BOOKS.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.* THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.*

IN this work we have a fresh illustration of the transcendental character of the speculative tendencies of the age, in some of the more thoughtful if less disciplined intellects that are in- terested in the solution of the great problem of existence. Such intellects represent the reaction against the limitations of the scientific philosophy, now generally received. The human mind is impatient of boundaries. In its ambitious aspirations it will overleap itself ; it will seek to know the hidden realities to ascer- tain causes, and discover essences. It is not satisfied with a science of phenomena ; it insists on constructing a science of noumena ; it rejects the doctrine of sequences, as insufficient; and demands a revelation of the invisible tie which connects the cause with the effect. Is this metaphysical tendency an incurable malady, the inbred sin of the human intellect ; or is it, in coming ages, destined to disappear, before the therapeutic influences of a severe mental discipline ; or finally, is it the noblest characteristic of our nature, announcing future conquests in unknown realms of knowledge ? These are questions which we shall leave un- answered here. In cases like the present, our business is rather to record the intellectual methods and conceptions of the age, than to adjudicate on them.

Into Mr. Boase's work on the Philosophy of' Nature, specula- tion enters largely. He does not, however, consider that his book is metaphysical in the ordinary bad sense of the word." In his view, it is not mystical or visionary. "In it the physical sciences are referred to the fundamental principles of realities ; and not only so, but even the abstract sciences which are commonly as- cribed to the a priori ideas of intellectual intuition, are based on the direct interpretation of these rational forms of nature." Philosophy, our author defines to be " the science of the sciences, the minimum genus of systematic knowledge ; a synthesis of the diversity into unity ; the universal from which by analysis all particulars maybe developed and demonstrated." While highly valuing the philosophical speculation of the Germans, he condemns it as one-sided. Its fundamental principle, moreover, is, he says, not a logical universal that relates to all parts of its system. German idealism, therefore does not supply that explanation of the universe, that unity of knowledge which 3.1r. loase requires. Two other attempts at generalization also fail to satisfy him. The first of these is "Positivism." The object of Positivism is to frame a hierarchy of the sciences, and to determine the invariable laws to which all natural phenomena are subjected. Its ultimate perfection would be to represent all phenomena as the particular aspects of a single general fact ; a perfection which our narrow intellectual resources and the complex nature •of the universe compel us to regard as unattainable. Positivism therefore, is dismissed as a failure. The second great generalization of our own time is based on the alleged identity of physical forces. In the Correlation of the Physical Forces, Grove says : "The position which I seek to establish is, that the various affections of matter which constitute the main objects of experimental physics (viz. : heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, and motion) are all correlative, or have reciprocal dependence ; " so that, though neither taken abstractedly can be said to be the essential cause of the others either may produce or be convertible into any of the others." This position Mr. Boase controverts, declaring that the doctrine is "not only contrary to facts, but is inconsistent with that action and reaction which pervades nature, and is the basis of all physical phenomena."

Having stated his objections to the principles of former philo- sophies, Mr. Bosse proceeds to set forth the fundamental principle of a universal system, as conceived by himself. Let the reader make what he can of the following statement-

" Power is Being : this is an identical proposition, the simplest form of enunciating knowledge. Either term, taken alone, does not constitute a thought ; the term being is that which is, or exists; but what is the that ?

It must be a something, a reality; and, when we say that it in a power, the mind rests satisfied, though both ideas are the purest abstractions. But im- mediately the suggestion arises, what is a power ? and its definition answers, that it is a reason-directed force, a force which acts according to its innate ra- tional law."

"Men," says Goethe, "are wont to believe when they hear only

words that there must be something in it." For as Mr. Boase's first principle sounds very like "the witches one-times-one, but there may be something in it ! " To return. Of this one or ab- solute power a conception, according to our author, is attainable ; but its relation to subordinate natural powers can only be ascer- tained through some supernatural channel. These natural powers are dualisms, and out of them a general system can be constructed. System implies subordination of orders. Regarded only on the quantitative side of its two-fold constitution (we closely follow our author), Nature cannot possibly be associated with absolute power, as the universal ; "but viewed on the other side as a hier- archy of powers or beings, systematic knowledge, as ontology, might be admissible." Thus oosmical beings rise above one an- other in dignity till they culminate in man. "The natural uni- versal is distinguished from the sammum genus of ontology by its conditioned or finite character ; and from the collateral branch of the conditioned, the angelic host, in having material instead

of spiritual bodies. Or in other words, the natural and super- natural are distinct branches of conditioned beings subordinate to, but not forming part of, the absolute or supreme Being."

• The Philosophy of Nature. A Systematic Treatise of the Causes and Laws of Natural Phenomena. By Henry 8. Boase, Sic. Published by Longman and Co.

