TOPICS OF THE DAY THE BAGHDAD ENTANGLEMENT.
.117. E are still not definitely committed to a German V V entanglement in regard to the Baghdad Railway. At least, that is the general impression among well- informed people as we write. The sands are, however, running out, and unless public opinion can be aroused there is only too much reason to believe that we shall very shortly be told that all further protests are unavailing, and that we have finally adopted the dangerous course of _lending political sanction and encouragement to a scheme which is likely to prove -full of risk to British investors, and cannot but have most serious and perplexing consequences on our international position. While, then, there is yet time, we would urge all those who read these words to think well and think wisely on the whole matter. If they are convinced that it would not be prudent for us as a nation to walk hand-in-hand with Germany in the matter of the Baghdad Railway—or rather, we should say, to follow Germany blindfold along a path which she knows and from which she can escape at any moment, but which for us is full of pitfalls—we would implore them to exercise all the influence of which they are capable both on members of the Cabinet and on Members of Parliament. They must, that is, do all in their power to prevent our being committed to another German entanglement, and one fraught with far more permanent and serious embarrass- ments than that from which we have just escaped in the Caribbean Sea.
We would beg our readers to believe that in our attempt to prevent the nation being entangled in the Baghdad B..ailway scheme we are not acting from any foolish prejudice in regard to Germany, or from any desire to retaliate for her unfriendliness during the Boer War. We have never suggested that any good could come from cherishing a national hatred of Germany because of the verbal excesses of German speakers and writers. Except as indications of German policy and symptoms of German aspirations, such things should, in our opinion, be ignored and forgotten. In any case, the present situation is far too serious, far too much fraught with great conse- quences, for recriminations over German hard words. The question of whether we ought or ought not to accede to the German proposals must be settled entirely on its own merits, and without any desire either to do Germany an ill turn on the one hand, or on the other, to show her that we bear her no malice and are anxious to forgive and forget. The one matter for us to consider is whether the Baghdad Railway will not prove a dangerous entanglement to us, and though apparently a simple commercial invest- ment, may not at some future time involve us in animosities and responsibilities, and so in dangers and difficulties, whioh we might otherwise have avoided. We stand at the edge of the Mesopotamian morass. Germany, already half in, tells us that it is not nearly as soft or as deep as it looks, that the ground will soon be firm enough, and further encourages us by telling us that France will soon join us, and will tramp through the mire at our side. Shall we take the fatal step, and plunge in, to flounder certainly, perhaps to fall ; or shall we refuse, and tell Germany that though it may be worth her while to quarrel with Russia over the Baghdad Railway, it decidedly is not worth ours, and that we have something better to do with our money and our political influence than to throw them ather bidding into the marshes of the Euphratei or the sands of the desert ?
We do not, however, wish to make a mere appeal of dis- trust in regard to Germany. Let us try to look the facts in the face. We are asked to do certain very definite things as a nation, and things, in one particular, practically without precedent. What are these things ? Among them are things seen, and also things unseen, which latter are, however, none the less real, and none the less capable of the most momentous consequences. Let us deal first with the things that are seen, and so obvious to all. In order to facili- tate the 'making of the BaghdadRailway, we are asked; to begin with, to allow the Turks to increase their Custom dues,— the object being to enable the money for the railway to be raised more easily. But since British goods are the chief payers of Customs, this means that the railway. will be partly built out of a new tax imposed on British commerce, [It is true that the Turkish consumer will also pay, but since his purchasing power will be dimihished the British trader must suffer.] Next, we are asked to let Koweit; a port under our protection—a place, that is, definitely declared . by us not to be Turkish territory—be the •, terminus of the railway. Thirdly, we as a G-overnment are asked to . assent to a scheme under which nearly a-- third of the directors are to be British, and, so to give an air, of official sanction to the undertaking... Fourthly, we are to agree to send the Indian mails by . the.railway, and so to pay it the mail subsidy liow, paid to the P. and 0. These are the things seen. The things un- seen are equally important. The railway, though nominally' not intended to ,hurt Russia, is, in fact, strongly opposed- by Russia, and those who participate in its making must' incur the dread and enmity of Russia. Next, the partner- ship with Germany, though not now insisted on, may at a. time of difficulty become very real through the necessity fOr joint action. Thirdly, the responsibilities connected, with the construction of the line cannot but be serious. Suppose when the line is half made it is raided from Arabia, and the Sultan is genuinely unable to protect it and to keep the necessary order along the route. In those circumstances our official encouragement of the line will practically force us to prevent our shareholders' property being destroyed ; and we may find ourselves saddled with a Euphrates Expedition ten times more troublesome than the Somaliland Expedition, because it will be watched from Russia with jealous and unfriendly eyes. A fourth matter which is unseen is the fact that though the Company is nominally international, it will in reality be a German line. Of the directors eight are to be German, eight French, and eight British ; but besides these are to be three Anatolian Railway directors. But the Anatolian Railway is a purely German company. Therefore the German directors will number eleven, not eight, in any case ; and if the two Swiss and one Austrian on the Board are chosen under German influences, which is more than probable, the German's will *have fourteen directors to the British eight. A fifth matter which is unseen is the fact that, even apart from this question of directorships, the line will be a distinctly German line. As a proof of this we may quote the words used by Mr. Waugh, the British Vice- Consul at Constantinople, who states, after enumerating the facts : "The entire management of the line is thus secured in German hands, and is independent of the nationality of the capital which may be raised to build the line." He thinks, moreover, that this independence will be used for the benefit of German goods con- veyed over the line ; but on this point we do not desire to insist, as, after all, it is hypothesis, not fact. The sixth unseen fact in regard to the scheme is that the French are not officially bound to the line in any way. The French Government could at any moment repudiate all connection with the scheme, if, indeed, it his ever had any real official connection, which appears very doubtful. For all we know, the French capitalists are merely inter- national capitalists with offices in Paris—a very different matter—and when they have served the useful purpose which the tame elephant serves in catching wild elephants —i.e., that of producing an atmosphere of trust, security, and companionship „.,they may fade away into thin air. Another fact at present unseen, but we fear only too likely to become visible in a few years' time, is that, mentioned by Mr. T. H. Cooke, secretary of the Ottoman Railway. , He expresses the opinion "that the projected railway. would not pay in a hundred years. The new. company .would not get enough out of it to pay for the carriage 'grease they would. use.