THE VALUE OF A CHILD'S LIFE
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] Sm,—At the end of my letter which you printed last week, I expressed a doubt whether the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 5934, which makes causes of action for tort survive to an executor, would apply if the cause were an accident due to negligence resulting in instantaneous death. By a coincidence, the exact point arose in a case, Morgan v. Scoulding, heard by Mr. Justice Lewis, on Wednesday last, and reported in The Times the next day. After referring to the " interesting discussion " his Lordship decided in favour of the plaintiff, apparently on the ground that there was a " split second " between blow and death.
This decision is just and reasonable, but, if I may respectfully venture a criticism, I have considerable doubt whether the Act is wide enough to admit it. In the first place amnia praestaniter pro negante, and I should have thought that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that split second of life, which would appear a manifest impossibility. Again, I take it the damages lie as compensation for the gloom and despondency induced by the expectation of a short life punctuated probably by suffering, instead of a normal course of good health; but I do not see how the gloom of a split second of unconsciousness - can be measured.
A stay of execution was granted, which implies appeal,' so more may be heard of the case.—Yours, &c., ALFasn FELLOWS.
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