Western Defences
• By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS
WHATEVER uncertainties there may be about a more distant future, no one of any re- sponsibility today imagines that there is any like- lihood of an immediate Russian nuclear attack on the West. The off-chance remains of a conflict breaking out through accident, but the handling of difficult situations, whether they be in Berlin or in Laos, in the Congo or in Cuba, seems to show that, however ready they may be to play with fire, leading statesmen arc at least determined not to be immediately burnt by it. On the reasons for this relative and temporary security opinions differ. Russophils are content to say merely that Russia is peace-loving. More sophisticated critics, with somewhat better reasons, argue that the Russians are convinced that they are winning anyway and see no reason why they should wantonly destroy what in their view will soon be their own assets. The defenders of the West's defence policies say that peace is maintained by the balance of forces—by the West's deterrent power.
Now, it is a platitude that a deterrent can only be effective if it is credible. In order that it should deter. it is necessary not only to show the damage that it could inflict, but also to persuade the enemy that it would in fact be used. If there is once a suspicion of bluff the credibility vanishes. That being so, Lord Home was unwise to say in the House of Lords, during the debate about NATO, that 'all the evidence' shows that the United States would come to the aid of her allies if they were attacked. If he had said that on the balance of the evidence we think it probable that she would, I would have had no quarrel; but to say that all the evidence is in favour is simply not true; the Russians know very ■ % ell that it is not true; and obviously they will be encouraged in their belief that the West is not sure of itself: For it is notorious that there has been debate in America, as.is indeed only natural, whether, in these days of intercontinental ballistic missiles, America should reply to an attack on one of her allies by an attack on Russia that would inevit- ably attract a further attack on her own cities. In what was the most fundamental criticism of the present British defence policies in the recent House of Commons defence debate. Mr. Julian Critchley quoted from what he called the 'Freu- dian slip' of Mr. Herter, until the change of ad- ministration American Secretary of State. 'I can- not conceive of any President,' said Mr. Herter, 'involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of all- out devastation ourselves.' Admittedly plenty of
other Americans have said the opposite and—
particularly after the change of administration— Mr. Herter's word does not in itself settle Ameri- can policy, but it is important enough to make it silly to say that all the evidence is in favour of an automatic American reaction.
Those who insist that our security depends on the strength of our defences have always assumed that American support can be taken for granted. --that the whole Western world is the defence unit. British unilateralists are often con- demned for 'sheltering behind the umbrella' of the American nuclear bomb. But if we cannot take American. support for granted, the whole argument has to be revised. In an article, 'Who Commands the Atlantic Deterrent?' in the cur- rent issue of Crossbow, Mr. Critchley argues that we should throw all our resources behind NATO; make over Bomber Command to it, offer France a number of V-bombers provided that she puts them under NATO control, and equip NATO with Polaris.
But there are two obvious difficulties about a NATO nuclear deterrent. Obviously it makes no sense so long as NATO remains a loose, unco- ordinated alliance with fifteen fingers on• the trigger and no clear arrangement who would have the authority to press it. Lord GladWyn in his speech in the Lords admitted this defect, but was not greatly worried because he did not think that there was going to be a war anyway. Mr. Critchley and his Bow Group associates, more responsibly. argue that the logic of a single de- fence unit dentands a single political authority. But whatever logic requires, and whatever the future may one day produce, there seems little chance of any immediate surrender of sovereignty by Western governments on a scale to make NATO a real authority. One can hardly imagine General de Gaulle agreeing to such a surrender.
In any case. NATO is not a European Third Force. It is an alliance in which the United States is the predominant partner. American opinion would never tolerate any other than an American Supreme Commander for NATO, and, if there- fore the problem is that America cannot be trusted to make 'a nuclear retaliation for an attack on Europe, it surely follows that she would not allow such a retaliation to be made by the nuclear forces of NATO--for the Russians would certainly consider a NATO attack as an act of war by the United States.
Mr. Murray, late of the American Atomic Energy CoMmissiOn, has argued 'that the destruc- tive power of the megaton bomb and the un- certainty of the extent and the manner of its
effect are such that no sane man would use •it whether there was to be a second strike in re- taliation or not. The danger of destroying his own people as well as destroying the enemy would be too great. Meanwhile, argues Mr. Murray, the United States has unnecessarily weakened herself by devoting too much of her resources to megaton weapons which she dare not use, and by conse- quence too little to lesser weapons which she could use. We in Britain have manifestly been guilty of the same fault, and it is not at all easy to see either what a NATO nuclear force would be for or how it would work.
For the continental nations, as for us, what is important is to strengthen the conventional forces so that they can contain a probing operation or a local conflict. If it is uncertain whether the Americans would retaliate' against a Russian attack on a European country, and if it is certain that the Russians would only deliver such an attack as a consequence of local war that had already broken out elsewhere through some acci- dent, then surely it is more important to be strong enough to see to it that accidents do not happen or are immediately brought under control, rather than waste our resources on bombers flying per- manently round in the air on some ridiculous standing patrol to meet an attack that everybody knows is not coming. Mr. Critchley is really much more anxious---1 do not think that I mis- represent him—to see stronger conventional forces than stronger nuclear forces. Our .aim should be, he sensibly writes, 'to ensure that a conventional attack could be halted without re- sort to nuclear weapons.' This aim, he adds, 'is by no means hopeless, given the potential improvements in conventional lire-power.' I agree.
The strongest argument against unilateral dis- armament is that, by removing the motive for the other side to make concessions, it may make multilateral disarmament more difficult. By a curious paradox the strongest argument for creat- ing a NATO nuclear force is that it might prevent the proliferation of independent national nuclear forces all over Europe--which would be very dangerous. But this, if it be not too cynical a conclusion, is on the whole a reason for talking about such a force rather than for having one. What is important is• to strengthen the conven- tional forces of the NATO nations.
'Thal Professor Lombroso! Ile's a real "type"P
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