever why we should not, throughout that vast section of the globe, bid violent oppression cease. That is a magnificent prospect ; but of course the difficulties are many. One, which we believe to be wholly unreal, is the jealousy of ages as to that hope of possessing Constantinople, which Russia is unable to give up. Another, which is partly unreal, is the dread of treachery which exists on both sides, but which we believe could be soothed away if both Governments were willing ; and the third, which is very real, is the British fear lest we should be drawn by any alliance into assisting Russia in an invasion of Western Europe. We cannot do that, whatever happens ; but it is not necessary to make an agreement cover so vast and indefinite a field. It is not in Europe, but in Asia, that Russia and Great Britain need to understand each other and act together.
And, lastly, there is France. There is no need, we sup- pose, to prove to any reasonable politician that—Germany having with a kind of brutal frankness refused our friend- ship, and stated her intention of injuring us if she can upon a vital point, the possession of South Africa—the friendship of France is the most valuable we could possibly obtain. She is the only Power which could even threaten to invade us ; she is the only one whose fleet could attempt to dispute with us the sovereignty of the seas ; and she is the only Power who meets us everywhere,—in Africa, in the Mediterranean, and in Asia. A cordial agree- ment with France would double the effective power of Great Britain ; and we do not believe that, in spite of Egypt, such an agreement is impossible. Great Britain, as we pointed out years before the German Emperor so unexpectedly betrayed his enmity, has much to offer France. In the first place, by standing aloof, should France ever make an effort to regain her provinces, we release the whole French fleet, which in the war of 1870 accomplished simply nothing. In the second place, Italy could with a word from the new allies be detached from the Triple Alliance. In the third place, we have only to withdraw opposition, and in Morocco and on the Congo France could build up at her doors, and without incurring hostility from her own conscripts, a magnificent Colonial Empire, larger than India, and though less populous, over a vast extent of territory equally fertile. There is not a states- man in France who would not declare those prizes worth having, and far more than compensation for our new position in Eastern and Southern Africa, even though our dominion in the former should ultimately stretch in one unbroken line from Alexandria to the Cape. The senti- ment of France clings to Egypt because Napoleon fought there, and she has dreamed of an Empire in Indo-China, chiefly out of rivalry with Britain, but her true interest is an Empire on the Western Mediterranean with a " Hinter- land" stretching nearly to the Equator. There are infinite potentialities of wealth in Morocco, which is no more entitled to independence than Matabeleland, and in all that region French conscripts, who hate Tonquin and dread Madagas- car, do not object to serve. France need not claim Tangier, for she has entrance by land into Morocco, and alone among the Powers she need have no dread about the entrance to the Mediterranean. She is there already, seated in strength at Toulon, Marseilles, Algiers, and Bizerte. We do not believe an arrangement with France is impossible ; and if Germans murmur that it is contrary to their interests, we reply that their Emperor has brought it on himself. In a time of profound peace, without the smallest provocation, he has declared his resolution to resist British pre- dominance in South Africa, and he must accept the con- sequences of his own rashness. Even William IL, to whom we allow full credit for versatility and a varied range of accomplishment, cannot be at once the enemy and the friend of the mighty Power which he has so cause- lessly and suddenly aroused to a sense that the one Power with whom she has never in all history exchanged a shot, has proclaimed itself a foe.
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