TOPICS OF THE DAY.
FRANCE—THE TWO NATIONS.
THERE are, and there always have been, and as far as political vision can extend there always will be, two French Nations. There is the nation of Richelieu, of Louis XIV., of Napoleon—the Nation of glory and grandeur, of political and military greatness, of aggression and domination. Opposed to it in every part and section of France, and perhaps also in every French heart, is another and wholly different Nation—the Nation of peaceful ease and quiet living, the Nation of the toiling, land-loving, land-hungering peasant, the Nation of the bon bourgeois. It is a Nation self-centred and self- esteeming, but happy and anxious above all things to be let alone, to live and let live, in peace and plenty if possible, in peace and quiet at any rate. That was the Nation of which Goldsmith wrote when he focussed the French people in a couplet :- " They please, are pleased ; they give to get esteem,
Till seeming blest, they grow to what they seem."
That, too, was the France of Louis XVI., one of the most typical and most popular of Frenchmen. Though he ended his life on the scaffold, he exactly represented the second nation. That, again, was the France of Louis Philippe, though he represented it less well. In the noblest sense of all, and though she was a soldier, the Maid of Orleans was the symbol of the second Nation.
Between these two Nations the pendulum of power and representation has always swung. Now one, now the other, has prevailed. A sense of anxiety, of rest- lessness sometimes reaching to panic has always belonged to both and has provided the impulse. Fear of foreign aggression and of external interference has again and again sent France flying into the arms of great soldiers and Imperially-minded rulers. Again, detestation of war's alarms and of waste, worry and extravagance has urged her to overthrow her War-Lords and Rois Soleils, and to allow the people to sit once more under their own olives and fig trees, to work their ploughlands and to prune their vines.
Last Sunday we witnessed a typical swing from the first to the second Nation. Ever since the War France had been in the hands of those who represent the first Nation, with the results that the world has seen. Appar- ently with acquiescence, but in reality, as we now know, with a growing sense of distrust and even of indignation, France has pursued the path of aggressive Imperialism. We beheld in action the France that takes material guarantees at every step, that trusts to nothing but the sword of the soldier, or the Machiavellian policy and the craft of the statesman. Whatever may have been the personal views of that man of steel and phosphorus, of denaturalized blood and mechanical heart-beats, M. Poincare was the instrument of those who dreamt the dreams of Louvois and Louis XIV., of Napoleon and of Talleyrand. The policy for which they stood, and which they believed France would endorse, was to dominate Europe by her arms, by her skilful alliances, by the destruction of all who might cross her path, by the patronage, military and financial, of the smaller nations who would enlist under her banners, and finally by the sinister and dangerous policy of training and arming black soldiers to maintain the French hegemony of Europe. That policy has been swept away by the emergence of the second France. The men who stood for this delirious dream of Empire have gone like shadows on the grass. France has shown that she liked not the security which they so madly offered her. In this victor!' by the second Nation every true friend of France mud, rejoice. We believed that the Government of M. Poincare were not only on the wrong road, morally, politically and financially, but that they did not represent the wishes any more than the interests of France. For taking this view we were assailed with a passion that seems ridiculous in the light of Sunday's elections. However, it is an unimportant matter whether an English paper was right or wrong in its diagnosis, and we are perfectly content, as no doubt our readers will be, with the result, and need make no further attempt to justify ourselves.
Our contemporary, L'Oeuvre, by the way, has described this victory in one of its posters as a victory of Joan of Arc. It must not be supposed, however, that there will be any sudden or cataclysmic change in French Foreign policy. No true friend of France, or of Europe, or of a lasting settlement, will expect the French people to give up their claim to ample reparations, or to bring about a sudden and sensational evacuation of the Ruhr. Any demand for such action would throw France into a panic, and probably mean another swing of the pendulum towards militarism and an exaggerated Nationalism. What the elections mean, in terms of action, is, in the first place, a change of atmosphere. They mean a willingness to proceed on sound and reasonable lines, and above all, to maintain the essential spirit of the Entente—the spirit of justice rather than of aggression, of common sense rather than of fear. Britain, Belgium, and Italy, with the best will in the world, of late found it quite impossible to take common action with the Government of M. Poincare, and thus the Entente was paralyzed. Now we not only hope, but have firm ground for believing, that the pressure which caused this paralysis will be relieved, and that we can get back to the region of sanity. The reaction on Germany will, we believe, be as beneficial as it is in the case of the Allies. This does not mean that the Germans, when they review the situation, will come to the conclu- sion that they can now do anything they like, or at any rate, get better terms than they have a right to get. On the contrary, it will, we believe, make them see that they must be, not less, but more reasonable and more moderate in their demands. Of late they have felt, in a sense, though in a bad and dangerous sense, that they were masters of the situation. Now, however, that the Allies will be able to adopt a sound and just joint policy, the Germans will feel that they must abandon all attempts to play off one Power against another, or to adopt any type of Machiavellian tactics. In a word, all Europe should now feel that we can have a reasonable settlement, and that it behoves everyone to make sacrifices for that settlement.
After the tremendous sacrifices that we have already made, we cannot be expected to play a part which would be condemned by business people as one of foolish generosity. We ought, however, to be willing to take the lead and set the example in a policy which may be described as that of a wise self-denial. As to America, we can only say that we believe that the best—perhaps the only—way to bring her into the settlement is for the nations of Europe to show that they not only mean business in the matter of Peace, but that they have no intention of taking advantage, either of America's wealth, or of America's secure isolation from European troubles. America obtained these advantages by no trickery and by no sinister means, but solely by the operation of natural causes, and Europe has no right to try to force her into any particular path by accusations of selfishness or hard-heartedness. Whatever America does, she must do on her own initiative.
J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.
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