AUNG SAN OF BURMA
By AUBREY BUXTON
THE general public, having, so to speak, discovered Burma as a result of the war with Japan, must find it hard, if not im- possible, to fathom the political situation of today. .News reports are confusing, whilst opinions expressed in Parliament and in the Press have been contradictory in the extreme. To the spectator who attempts to revieik them all Burma must appear to be a political madhouse. The great issue of conflict concerns the young nationalist movement, of which the central figure is Aung San, now in London. In every debate in the House some Members have demanded that he should be treated as a treacherous murderer, whilst others have proclaimed his virtues and demanded his inclusion in the plans for rehabilitation. Letters on Aung San have appeared in the Press. What, then, is the man in the street to think? Is Aung San a murderer or a patriotic hero? Is he a pleasant or unpleasant character? In any case, who is Aung San?
To begin with, he is a typical Burmese extremist. There always have been Burmese extremists, and, more important (and we must realise this) there always will be. It is of no consequence at all whether Aung San is attractive or unattractive ; what matters is that he is typical of a very common Burmese type—impulsive, hot- headed, pig-headed, enthusiastic, arrogant, patriotic (to his own cause), and so on. He is nothing new, or odd. We annexed Burma during the last century because the Burmese kings were insolent, . because they slighted the Viceroy's delegates and considered them- selves the chosen race. Today certain elements of young Burma display a similar outlook. Had they the chance they would probably behave in the same manner. In 1942 Aung San and others either committed or condoned acts of violence and cruelty against Allied subjects retreating to India. That is undeniable, but it is besidt the point today. The crux of the matter is that Aung San, possess- ing traditionally Burmese characteristics, has great appeal for the masses in Burma. He is, in fact, a national hero. Whether we like it or not, he is a leader of the people. Whether we like it or not, we can only enlist public support through him and his friends.
Aung San was a student in Rangoon before the war, when his participation in subversive agitation caused his confinement in gaol. He escaped, not only from gaol but out of the country, and was next heard of in Japan, where the future war-lords trained him in military science and civil administration. Plans for the conquest of "Greater Asia" were well in 'hand, and it is little wonder that the fugitive undergraduate became a ready pawn in Japanese hands. With him were other Burmese fugitives, and they became known, during the Japanese advance into Burma, as "The Thirty Com- rades." The agreement was that the Comrades should take over the reins of civil administration as each province was liberated by the Japanese Army, but grave doubt of Japanese sincerity was felt after the fall of Moulmein, capital of a substantial district in Southern Burma. Aung San asked for civil power, but was told bluntly that nothing could be handed over until after the capture
of Rangoon. Rangoon fell, and this time he was informed that there could be no arrangement until Burma had been occupied completely. The usual Japanese tactics of "putting off" convinced Aung San that he had been thoroughly duped, and that Burma was to become simply a vassal state in the new Co-prosperity Sphere. Not long afterwards he sent envoys to India and China to contact the Allies.
From that time until the final liberation of Burma Aung San maintained some form of communication with us. He commanded a small Japanese-sponsored army known successively as the Burma Independence Army, Burma Defence Army, Burma National Army, and Patriotic Burmese Forces. He encouraged among its ranks a keen national spirit, eliminating the early anti-Allied propaganda from their training. He found his recruits among the more simple rural folk and taught them that they were there "to fight the enemies of Burma"; gradually it became understood that the enemies were Japanese. During all this time the Japanese High Command, even if it smelt a rat, failed to crack the plot ; either it was incredibly stupid or Aung San remarkably astute—probably a combination of both. Aung San also became a bitter opponent of Ba Maw, the would-be dictator of Burma, and it is a tribute to his strength and influence that for three years Ba Maw failed utterly to oust the young "Commander-in-Chief" and "War Minister." Finally, in April, 1945, when the 14th Army was in the final stages of its spectacular dash from Upper Burma, the Burma National Army rose in the Japanese rear and caused complete confusion. Its con- tribution to the campaign was neeigible by comparison with that of the Allied forces, and the outcome would have been the same had it never existed. Moreover, its claims of Japanese killed have been fantastic. Nevertheless it is fair to say that the National Army performed a useful task in the dosing chapter, that it rose at the right moment, and, what is more important, not before it was ordered to do so by Allied Headquarters. Premature underground risings had proved failures in many other theatres of war.
As a result of it all, Aung San was the champion of Burma when we occupied Rangoon on May 3, 1945. The political counterpart of the B.N.A. was the Anti-Fascist Organisation (now known as the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League) of which Aung San was also the leader. This group was the strongest political factor in the country and embraced all parties and creeds, even unpopular minorities. If ever there was a chance to raise Burmese politics to a new level it was by using this united, zealous and popular body. The A.F.O. was, in the early summer of 1945, well disposed towards the British Government, and anxious to co-operate in order to restore life to torn and shattered Burma. Lord Mountbatten saw this, and encouraged and assisted Aung San and his party. For the Supreme Commander they had a high regard, and at a banquet given to him by the Burmese Orient Club in Tune, 1945, there were happy comments and appreciative "exchanges.
But it was not to last. By July the A.F.O. felt frustrated. By September they were openly critical. When the Governor returned in October they had made up their minds to remain outside die administration. From then on there was steady deterioration. For many months there was total deadlock. But the Governor was not to blame, nor was his Deputy during the military administration. The harm had been done before they arrived. Certain civil officers returned from Simla to put the doctrinaire undergraduates of 1941 in their places. Unfortunately nobody can put national heroes in their places quite like that.
Last autumn, Sir Hubert Rance, the new Governor, arrived. As an officer of the regular army he had had no previous connection with pre-war civil administration, nor was he in sympathy with its more reactionary members who treated the Burmese with scant respect. In a shoot time, Sir Hubert succeeded in bringing Aung. San and his colleagues into the Executive Council—a signal suc- cess. Thus the nationalist movement gained firmer roots, and without doubt much public support. Conscious of their power, the nationalists pressed for constitutional progress, and His Majesty's Government, at last aware of its responsibility in Burma, invited them to London. With Aung San as their leader, the Burmese delegates are now conferring with British Ministers. And Aung San's Yes or No may decide the issue.
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