British Foreign Policy
IT is proper and necessary at this crisis in the affairs of Europe and the world to ask what the foreign policy of this country is, and how and by what means it is intended to give expression to it. Never was there a moment in recent years when it was more imperative that Great Britain should know its mind and at the right moment speak it fearlessly. There has been no speech, fearless or otherwise, as yet on the two questions that threaten the harmony of international relations most, disarmament and the Manchurian problem. There are several not unreasonable explanations of that. Parliament has been in recess ; the Disarmament Conference stands adjourned ; attention has been con- centrated first on Lausanne (where the success of British leadership calls for full recognition) and then on Ottawa; and in regard to Manchuria action is suspended till the Lytton Report has been received and studied. All that is true, but the necessity of knowing clearly—and showing clearly—where this country stands remains no less urgent. The internal situation in Germany must develop as it will. Nothing we can do or say will have much effect on that, except in so far as any resistance to the demand for equality of status in armaments will tend to make German nationalism more intractable still. But Germany's external relations do beyond question depend largely on the decisions this country and France may take. And those decisions must be taken quickly. The bureau of the Disarmament Conference is sum- moned for next Wednesday, and Germany will not be represented unless her demands for equality have been satisfied. That would not be the end of everything so far as disarmament is concerned, but it might well be the beginning of the end, for Germany in this matter is supported to the full by Italy, as Signor Mussolini's striking article in the Sunday Times and other papers has shown, and in so far as that demand makes for equality by general reduction rather than equality by the rearmament of Germany she will be supported by the vast majority of the countries at the Conference, including the United States and Russia.
Will she receive the support, no less resolute, of the British Government ? At this moment, it may be argued, a declaration would be inopportune, for direct conversations between Germany and France are still in progress. They are in progress, but they are leading nowhere. M. Herriot's reply to the German aide vthnoire is conciliatory, but unconvincing. Psycho- logically it is doubtful wisdom to assume that what . Germany really aims at is rearmament. Her aide memoire declared explicitly that she would accept any . measure of disarmament for which other nations were . prepared, and the Chancellor, Herr von Papen, in his broadcast speech on Monday, said again in language no less plain that " Germany would accept the most sweeping measures of disarmament if they applied equally to all States." It is no answer to say that this is a matter for the Disarmament Conference itself. That Conference dragged its first instalment through five weary months and at the end of it, so far as any decisions were foreshadowed, they were decisions that perpetuated the inequality of armaments, not removed it. It is no answer to say that under the Treaty of Versailles the decision regarding Germany's demand rests with the Council of the League. It rests in effect, as everyone knows, with France and Britain. Let Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot announce that they recognized the justice of the German demand and would go any reasonable distance to meet it, and a new atmosphere of harmony and co-operation would be created in Europe. But neither the British nor the French Prime Minister has said that. France has taken her stand courteously, but resolutely, on technicalities, and the British Government has said nothing at all.
This is not written in criticism of Mr. MacDonald or Sir John Simon. We do not profess to know what action may have been taken, or representations made, in private. But the time is at In nd, if it is not fully come, when a public statement, i nezjuivocally phrased, of the policy of this country is called for. Ultimately Germany's demand involves detailed discussion, and no mere generalities will satisfy her. But between the two there is a middle course. It has been repeatedly urged in these columns that the British Government should declare its acceptance in principle—subject, that is, to reservations only on points of detail—of the Hoover plan presented to the Disarmament Conference in July. That would involve withdrawal of the British proposals submitted as an alternative to the American President's, and it would assure Germany forthwith that general disarmament towards her level was the accepted policy of Great Britain, as it is of Italy and the United States and Russia, and as, with such a lead from this country, it might well be of France.
But that is not the only reason for the acceptance of the Hoover proposals. On a larger stage than the European, British foreign policy at this juncture should be shaped by one unswerving purpose, the maintenance of active, cordial and continuing co-operation with the United States of America. The Prime Minister, at least, with his memories of the Rapidan and the London Naval Conference, has no need to be reminded of that. But that co-operation has not been quite unclouded. It is a curious fact that on the two great issues affecting the League of Nations to-day, disarmament and the Manchurian question, the United States has appeared repeatedly to stand for a fuller acceptance and application of the treaty obligations of the League Covenant than many League States, among them, in more than one instance, Great Britain. That, at any rate, is the impression rather widely prevailing in the United States. America has put forward disarmament proposals and Great Britain has declined to go as far. The American Secretary of State laid down in relation to Manchuria a new doctrine of non-recognition of situations created in violation of treaty obligations and the British Government endorsed it only tardily (after a first refusal) when the whole League Council decided to adopt it. More than once, moreover, the British Foreign Minister at Geneva was considered—perhaps quite- undeservedly, but it is the impression created that counts—to be showing undue solicitude for Japan at a time when her policy constituted a plain violation of the covenants she had signed. So far as that was the case it was unfor- tunate, but no one would suggest that any irreparable harm has been done. Neither is it to be suggested that this is the moment for a new declaration of policy regarding Manchuria. The Lytton Report will in a week or two be in the hands of the Governments. It is known to be unanimous. It is known to be the work of men of marked ability and political wisdom. It is known that the American Government attaches particular weight to its investigation of facts and the conclusions to which that investigation will point. Its publication will create a situation of the utmost delicacy • and the utmost importance. Any semblance of recognition of the right of a nation to achieve its ends by force, refusing sub- mission to the impartial judgement of its fellows, would convince not only China, but every country in the world that its only safety lay, not in covenants and pacts, but in armaments stronger than any prospective invader could bring against it. The Disarmament Conference might as well dissolve and the World Economic Conference be cancelled. The contents of the Lytton Report are unknown. In any case, there can be question only of isolating Japan in case of need, not of any forcible coercion. What is asked of our own Govern- ment in such an event is that it shall endeavour throughout to work in persistent co-operation with the United States in vindication of principles both countries have accepted and proclaimed in formal treaties.
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