NATURE AND THOUGHT.*
Tax old problem which has from the days of Pyrrho exercised the ingenuity of philosophers, the attempt to justify theo- retically the beliefs which none can practically shake off in the avouchments of our faculties, and in an objective external world, has here been restated and discussed by Mr. Mivart, well known as a writer on anatomy and physiology. His work is intended, he tells us, as an introduction to a "natural philosophy,"—that is, as he explains, to a system which, "as justifying the spon- taneous natural dictates of man's uncultured reason by philo- sophical analysis, and as seeking to make plain the concord of the world of Nature with the world of Thought, may perhaps be allowed (if it succeeds in its task) to have made good its claim to the honourable title of a Natural Philosophy." We hold the book to be a serviceable one, as containing a pointed and intelligent résumé of much that has been said by the best writers, on both sides, about questions of the deepest and most practical interest ; and as offering, here and there, an original thought or suggestion of some value. It can hardly be considered, how- ever, as a whole, an original contribution to the literature of the subject. There are, no doubt, incidentally, acute and telling re- marks, but the evident absence in the writer of any power of sustained philosophical thinking, and the consequent incom- pleteness of his treatment of most of the many questions which he passes in review, are fatal to any high pretensions in that direction. When we say incompleteness, we do not mean simply incompleteness of development. This is, of course, to be ex- pected in a work of the dimensions of Nature and Thought, which, as only professing to be an "introduction," would dis- arm criticism on that score. What we rather mean is the evident absence of that power to see all round a subject, to note at once the consequences of each view, and its bearing on the rest of his system, which is essential to the work of a true philosopher, though it is not necessary that he should draw these things out explicitly and in detail, in all that he writes. Cardinal Newman, for instance, in his essay on "Assent," although some might say that he did not quite exhaust an almost inexhaustible question, nevertheless makes it plain to his readers that he has thought his subject through and through. No objection can arise in their mind which is not anticipated by him ; and even where his limits prevent him from fully developing the reply of which he indicates the direction, it is so clear that all considerations which arise in the minds of his students as difficulties have been already felt by himself, that thtir trust in him as a teacher is strengthened by the very force of his statement of prima.' facie objections. In reading Professor Mivart's work, we felt the very opposite of this. No doubt, incidental objections are stated by him with great force—objec- tions raised by recognised writers on the subject—but his thought is wanting in maturity ; it has not been long enough "in bottle," and he consequently fails often to see the bearing and consequences of his own views, beyond those which are most• superficial and immediately evident ; and makes no attempt to harmonise principles which appear to conflict. A notable instance of this is his hasty conclusion that, because a • Nature and Thought an introduction to a Natural Philosophy. By St. George blivart. London: Reran Pant, Trench, and Co. 1982.
good "First Cause" must certainly have made happiness depend, in the long-run, upon goodness, we may, therefore, accept Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the evolution of the moral sentiment by "past pressures of utility." His language on this point seems to us quite express ; but we place it before our readers, that they may judge whether or no we have represented him fairly :—
"We may fully accept Herbert Spencer's views as to
the means by which materially moral habits and feelings have been evolved, and have thus prepared the way for the existence of formal morality. His error is to mistake the mere instrument of evolution for the cause, as a cockroach might regard only the broom, and be blind to the mistress of the house, who had ordered the housemaid to sweep it away. Thoroughly analysed, Herbert Spencer's view is eminently satisfactory, for two reasons. One is (1), his teaching that conduct should be conformed to an end; the other is (2), that we are to act with confidence upon moral sentiments which have become innate in us, trusting to the good effects of evolution. But such teaching implies the existence of a deep purpose in nature, and this purpose must harmonise with that inextinguishable desire for beati- tude which is also innate in man. A good First Cause must, then, have given to man, as the end of his being, a perfect beatitude coincident- ally with a perfect moral development."
