'THE ARMIES OF EU ROPE: HI. FRANCE
By CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART
apart from the Russian. That idea is reinforced if trained reserves of men and stored reserves of war material be reckoned. And the impression has thus been spread that the French Army was, at any rate until recently, a serious potential threat to Germany. But the numbers had small offensive meaning under modern conditions ; a large proportion were abroad ; and most of the war material was old. Although 22 tank battalions are maintained in France most of them are still equipped with machines of the last war, slightly renovated. They are slow machines, employed to help the infantry forward, yet with a very limited obstacle-crossing capacity for that purpose. The Army comprises 20 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, and 5 colonial infantry divisions which serve as a "mobile force" ready for despatch to deal with trouble overseas.
The total " strength " of the French Army is some 640,000, but of these nearly 200,000 are serving in North Africa and other colonies. Conscript service is still nominally for one year, but contingents are now being held for an extra year.- This is due to the threat a the German military expansion combined with the shrinkage of the annual contingent of young men reaching military age (caused by the fall of the birth-rate during the last war). The shrinkage, . together with _ the need for adequately trained personnel in the mechanised arms, has also led the French to enlist an increased proportion of long-service professional soldiers, who form a corps of specialists. A maximum of 117,000 has been legally sanctioned, but only some 80,000 have been obtained hitherto, as the terms have not been sufficiently attractive.
Until recently the horizon of the . French Army was bounded by 1918. If war came again, it apparently intended to resume where it had left off. In French military doctrine and training all else was subordinated to the production of a great volume of fire by methods that were as studiously deliberate as the rate of movement they promised. The best thing that could be said of the doctrine was that it recognised the importance of material factors, especially the effect of fire, and recanted the fallacious belief of 1914 that the unshielded will of the soldier was proof against .bullets and shells. . But it seemed to ignore the truth that fire is a means to move- ment; and that the effect is lost unless it can be. followed up quickly.
But in the. last year or two there has been a rapid evolution—towards a. more flexible and- mobile type of force and action. One cavalry division has already been completely mechanised, mainly, with armoured fighting vehicles, but has a proportion of "motor- dragoons" in light cars and on motor-.cycles. A second cavalry division is to be mechanised this autumn. In addition some ten infantry divisions have been motorised ; their artillery is all tractor-drawn, their, infantry regi-. ments are provided with little armoured carriers for mortars, machine-guns and. anummition, and can themselves be mov.ed by lorry convoy.. . The creation of these new-type formations, so different from the rest of the active forces and from the bulk army of mobilisation, is naturally leading the French towards a new picture of warfare. General mobilisation is a process that works slowly in putting an army into the field; so slowly indeed, that if mobilisation and concentration were made as in 1914, the army would court the risk of never reaching the field. Air pressure on the congested traffic arteries might cause a premature collapse. Even at the best, an interval of a week or two must elapse before these forces can come into action.
But the new-type formations, helped by their special composition as well as by their rail-free 'mobility, may be ready within a time that we commonly count -in hours. To keep them in waiting while the bulk army was assembling would be a precarious, discount of the time. factor, even if the enemy's action allowed . the attempt.
Thus, in the new picture, the first phase . of a war is fought. out by the mobile forces together with the frontier garrisons. The second phase, of conflict between the mass forces, is provided -for as a possibility—although some regard it as a doubtful one. • • National conditions, however, give-the new direction of military evolution a turn different from what is visualised in other countries. French thought revolves more than ever around the particular problem of safeguarding France against invasion—a problem essentially defensive. Thus the new-type :formations seem -to be- .visualised, above all, as a means of strengthening defeneer,by switching fire more quickly to a threatened spot. and by developing a .. counter-offensive more promptly. To many there may be novelty in this " defensive " view of the value of mechanised forces. But it is justified on technical grounds. Despite the obvious . increase. of offensive power conferred by .mechanised forces, the reinforcement of the defensive may well prove greater indirectly. On a long- view, it might even_ be said that this has been the trend of the growing mechanisation of war through the . centuries. The preponderance of the defensive also finds expression in the frontier .fortifications_ to which so much of their money and attention have been devoted in recent years. That newly fortified line, for the most part running just inside the frontier, has been widely, discussed. It consists of a chain of forts and casemates-7the pro- portions varying not, only according to the ground but to the money available. The " forts 7 themselves consist of a mushroom-like cluster of concrete casemates linked by underground galleries ; these lead to the living quarters, magazines, and power stations which serve each cluster, and are likewise .buried. deep. The defence of the approaches -thro:ugh Belgium and Belgian Luxembourg as well as of the German frontier has been taken in hand, Work being carried 'out along the line of the frontier towards Maubeu. ge and- Lille. .
Such a fortified line, although better 'designed, naturally lacks the depth of protection afforded by the' vast. trench _systems which developed in' the- War. Stronger in meeting. the first. shock, it is intended to gain time rather than to be. a_ final barrier. It is, above ell, a shock-absorber, to cover the process Of mobilisation. Its effectiveness thus depends on • the adequacy and readiness of the forces which normally garrison it, and on the promptness with which. support can be given. The main danger lies in a surprise attack which might overwhelm a sector before the emergency was realised ; a further danger now on the horizon is a penetration of the intervals by mechanised forces, which might disregard the forts or leave them to be "mopped up" by a second wave of invaders. It is for this reason that the French are so concerned with the new risks of the attaque brusquee.
Meanwhile the problem of immediate concern is to adapt their own organisation to the current of changing conditions. One need is to remodel the • mobilisation scheme so as to produce an effective force in support of the frontier garrisons in the shortest possible time— a time that we must now count in hours rather than in days. That mobilisation scheme must also take account of the new 'risks threatened by hostile air attack during the main process of mobilisation and concen- tration. Concentration must not spell congestion. The other need is to develop mechanisation as a means of saving time in arrival and intervention. The fortified region itself is garrisoned by units of varying com- position which are "hand-made " to suit the sector allotted to them ; they can be brought up to strength at short notice with reservists drawn from the neigh- bouring district. But for the prompt support of the region, and for manoeuvre based on • this pivot, mobile formations are necessary. The need is now being met.
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