TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW HOME-RULE BILL.
MUCH the most remarkable portion cf Mr. Gladstone's speech on Monday, the most remarkable feature of Mr. Bryce's speech on Tuesday, indeed, the most remark- able characteristic of the new Home-rule Bill itself, is the impression of difficulty and elaboration,—of wheelwork within wheelwork,—which the ablest apologies for the Bill, as well as the analyses made of the Bill itself, produce on the mind of the attentive politician. Mr. Gladstone was never so convincing as when he was explaining the overwhelming objections to his own measure. Mr. Bryce was never so clear as when he was arguing from the point of view of the federal theory of the new Constitution,—a theory which the Bill does not adopt, though if it were ever to become law, it would necessarily do a great deal to promote full-blown Federalism. He even assumed (for example) that England would have no moral right to interfere in the question of the disestablishment of the Church in Wales, that being an issue on which the majority of Welsh representatives ought to be supreme, though nothing, of course, in the Irish • Bill touches that question. The whole effect of the Bill itself is that of an ingenious attempt to reconcile absolute in- consistencies, to strike between wind and water, to sail, as Cardinal Newman put it," between the Scylla and Charybdis of ' yes ' and 'no.'" This seems to us so very remarkable a feature of the great Gladstonian measure, and of the Gladstonian arguments in support of it, that we will ask our readers to consider a few leading illustrations of this aspect of the case.
In the first place, Mr. Gladstone was eager to deny that he in any sense approves or proposes a repeal of the Union. What, he asked, is the essence of the Act of Union ? "The Act of Union made the Kingdoms into one, and the Sovereignties into one, and the incorporation of the Par- liaments was a measure subsidiary to the Union, subsidiary and instrumental ; that incorporation is the question which we raise, and which we wish partially under the conditions of the present Bill,—but not entirely,—to alter." Accordingly, Mr. Gladstone went on to explain that, while he does not wish to untie the knot, he does wish to loosen it, to untie, in fact, what Unionists hold to be the most valid andbinding part of the knot. The nominal unity he desires to retain. The effective unity he desires most gravely to relax. In place of the one legislative and administrative power, there are to be two legislative and two administrative powers, one both subordinate and active, the other supreme but the next thing to inert. The former is to do as it will, subject to the revision or veto of the other,—a revision or veto, how- ever, which is earnestly deprecated, and which everything that can be done, will be done to avert. There will not be two Sovereignties, but there will be two popular minds and wills not at all likely to agree, one which must speak out, and the other which may speak out, one which will preoccupy ground,—often and necessarily with a trumpet-note of defiance,—the other which may be compelled to evict the former, but, if it is so compelled, will excite the same rancour and resistance to which simpler kinds of eviction have proved themselves to be liable. Mr. Gladstone, in short, proposes so far to loosen the knot between Ireland and Great Britain, that under the new condition of things the lesser power shall be .stimulated to assert itself against the greater power ; while the greater power is, as far as possible, to be reined in and paralysed. The new departure is to lead to a continual crossing of purposes and policies which we are told to hope will never come to a real fight. Instead of the present finality, we are to have a succession of doubts and hesitations, in which the rivalry between the subor- dinate and supreme Parliaments and Administrations, will be galvanised into high activity. So much for the first step. The supreme power is to be flattered by the con- stant assertion of its abstract supremacy into hardly ever, or never, putting its supremacy in force. Next comes the very complicated arrangement with regard to finance, which, according to the Irish Members, is a worse arrangement for Ireland than that of 1886, and, according to the hints which are dropped by Members of the Cabinet, is more generous to Ireland than that of 1886; but whether better or worse, it is certainly intended to give Ireland a bonus of half-a-million a year, and to leave the Irish contribution to the supreme Government, in the shape of a Customs revenue in the hands of the British authorities, to be by them collected and retained. All we know of this arrangement is, that though two first-rate. statesmen, one of them the greatest financier of his age, have tried to explain it to the House of Commons, nobody as yet understands it, since it appears to make it absolutely essential for us to keep the Customs duties as high as they are now if we wish to get as large a contribution from Ireland as we get now ; but we are assured by Mr. Bryce that that is not so, and that by some complicated arrange- ment, of which he could not even convey to the House the shadow of a conception, it would be possible for the House, even if Customs duties were reduced, "to deal equitably with the claims of Ireland, and' with the adjustment of taxation between the two countries." Mr. Balfour held, very naturally, that if the English Radicals carried a Budget "securing us a free breakfast-table," this step would make Ireland a free gift of her share in the common expenditure of the two ; but Mr. Bryce denies this, and says there will be a difficulty certainly, but that the Government (like General Trochu) have a "plan" for surmounting.that difficulty. No doubt they have ; but it is at all events a plan which must surrender the special advantage claimed by Mr. Glad- stone for an arrangement in virtue of which we take the Irish Customs as our share of the common expenses. And. though any alteration of Customs duties can only be carried with the assent of the Irish Members, we do net suppose that the Irish Members will make any great difficulty about a sacrifice of revenue out of which they will "suck no small advantage." Mr. Bryce admits that "Budgets will occa- sionally present problems of more complexity than they have presented hitherto." No doubt they will. The character of the whole scheme is a character of excessive. complexity. And it is clear that on the only point on which Mr. Gladstone hoped that he had effected a simple arrangement, all the simplicity is to vanish the moment the Free-traders persuade us to reduce Customs duties. We must leave the spirit, tea, and. tobacco duties exactly as high as they are, under pain of reopening an arrange- ment by which the Irish Members will have fresh means put into their hands of driving with us a new and profitable bargain.
