THE FINAL STRUGGLE OF RACE IN NEW ZEALAND. THE war
in New Zealand has suddenly assumed the dimensions which mark it out as likely to be the last great struggle between the English and the Maori race in those islands, and this has happened in a manner which amply justifies those who have all along asserted, with us, that the one Maori purpose, alike in the last and in the present war, was to establish the political ascendancy of the natives in the Northern island, and, if possible, to drive the English settlers out of it. Even-the English party, who were most troublesome, we may almost say treacherous, two years ago in the ill-advised en- couragement they gave to the rebellious natives, and the obstacles they threw in the way of Colonel Gore Brown's Government, are now compelled to throw their whole influ- ence into the war scale. TheBishop of New Zealand has himself made a strops"a war speech, and replied to the threats of the natives, not by meekly turning the other cheek, but by appeal- ing to the valour of "our young men." The unprovoked murders which startled Taranaki in May were imitated in Auckland in July. In a word, Sir George Grey's temporizing policy has ignominiously failed, as we always predicted ; the views of the Stafford-Richmond Government have been abso- lutely vindicated by the event, and the only result of the two years' half-suspended hostilities has been to give the natives that period to mature their plans, unite their counsels, organize their forces, and strengthen their strongholds in the bush. Perhaps the Home Government may, at last, learn,—too late for much use as respects the present war,— that the surest way, after all, to secure tranquillity in the case of a colony thus assailed by native enemies is, not to starve it of soldiers in order to render it timid, but to give it an amply sufficient force to over- awe the native rebellion, and then trust to the Governor's dis- cretion not to employ that force offensively. Had Mr. Rich- mond's able, memorial, imploring an adequate reinforcement, been attended to in 1861, we should not now be anxiously calculating the probable expense of a long colonial war, and the number of fighting men whom the English Government in Auckland may be able to bring to the front during the months of August and September. There are many cases of doubtful danger when, as Sir George Cornewall Lewis used to say, cure is better than prevention. But the danger of a colony planted amidst acute and irritated savages,—whom the mere spectacle of weakness is sure to excite into aggression,—is not one of them.
The situation in Auckland, New Zealand, when the mail left was critical enough. The native part of the island was one flame of rebellion. It was supposed that the Maoris could command a force of 7,500 fighting men, and could concentrate 5,000 on any one point they chose to select. Our soldiers would, indeed, be nearly as numerous as the latter number, at all events when the reinforcements sent out two months ago arrived. But no hope of a real measuring of strength in the field could be entertained. The natives know better than to waste the strength of their supe- rior local knowledge and familiarity with bush-fighting in this way. They would, doubtless, concentrate at times on weak points, do much mischief, and then suddenly disperse again, thus harassing and fatiguing our troops to the utmost, and evading any risk of decisive defeat. At the time the mail left, moreover, General Cameron had not received oar rein- forcements, and the military resources of the colony were strained to the utmost. One regiment was left for the pro- tection of Taranaki. The other soldiers were quite insuffi- cient for the scale of the Waikato war, and Sir George Grey had called oat the Militia and Volunteers of the province of Auckland to the number of 3,000 men, —which was, in fact, not far from equivalent to a levy en masse of the fighting men of the settlement. This would, of course, leave the settlers no time for their farms, and the culture of the soil needed to support the war, and no colony could bear such a strain long. Accord- ingly, Sir George Grey had taken a very serious step on his own responsibility in the absence of his colonial Par- liament. He had determined to repeat on a much larger scale in the Waikato country the experiment already made in Taranaki, namely, to confiscate enough land belong- ing to the rebels in Waikato to tempt additional forces into the field from the neighbouring colonies of Australia by the offer of grants. This step will, in all probability, be gene- rally approved in England, though a much less strong mea- sure—the Confiscation Bill in the United States, which did not bribe any one to make war by the specific offer of rebels' pro- perty, was received here with Pharisaic indignation. One of the colonial Ministry, Mr. Bell, had gone in person to Sydney and Melbourne; to raise a body of 2,000 fighting farmers, who are to be settled eventually on blocks of rebel land, on condition of defending themselves there by force of arms; and his mission appeared to be succeedine° rapidly. There is no want of fel- low-feeling between the English colonies in Australasia, and the temptation of grants of land, even though to be held on a kind of military tenure, was sufficient to brine.a plenty of re- cruits into the field. Arms and ammunition had already been sent in large quantities from the allied colony—a gun-boat for the Waikato river was nearly ready at Sydney, and a ship with 500 candidates for the expected border warfare would soon, it was expected, be able to sail. Hence, we may reasonably hope that when our new regiments arrive they will be allowed to go to the front, leaving an ample number of volunteers to guard the communications, and protect the colonists at their no less necessary pacific labours in the rear.
