TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RIGHT AND WRONG.
THE exposition by the British Government of their view of French policy in the Ruhr has at last, and to great purpose, brought the whole issue into the light of day. The issue is represented—though this phrase is not used it is implied—as one between right hind wrong. The British argument is merciless in logic ; it is uncompromising, even scathing. Here and there language is used which emphasizes rather than diplomatically disguises the scornful dismay of the British Government at beholding the present spectacle of the Ruhr—the spectacle of a creditor nominally attempting to extort payment from a debtor by reducing him to ruin. If it be said that irony and sardonic touches are improper in diplomatic Notes, we would say that it is only within recent years that it has been the fashion so to regard them. Such things were not absent from the Notes or public despatches of Castlereagh, Canning, Wellesley, Wellington, Lord John Russell, and certainly not from the Notes of Palmetston. It was high time that an appeal should be made to the opinion of the world, and, for our part, we regret nothing that has been published in the White Book.
What we do regret is that this exposition should have been so long delayed—that the world was under the impression that the British attitude towards the occupation and the coercion of the Ruhr was one of benevolent neutrality. In the first place, Mr. Boner Law was to blame, though we know perfectly well that it was only his language and not his real feeling which was at fault. It is necessary for foreigners to understand Englishmen through and 'through before they can interpret all their nuances. What Mr. Boner Law was taken to mean was that, though he did not think that the French would succeed in the Ruhr, they would have his blessing if they did. Really, Mr. Bonar Law was merely doing what many an Englishman does when he splits with a friend on some point of policy or principle and exclaims with a dry grimace, " Well, good luck to you." Such a phrase, when all the circumstances and the tone of the speaker are taken into account, may be quite well understood to mean something of this sort : " I think you are making a fool of yourself, but, after all, it's your fault, not mine." There are hundreds of shades of meaning in English calmness and in the English faculty for saying less than one means. The form of understatement which the schoolboy, under " the good old fortifying curriculum," has been taught to recognize as " meiosis " or " litotes " is a national habit. But, for all that, we deeply regret that Mr. Boner Law did not weigh his words more carefully on such a vital occasion.
After that original misunderstanding there was a long period of diplomatic exchanges in which the world did not understand that the British Government were objecting to French action, not only because it seemed inept but because they regarded it as illegal. Although the world has now learned the truth with a shock of sur prise—a shock which was really unnecessary—it cannot be said that the statesmen of France had any reason to misapprehend the situation. We read in the Manchester Guardian, which is always careful to inform itself accurately on such points, that in May and July last year the Government explained to France that they con sidered a • separate French occupation of the Ruhr as unjustifiable. In January of this year they toldthe French Ambassador in London that they were still of the same opinion. On June 11th the French Ambassador reported to his Government that the British Government " continues to think our action illegal." On June 15th the French Ambassador, pursuing the same subject, wrote to M. Poincare : " Your Excellency knows that the British Government still refuses to admit our thesis as to the legality of our action." Indeed, we do not see how the French point of view can be defended by a plain reading of the Treaty of Versailles. France asserts that she has acted under Section 18 of the Treaty. But that section is obviously subject to Section 13, which states that the Allies must act unanimously in all matters which have to do with " the interpretation of the provisions of this part of the Treaty." France did not ask for unanimous action. If she had done so a refusal would have been certain.
However, we have at last made our statement and appeal to the world, and we hold most strongly that Mr. Baldwin is committed by it to a good deal more. To denounce the policy of a friendly nation as the British Government have denounced that of France and then to do nothing more would be self-stultification and humiliation. Mr. Baldwin is bound to go on to the next step in the natural sequence. In a matter of right and wrong he cannot consent to the wrong, particularly as this country has a certain responsi bility for that wrong having been committed. We are convinced that Mr. Baldwin feels this as strongly as any man could. The only question is whether when he takes his next step it will not be too late.
We appeal to the Government to remember that time is of the essence of this problem. The European situation may become so much out of hand that all international schemes will have only the value of idle talk.
Meanwhile, Mr. Baldwin has given by far the greatest proof in his career that he is in the true line of British statesmanship, which has always stood for toleration.
Defeated enemies have always been helped by Great Britain to get on their feet again ; British policy has never been one of keeping sores open or of driving men, or allowing them to be driven, to desperation. Milton understood to perfection the spirit which has instinctively guided the destinies of our nation when he wrote : " Yet if all cannot be of one mind—as who looks they should be ?—this doubtless is more wholesome, more prudent, and more Christian, that many be tolerated rather than all compelled."
There is no more searching piece of analysis in the last Note signed by Lord Curzon than that in which the British Government deals with M. Poincare's state ment that he does not wish to annex any German territory. " Nothing tangible was suggested which would hold out any hope of the occupation being brought to an end, even when the avowed object of breaking Germany's will to resist has been attained." Lord Curzon goes on to point out that as complete evacuation is apparently not contemplated until the total German reparation liability is discharged—the unreduced liability upon which the French Government still insist—the French, on their own showing, intend to remain in occupation of the Ruhr for at least thirty-six years !
Thirty-six years is the minimum period over which the discharge of the debt is spread under the Schedule of Payment. That seems to be a fact from which there is no escaping, and we agree with Lord Curzon's comment that such a prospect can only be described as " disastrous."
Without delay the Government ought to set to work to obtain what has stood in the forefront of their policy . —an impartial international inquiry into the capacity of Germany to pay. France, who should be treated, of course, with the utmost consideration, should be invited to take part in that inquiry. We hope also that the Government will act upon the proposal which appears in one of the Notes just published and invite America to be represented. If France should refuse to take part in the inquiry it would, of course, be held without her assistance. When this body of experts had reported, France should again be invited to withdraw from the Ruhr on the understanding that the full amount as recommended by the experts should be exacted from Germany, and that Great Britain would remit the debts due to her to the generous extent proposed by Great Britain in the White Book.
These are only the principal points, but other things that are necessary will be obvious to all readers of the White Book. What should be aimed at is to translate the British reasoning in the White Book into hard, practical fact without a moment's unnecessary delay. What would happen then ? Unless Germany were very foolish she would at once express her readiness to adhere to our policy. Virtually the whole world would be with us. Italy would almost certainly agree. Belgium would probably agree, if only because she would want to have her debts cancelled. France, of course, might hold out, and we do not forget the probability that she would do so. But France could not afford to remain permanently isolated with opinion everywhere against her. In such a case there would be a gradual change of opinion in France, and it might even be sudden. Frenchmen would begin to ask what they stood to gain by refusing, and they would remember only too vividly what they were as a matter of fact losing through M. Poincare's policy.
The British policy, if put into deeds, means material gains for France—not dazzling, it is true, but substantial —and it also means peace; whereas M. Poincare's policy means growing expense stretching away into the vista of the years and strife and only too probably the collapse of Europe. Mr. Baldwin has only to speak the word to range the nation behind him. Before such a problem Englishmen have not shrunk back aghast in former days, and they will not do so now. But, after all, we feel fairly confident that we are only contemplating what Mr. Baldwin has already made up his mind to do.
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