THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD. T HE responsibilities which the
United States assumed in becoming a colonising nation and a potentially great naval Power after the Spanish-American War were epitomised in the most recent demand of Mr. Roosevelt for a larger shipbuilding programme. In a special Message he has just asked for four new battleships, as recommended by the Navy Department, instead of two, as recommended by the Naval Committee. It has been whispered that Mr. Roosevelt, who is, so to speak, a diplomatist trying to extract the best possible bargain for his cause, made a much higher demand than he knew would be granted in order that he might at least make sure of the two battleships. For it is not even yet certain that the two battleships recommended by the Committee will be voted. American:: are in an economical frame of mind ; they want breathing-time after the financial crisis ; and some members of the Naval Com- mittee have freely said that one battleship would be enough. If Mr. Roosevelt's special Message was therefore chiefly a method of argument, he will not have been deeply discouraged by the decision of the House of Representatives, which on Wednesday rejected the proposal by 190 votes to 79. The announcement of the result was received with loud cheers. We cannot pretend to know whether at the moment the House of Representatives was wise or not in its decision. But it may be observed that it expressed itself more emphatically than had beeu expected, for it is not an unknown practice for it to pass measures it does not like under the certainty that they will be refused by the Senate. This time it voted unequivocally. We cannot help feeling a certain sympathy with the men who let peep out the traditional American mistrust of expensive arma- Ments as a kind of menace to Republican liberty, and it is obvious now that the building up of American naval power will be challenged again and. again as it proceeds. But that it will proceed we cannot doubt, and our own opinion is that the moment the United States abandoned her policy of aloofness from the affairs of other nations a serious naval programme became quite inevitable. And if the Spanish-American War had not proved it so ten years ago, the rise of Japanese power in the Pacific would subsequently have forced the United States in any case to give up a policy of professed unconcern. All that Great Britain hopes is that between the professional zeal of the American Navy Department and the intelligible reluctance of many Congressmen the safe middle way may be found along which the United States may travel in confidence, strong enough to be a firm and just steward in the affairs of the world, but not wielding a new and deadly instru- ment to provoke others. That such is the one and only wish of Mr. Roosevelt, whatever Americans may think of his particular proposals, we have the inestimable satis- faction of knowing.
It might be supposed that a country unwilling to buy itself a new and much larger cudgel would be quick to accept those peaceful expedients by which disputes with other nations may be settled without blows. Vet the United States is notoriously backward in accepting arbitration. How can we account for this paradox ? The explanation is not, we believe, an inherent dislike among Americans for an international judiciary in its proper place, but a very real Constitutional question which stands in the way, and which it would be well for every Englishman to understand before he condemns American recusancy, or hopes ideal things of arbitration. Let us consider the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, of which the text was recently published, but which has not yet been ratified in America. The two Powers agree to refer to the Hague legal differences in the interpretation of Treaties. But it is stipulated that the Agreement shall not be applicable to existing pecuniary claims, and shall not cover differences which affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of either of the Powers, or concern the affairs of third parties. More- over, it is agreed that every case of arbitration shall be preceded by "a special agreement defining clearly the matter in dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbi- trators, and the periods to be fixed for the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the several stages of the pro- cedure." Again, no such special Agreement shall be binding until it has been confirmed by an exchange of Notes. The proposed area of arbitration, it will be seen, is very narrow, and yet we are persuaded that it is only in such ways that we can at present hope for arbitration with the United States. The Constitutional difficulty has always been, and may long remain, the great impediment. In Britain the Cabinet has the power to commit the country ; a Treaty signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs is a binding Act. But no Treaty is binding on the United States unless it has received the consent of the Senate. "President plus Senate" is the rule, and it remains so even under the proposed Treaty. Now it is clear that if the Senate ever accepted a Treaty which permanently removed a considerable part of inter- national affairs from its cognisance, or, at any rate, from its control, it would be signing away half its strength. The American Samson does not lightly agree to lose his hair. It is a domestic, not an international, reason which directs his thoughts. The only kind of Treaty, therefore, which has a chance of escaping through the hands of the jealous Senate is a studiously guarded measure.
The Treaty we have roughly described seems guarded enough for anybody, and we dare say that it will be ratified very soon. Similar Agreements have lately been concluded by the United States with other Powers. If we look back on the history of arbitration, we shall see that the failure of proposed Treaties with the United States has always been due to asking the Senate to give away its precious Treaty-making powers. The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty in 1897 and the Hay-Durand Treaty in 1904-5 both made that mistake. We hope better things of the Treaty negotiated by Mr. Root and Mr. Bryce precisely because it is more cautious. It essentially recognises the Constitu- tional position for which the Senate has always contended. One point in the wording of the Treaty is worth noticing for another reason. It is laid down that the British Government reserves the right, "in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, to obtain the concurrence therein of the Govern- ment of that dominion." Does not this provision create a precedent ? There have been many cases, no doubt, in which the Imperial Government has refused to bind the self-governing Colonies, and has consulted them fully before signing any document, but it has none the less acted overtly as the one and only authority in foreign affairs. The new Treaty suggests the setting up in certain cases of what would be in effect a dual authority in the negotiations,—the Home Government, and some self-governing Colony immediately concerned. Of course, there is nothing in the Treaty to compel the Imperial Government to share its powers, but it is curious that the matter should have been mentioned at all unless some such public co-operation in the drafting of a Treaty was foreseen.
The General Arbitration Treaty is not the only Anglo- American Agreement which depends upon the goodwill of the Senate. It has been said lately (particularly by the Morning Post) that there is a movement in the United States to restrict the terms of reference to the Hague of the Newfoundland fisheries dispute. The reason for restriction appears to be the improbability of the Senate accepting arbitration on the points demanded by New- foundland. We can only hope that this movement may mean nothing or end in nothing. We understood that it was to all intents and purposes settled that there should be arbitration on the 1818 Treaty. That Treaty is obscure in meaning, and is a perfectly fit subject for arbitration. It was in that conviction that Englishmen agreed readily to a modus vivendi for one more year in Newfoundland waters. We did not care to look too closely into the alleged grievances of Newfoundland, because we under- stood that, however pressing they might be, they were temporary, and that all would be arranged satisfactorily before the next fishing season. Now the terms of reference to the Hague have yet to be ratified by the Senate in the form of a Treaty, and it is said that the Senate will probably end its Session in May. There is obviously not much time to lose. Englishmen, we are sure, will not mistake the acute Constitutional jealousy of the Senate for mere unreasonableness about the Newfoundland fishery dispute. We believe that Americans are on the whole as much disposed as we are to welcome the judgment of the Hague Tribunal. But if the arbitration were delayed, the fishery question would undoubtedly be a very inconvenient dispute for the two countries to have to enter upon once more. To under- stand the motives of the Senate is to forgive much, but we earnestly hope that nothing will prevent it from doing what we understood would be done during this Session. Any anxiety there may be so far in the matter is one more proof of the strangely powerful position of the Senate in all the transactions of the United States with the rest of the world.
Previous page