There are but two points of practical importance for us to con- sider at this outset of what is sure to be a tedious, and what will perhaps prove to England an expensive, though probably a final war. The first is, whether there is now any possible line of compromise with war, which either justice or policy should induce us to press on the New Zealand Government. The other is, how far we ought to regard ourselves as responsible for the expense of a war which is said to be already approach- ing 4,000/. a day, and will be, say 1,500,0001. for a year, for it is not likely, we fear, to last a less period. As to the first question, we have a very strong conviction that a vigorous pro- secution of the war is now the only just, the only wise, and the only merciful policy,—a prosecution, we mean, to the natural conclusion of the complete supremacy of the autho- rity of the Queen throughout the Northern island. It is the only just policy, because the war is now, on our part, purely a defensive war, the object of the natives being avowedly incon- sistent with the growth or even existence of our colonies in the Northern island at all. The natives confess that they anointed their native king Potatau " to do the work of the spear,"• and the most English of all the natives in his sympathies, W. Thompson, till now strongly on our side, has given the English settlers fair notice that all whom they can lay hands on, "armed or unarmed," will be put to the sword. Now, no " patched-up " peace can relieve our colonists from this danger. A patched-up peace would, in fact, only mean a further grant of time for preparation to the side which has most to learn in the military art, and nothing to lose by delay. To let all the New Zealand settlers languish for another interval of hollow truce in a condition so miserable as that of the Taranaki settlers during the lust two years would be the grossest injustice to them. Next, it would be exceedingly unwise, in a selfish point of view, to aim at anything short of a complete sub- jection of the native districts to our rale. These lingering wars, with the chronic fear of war, do more to depress the finances of the colony, to throw it back on imperial help, than any one decisive war, followed by real safety and the sway of a strong Government throughout the native districts, could do. It would be wiser to abandon the island altogether than hold it any longer at the will of the natives. Lastly, it is obvious that mercy to the Maoris is only possible on condition of their final reduction. If there is to be constant fear and suspicion, there will also be constant and, probably, cruel oppression.. No colonial legislature sitting in fear of treachery and insurrection can be expected to be clement and con- siderate for the interests of the seditious party whom they fear.
And now as to our imperial responsibility for the expense of the war. We ought, no doubt, to look for very substantial sacrifices from the settlers. We may well sanction and approve all such efforts to make the rebellion defray its, own cost, as Sir George Grey has recently adopted in offering rebels' land to settlers on a military tenure. For this is the best possible security for keeping order in future. Once let the border be strongly occupied by men of military habits, and the first blow will have been struck towards the permanent reduction of the native districts. So far as they can, the settlers should pay for their own militia,—but the militia now promise to be a very large numerical proportion of our army there. But when everything practicable has been done in this way towards reducing fairly our imperial responsibility, no doubt the largest part of the expense of the war must rest on England, and we do nut see how we can honourably evade it. The settlers have gone out under the protection of the British Government. It was the Government, not the settlers, who twice purchased and twice cancelled the purchase of the land that was the s ibj ect-mat ter of the last war. If any blunder were really made in that matter, the Governor made it, and lent it his personal authority. The struggle which ensued was undertaken on his own responsibility, and his measures were approved at home, though he was recalled, and Sir George Grey sent out to a reluctant colony to patch up the old trouble, -which he so managed that eventually the new patch came away again, and the rent was made worse. At every step the Governor sent from home has had the full responsibility of the quarrel,—and the steps taken from home have been unsuccess- ful steps, aggravating the evil. It may bo true, though we do not think so, that such colonies should never be founded on the faith of the English protection ; but even if we are to cut them adrift, we cannot do so without giving them a fair start and a clear field in a career of their own. To deny our responsibility and close our purse in the very crisis of a great colonial emergency would be simply base. The only course now opan to us is to place before the colonists clearly the duty of straining every nerve to help themselves, —and for the rest to accept fairly the national duty of carry- ing this war with all our energy to a speedy and triumphant close.
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