According to Mr. Boase, all natural bodies, from a star to a molecule, are dualisms of powers, the constituents of each dualism being regarded either as antagonistic forces (whence natural phi- losophy or physics), or as ideal forms(whenee mental philosophy, or metaphysics). These modes of investigation are pronounced equally onesided. Truths, it is said, as the forms or reason in nature exist previously to their interpretation by the mind. Space, for instance, is said to be something real and independent of bodies; it is " the form of nature divested of its real contents." As an interpretation of nature, knowledge, however, is itself of a dualistic character. This character is expressed by the logical idea of correlation, which is a dualism of correlatives. To make this plain, consider family as a correlation, parents and children as its correlatives; or take material substance as a correlation, and weight and volume as its correlatives; or take matter itself as a correlation, and attraction and repulsion as its correla- tives.

"But what is matter ? It is usually regarded as an unknown substratum ; the basis or support of the properties of bodies," or "as an actual reality, having extension and impenetrability." Rejecting both these views, Mr. Boase inclines to believe that natural forces are not only the causes of phenomena, but that they are in truth, the very phenomena themselves ; that is, that all natural bodies are compositions of forces. For if you abstract from them all their secondary properties, only. weight and volume remain as their primary properties ; and weight depends on at- traction and volume on repulsion ; or matter is the correlation of these two "antagonistic and reason-directed powers."

Such being the constitution of matter, Mr. Boase not un- naturally asks, where is such matter to be found—where can we detect that unbarrelable commodity, that invisible srlyboots, as Emerson might call it, which our author de- scribes as pure uncombined matter, a dualism of the phy- sical powers in all its simplicity ? Unless he greatly errs, there is sue& a substance. It is the interstellar and interstitial ether, commonly known as the ether of space, the acknowledged medium by which the radiations of light and heat are accomplished." As in every dualism one power, simple or compound, forms its basis or body, and another its species or type; so in this dualism at- traction is the quantitative or basic power, and repulsion the qualitative or typical power.

This doctrine of dualism is illustrated and applied in several chapters, which show considerable reading and ingenuity. Gravity and centrifugy are the correlatives of the celestial bodies: or perhaps, more accurately, they are the dual phase of physical powers regarded as central forces, as cohesion and heat are of the same powers (attraction and repulsion) regarded as molecular forces. So a vibratory force, called apipallism, and elasticity are the dualism which represents the correlation of sound ; and ac- tinism and thermacy that which represents the correlation of light. We cannot follow our author in his further application of this dualistic principle, or report his speculations on mind, the formal sciences or the logical interpretation of the reason in na- ture. We return to the fundamental idea of POWER.

Power, according to our philosopher is a reason-directed force. It is the synthesis of the real and ideal, an indissoluble union, which is manifested as an essential entity, or individual being. Powers, are in his jud„oment real causes, not the mere antece- dents of phenomena. He thus declares himself at issue with Mr. Mill on the question of causation. We doubt, however, whether he has thoroughly understood Mr. Mill's exposition of cause and effect as given in that "System of Logic," which he condescend- ingly admits to be "a talented production !" At all events, he will find the "specious objection '—that if invariable sequence can explain the relation of cause and effect, then is day the cause of night and night the cause of day—completely disposed of, in the first volume of that remarkable work ! Mr. Boase ought to know that its author has distinctly declared that not invariability alone but unconditional invariability is the mark of that ante- cedent which we term the cause. The succession of day and night is conditional on the occurrence of other antecedents. "We do not believe that night will be followed by day under all ima- ginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, provided the sun rises above the horizon."

It is impossible, however, that Mr. Boase could accept Mr. Mill's view of causation, for its acceptance implies the entire sub- version of his own system' which is based on the metaphysical

idea of natural powers as delegated efficiencies in relation to ab- solute power. In Mr. Boase's theory of causation, two causes are

concerned in every effect," an active or positive cause, and a passive or latent cause; and this latent cause, is he conceives, the nexus in causation, which has been so long sought for in vain, and so

defiantly demanded by the advocates of Hume's hypothesis. The conclusion at which our author arrives that all beings are powers, 'whether simple or compound, and that every power has the attri-

butes of force and reason is, he acknowledges, in direct antagonism

to Humboldt, Comte, and other men of admitted ability. He re- fuses to allow with them that the personification of forces was excusable only in that period of mental darkness which science

has dispelled. He cannot conceive of law except as "an ap- pointed rule for the regulation of an actual bar,b or power in its

Operations;" and he maintains that "if there be such powers, which as causes are known by their effects, then must such be in a sense, personifications : that is, individual existences." It is but fair to add Mr. Boase's assurance that his work is not a hasty and thoughtless production, but the result of many years diligent study. As such it deserves, perhaps, a more care- ful examination than we have been able to give it. We welcome it, at any rate, as a courageous attempt to solve the imperial pro- blem of existence, as we not long since welcomed a work of kin- dred import, the product of an earnest and accomplished mind.t

t See Spectator, June 2, 1860, Thoughts in Aid of Faith.