- Was highly desirable, in order to safeguard our interests, that Britain should have a say in its construction and management. The country through which the railway will pima is quite barren and undeveloped. Even although the mails to India were sent by the new route, the revenue derived from their transport would not be sufficient to Maintain the line, and it was out of the question to suppose, that manufacturers would send merchandise by that route, or that passengers would travel over the line even if it were a shorter route to -India than by steamer." • We leave. this expression of opinion without comment ; but we should like, while on the question of the paying or not paying of the. his, to address one word of preetle,i. advice to British investors. It is this. Granted that the line is to be made, those who desire to put their money into the Euphrates Valley will be wise not to put it into the railway, but to wait till an appeal to the public is made on behalf of the irrigation schemes which will follow upon the construction of the railway. It often happens in America that though a railway opening up new country does not pay, great fortunes are made out of the land on each side of it. So in this case, though the rail- way will not pay its shareholders, we have no doubt that it will pay the great capitalists who are now turning their eyes on Mesopotamia, and these will make vast sums out of the irrigated lands on each side of the railway. The railway, that is, if it is made, will render it possible to revive the wonderful system of irrigation perfected thousands of years ago by the Chaldaeans. Granted a railway, those who get concessions of land and water in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates will reap a rich harvest. If they can get them without injuring British investors or involving this country in political embarrass- ments, we shall, of course, rejoice at their success ; but mean- time it is wise to remember that the only money likely to come out of the scheme will come out of the water, not out of the rails. Therefore the prudent investor will in any case hold his hand and wait for the irrigation and land companies.
We desire before we leave the subject of the Baghdad Railway to recapitulate the chief facts which we have stated, and to ask our readers to draw from them their own answer to the question,—" Would it be wise for us to agree to the German proposals and to join them in making the Baghdad Railway ? "
(1) The line, even if made, thanks to the money of the pritish investor and to British official help, will be for all com- mercial purposes a German line.
(2) The line is opposed by Russia, and its construction will be regarded by her as an unfriendly action.
(3) Whatever political odium is incurred by the making of the line will fall on us rather than on Germany, because Russia dreads us more than she does Germany, because the terminus of the railway will be in our hands, and because we have in effect forbidden Russia to arrange with Persia to do what we shall have helped Germany to arrange with Turkey,—i.e., for a railway to the Persian Gulf.
(4) The French participation in the scheme has no real official sanction, and will in no way make the French share any of our responsibilities.
(5) We shall have to agree to an increase of Turkish taxation on British goods in order to find money for the line.
(6) We shall incur the grave responsibility of encouraging our investors to put their money into a speculation which is very nnlikely to pay, but which they will imagine is sound because of the assent obtained from our Government after official negotiations.
(7) The railway, if made, may very likely have to be protected by our direct and most costly intervention owing to the weakness of Turkey.
(8) The Germans, under the present scheme, will at any moment be able to make over their whole interest in the railway to Russia.
We do not think that these facts are unfairly stated. We would ask Englishmen of all opinions to consider them, and then, as we have said, to ask whether it would be worth while to agree to the German proposals, or whether we should not instead say, as was in effect suggested by the Westminster Gazette in a most clear and statesmanlike article on Wednesday,—` We will neither oppose nor en- courage the railway. Let it be built if any one is willing to build it. At present we cannot promise that we will allow it to be extended to Koweit ; but when some six or seven years jience it has reached Baghdad, we shall be perfectly willing to consider the matter of the terminus with an open mind.'
We ought as a Government to stand absolutely neutral, and to refuse to discuss the matter officially with the German Government or with German financiers. As we said last week, however, if the Government are determined to go further into the matter, they should at least test the bonaficles of the statements—(1) that Russiadoes not object to the railway ; (2) that France is officially pledged ; and (3) that our influence over the line shall never be de- creased. Let our Government ask Russia whether she is pleased with the project ; let them ask of the French an assurance that the scheme has their official approval, and further, let them propose to France mutual pledge that neither Power will abandon its interest in, and responsibility for, the line ; and finally, let them ask Germany to pledge herself never to part with her interests except to Britain. No one can say that these suggestions are unreasonable or foolish, or inconsistent with the plea that our proposed connection with the railway can bring us no possible harm or embarrassment. Yet we venture to think that Russia will not tell us that she has no objection to the line ; that France will not assure us that she has given her official sanction, and will also not give the pledge we sug- gest; and finally, that Germany will not give us any right of pre-emption over her interests. But if we are right, then assuredly any official connection with the Baghdad Railway should be avoided by us. Will our Government employ the tests we suggest, and abide by the result ?
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