But in addition to the complexities of the negotiations between the supreme Parliament and the subordinate Parliament in relation to the revision and control of the new Irish authorities, and the complexities of a financial arrangement so difficult that the greatest financier of the age cannot make it clear how much Ireland gains by the arrangement, while the Irish Members themselves complain that they lose by it, and Mr. Bryce admits that every- thing will be reopened if we relax our Customs duties, there comes the mighty complexity of all,—the new Irish political tide,—which is to ebb and flow in the division lobbies according to laws which it surpasses "the wit of man" to fathom. By far the most striking part of Mr. Gladstone's speech was devoted to showing that that tidal law which will bring an ebb and flow of eighty Members. into the divisions of the House, is almost unworkable. As. Mr. Balfour very justly said, nothing can be more pre- posterous than to bring in a Government by the aid of the Irish vote, which, after it has been brought in, is to be abandoned by the ally which brought it in and left to be defeated by the majority which that alliance cancelled and turned into a minority. The result must be that the Administration which cuts out the work of Parliament and determines the Government policy to be brought forward, will not be an Administration which can carry the policy that it approves. The Irish contingent is in- voked, for instance, to determine on a recall of our troops from Egypt, and a Government pledged to recall them is installed in power. But that Government, when installed, is required to deal with the question of religious teaching in English schools. It probably favours the voluntary and denominational schools, as an Administration supported by Irish votes would be likely to do. But the Irish con- tingent is no longer there to support it. And it finds itself defeated by Mr. Acland and his friends on the Edu- cation question. Yet if the question of want of confidence is raised, the Irish vote will flow back again and replace the defeated Administration in power ; but for the pur- pose of carrying out the policy of secular and unsectarian education, it will be as impotent as ever. Mr. Bryce apparently admits this puzzle, but calmly suggests that such a question as that of the character of the religious education in English schools ought not to be decided by the votes of Irish Members, but only by the votes of English Members. But how is that to be, if the Govern- ment which is chosen with the help of the Irish Members dislikes and declines to adopt the policy favoured by the English majority when taken alone ? What Mr. Bryce hints at is full-blown Federalism. It is, indeed, obvious to us that the Cabinet contains a certain number of full-blown federalists who would like to see an English Parliament, a Welsh Parliament, a Scotch Parliament, an Irish Parlia- ment, and a Supreme Parliament, and what these involve, —au English Ministry, a Welsh Ministry, a Scotch Ministry, an Irish Ministry, and a federal Ministry,—and that men like Mr. Bryce (and probably Mr. Asquith and Sir G. Trevelyan) support the present tentative measure by arguments which really involve a future evolution into full-blown Federalism. If that be the view of the Administration, let the people know it plainly, and we do not think there is much doubt how they will treat it. But as yet it is not the view of the Administration. On the contrary, a very petty instalment of this policy is pro- posed, which some of the Ministers hope to develop, and others of them hope to minimise and keep in strict sub- ordination to the old constitutional traditions. We have little doubt that Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Morley are both of them amongst the latter. And it is evident that the most active Ministerial journals are deeply interested in suppressing the development of this federal element of the Bill, though they can only manage it by perpetrating a great injustice and giving the Irish Members a double weight in our Constitution. The difficulty is so great and urgent that it cannot be wholly suppressed. On the one side there is the evident danger of offending England by bringing in Irish Members to vote on local English questions, while English Members may not vote on local Irish questions. That difficulty the Government dare not face, and propose instead to introduce that periodic ebb and flow of Irish Members, which leads to such absurd results. Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Morley would probably give anything in the world to get rid of the Irish Members altogether, as in 1886. But the Radicals are furious at such a proposal, and advocate rather the retention of the Irish Members for all subjects whether purely British or Imperial. The plan of the Bill, therefore, has become a feeble compromise between the two views, which never can work. It is neither full-blown Federalism,—which would frighten everybody,—nor full-blown Irish supremacy, which England, meek as she is, might resent,—but, as Mr. Balfour called it, "a bastard combination" of federal government, Colonial government, and the existing British Constitution, which is neither flesh, nor fowl, nor good red-herring. The Home-rule Bill has a little of each, and very little of the advantages of any. It has not the logic of the federal system, nor the simplicity of the Colonial system, nor the strength and concentration of the Farlia- meutarY system. It is a confused medley of inconsisten- cies, and like all medleys of inconsistencies, is sure to set its supporters at loggerheads with each other.
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