Now, we do not forget to bear in mind the distinction which Mr. Mivart draws between what is " materially " moral, and what "formally." But this does not really affect the case. The only difference between the two—using the terms in the scholastic sense—is that what is materially moral implies only objective morality, without regard to the motive of the agent. Thus, Mr. Mivart really accepts Spencer's view as to our percep- tion of what is or is not objectively right. Now, no doubt, accord- ing to God's Providence, what is objectively right coincides, in the long-run, with what is for our greatest happiness ; and, if Herbert Spencer's view amounted to no more than this—that in the course of evolution an instinct has been formed, by the past experiences of the race, which now tells at once what is and what is not for our ultimate happiness,—it might possibly be defended, as consistent with the 'Christian view of morality. But Mr. Mivart seems to forget that Herbert Spencer's view, "thoroughly analysed," as he puts it, involves very much more than that, and something very distinct from it. In the first place, that series of experiences which has, according to Spencer, generated the moral instinct, is, of course, exclusively confined to experiences in. this world,—and it is certainly very far from true that good actions invariably, or even generally, bring the greatest happiness in this life ; so that no permanent -association between goodness and ultimate happiness can have been bred or transmitted on such a principle. But secondly, and more importantly, the whole of Mr. Spencer's ethics rests on a purely biological basis of evolution. By natural selection, those survive who have the keenest sense, and habits founded on this sense, of what tends to the ultimate furtherance of life. This sense, and the resulting tendency, is transmitted to their posterity, and forms what we call the moral instinct. We have
• no space here to examine this theory, or even to state it as a whole ; but what we would draw attention to is that it changes the objective morality of actions. We have frequently pointed out that our moral perceptions aver many an act to be right which does not tend to the increase or preservation of life, and vice versa. In many cases in which the effects of an action on the lives of the individual or of the race are clearly visible—and such cases must be the crucial ones—our spontaneous moral approbation is far greater for that which fulfils Mr. Spencer's conditions imperfectly, than for that which completely satisfies them. His highest instance of right conduct is a mother suckling her child, because "there is at once to the mother gratification, and to the child satisfaction of appetite, a satis- faction which *accompanies furtherance of life, growth, and increasing enjoyment." Now, does this act arouse our moral approbation in any degree approaching to the admiration which we feel for one who could save the lives of himself and his family by betraying the friend who has trusted him, and yet refuses to do so ? No doubt, there are virtues which tell in favour of the life of the race, such as prudence, fortitude, temperance, and so forth. But it is plain that our spontaneous feeling of moral approval cannot be accounted for on principles which would result in an ideal of morality which does not arouse that spontaneous feel- ing. Either the "suckling mother" is not the ideal saint, or else the moral instinct tells untruly, and is not, as Mr. Spencer says it is, to be trusted. The truth is, of course, that the ultimate coincidence of goodness and happiness is not wrought out, as Mr. Mivart says it is, by the First Cause work- ing through evolution, supposing evolution to be a substan- tially true theory. That coincidence is in a sphere quite external to evolution,—in a future state, of which Mr. Spencer takes no account.
In making .this criticism, we do not at all forget Mr. Mivart's avowal, earlier in the volume, that moral goodness is a simple idea, distinct from utility, personal or tribal. We do not believe that he can reconcile this with his later statement ; but any- how, it is beside the question. The point we are examining is not how far the goodness of the agent involves an idea incapable of further analysis, but how far that course of objective action which our conscience tells us to be right coincides with the course which will tend to the "highest life" of the race, ex- cluding any future state, and having regard only to the good results of evolution. Unless this coincidence exists, as Mr. Spencer supposes, the theory of the evolution of the moral sentiment fails. We have done our very best to understand Mr. Mivart on this important subject, and we cannot but come to the conclusion that he has not quite thought out his own view. There is, somewhat earlier in the book than the passage we have quoted, a sufficient account of the evolutionist explana- tion of conscience, which makes his later statement the more remarkable.
There are, as we have said, various excellent and acute re- marks here and there throughout the volume, but we could have wished that the author .had concentrated his thoughts longer upon any one of his five chapters, instead of giving us a number of remarks, insufficiently woven together, and scarcely developed, though occasionally brilliant in themselves, upon so wide a philosophical field. We are not opposed to the form of " ques- tion and answer" which he has adopted ; but when we find a love-story and a scene with chit-chat about indifferent topics, we wish that the dramatic form had been more sustained. Fancy a friend, walking with one in a Yorkshire valley, who, on being asked what he considers the advantages of the philo- sophy he advocates, answers at once, and without hesitation, as if perfectly prepared for the question, "It has, I think, ten advantages," and proceeds to enumerate them. Here is a fine passage on asceticism, as the test and expression of love :—
"The voluntary sacrifice of pleasure is valuable as a test of human love, and may be eagerly sought for by him who practises it as the best expression of the devotion he feels for another. Does not Emily [his fiancee] value you the more on account of your disregard of certain worldly advantages you willingly forego for her, and do you not rejoice at being able to give her this evidence of your regard ? Would you forego it, if you could ? If this rela- tion applies to human love, how much more to our love for
God,----a God in whom all our highest ideals are realised If in his service we may be permitted to undergo humiliation, pain, and suffering, who that understands the theistic conception does not see that it would be reasonable for us to welcome such humiliation and suffering ? If, in the pursuit of all that brings us nearer to him, we can gratefully and lovingly deny ourselves lower pleasures which tend to impede or slacken us in such pursuit, who that believes in God can doubt but that he ought to spurn such pleasures, and be grate- ful to God for having granted him the opportunity of so spurning them ? Thus you see the principle of ascetiem is as deeply implanted in human nature, as is the perception of virtue, and the feeling of love."
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