Japan and the Naval Conference The Japanese have pursued a
strange course at the Naval Conference. They could never have supposed that their proposal for a common upper limit, i.e., equality, would be accepted by Britain and the United States. They can, no doubt, claim that by their drawal from the conference they will be able to free themselves at the end of this year from the position of inferiority involved in the acceptance of a lower ratio than the two Anglo-Saxon Powers.. Technically that is true. Actually the United States will unqUestionably build on such a scale as to maintain at least-the existing margin between the two fleets, and Japan will be involved in an expenditure which will • lay a further alarming strain on her precarious national finances. If, moreover; the naval treaty lapses there will lapse with it the agreement prohibiting the fortification of island bases in the Pacific. Japan may find herself no longer separated by 3,400 miles from the nearest American naval base at Hawaii, but by only 1,600 miles from a fortified Guam. Meanwhile Great Britain and the United States will have been driven politically closer, and Japan, whose aggressive attitude both in Mongolia -and in China proper is provoking increasing suspicion, will be left more isolated than ever. It seems a doubtful advantage. The Naval Conference itself will, of course, continue, and minor agreements of some value on limitation of individual tonnages and gun calibres may still be reached.
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