THE WAR AT SEA

By A NAVAL CORRESPONDENT

AFTER two and a-half years of intensive sea warfare, a fresh area of conflict has opened in the Indian Ocean. So far as

can be ascertained, the Japanese fleet which has recently been operating off Ceylon, includes at least three battleships, four or five aircraft-carriers, and a considerable number of cruisers and destroyers. From the scale of the air attacks upon Colombo and Trincomali, it had been apparent that several aircraft-carriers must be somewhere in the offing, and that such valuable vessels were unlikely to be risked so far from their bases without a strong escort. By the appointment to the command of the Eastern Fleet of Admiral Sir James Somerville, a flag officer with a fine fighting record, evidence is afforded that control of the Indian Ocean will not be allowed to pass into enemy hands without a struggle. Sir James is no stranger to the station, having been Commander-in- Chief, East Indies, in 1938-39. A few months before war began he was invalided home, and placed on the retired list on grounds of ill-health ; but the vigour which he has shown in the Western Mediterranean command during 1940-41 suggests that in retiring him the authorities were a little hasty.

Fortunately, he has had considerable experience in repelling air attacks, such as the very determined one made on a convoy he was escorting through the Sicilian Channel in January of last year. Though German dive-bombers succeeded in setting H.M.S. '

Southampton' on fire, and she had to be abandoned and sunk, the convoy was conducted safely to its destination. In other attacks of this kind the enemy's success has been insignificant ; though it must be borne in mind that on every occasion the British force had the advantage of air support. Having regard to the untimely fate of H.M.S. Prince of Wales' and H.M.S. 'Repulse' la§t December, when wave after wave of Japanese torpedo-bombers came over and at last succeeded in penetrating their defence, it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that our forces in the Indian Ocean will be left without the aid of aircraft-carriers.

There is no doubt that, if the Royal Navy had been in posses- sion of, say, 20 modem aircraft-carriers, fully equipped, when this war began, we should now have advanced on the road to victory. It was striking forces of torpedo-bombers from the aircraft-carriers Victorious' and 'Ark Royal' that halted the Bismarck,' and so ensured her destruction. Again, in the Battle of Cape Matapan, a year ago, it was aircraft from H.M.S. 'Formidable' that crippled the Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto ' ; it was this which led other enemy ships to come within range of our Mediterranean Fleet, which sank three heavy cruisers and two destroyers without loss to itself. In fact, the Air Arm has become an indispensable adjunct to a modern fleet, a fact of which the Japanese unfortu- nately seem only too well aware. Up to now they have used their naval aircraft with the utmost freedom, and generally with effect. At the same time they have husbanded their more important ships, realising doubtless that sooner or later they may be needed to face an attack from the United States Pacific Fleet. By now that fleet should have recovered from the shock of the Pearl Harbour disaster, and in strength it must be fully equal to any force the enemy can muster in the Western Pacific.

In spite of this the Japanese have taken the risk of send substantial proportion of their total strength 5,000 miles from It would seem as though, having occupied the strategic is Guam and Wake, and overrun the greater part of the Philip they felt themselves secure against attack in this region. Yet beginning of February the United States Navy carried out a conceived raid into Japanese waters in the Marshall Islands, only sinking sundry small craft, supply ships, &c., but doing siderable damage to shore establishments of a military ch Very little resistance appears to have been encountered, and came chiefly from aircraft, a number of strhich were destra Presumably this ..operation was of an exploratory character there appears to be no reason why it should stop there. In course it should be possible to follow it by a more ambiti pedition, in which seizure of enemy territory and the establis of garrisons at strategic points would be amongst the ob. view. If Guam and Wake could be recovered, our Allies be in a position to penetrate to a point where Japan itself be threatened with attack. Of the effect that this would upon the immensely long lines of communication with enemy peditionary forces to the south and south-westward there little question.

. In the meantime, unfortunately, Japan has won great succ Singapore, Surabaya and Rangoon have fallen in turn, and t the oilfields of the Dutch Indies are not yet in a condition to much fuel to the invaders, it may be regarded as a certainty not a moment will be lost in restoring the shattered plant and opening the wells to a productive point. It has been estimated experts that six months is the least time that such work is to occupy. During those six months it is the business of Allies to strain every nerve to recover the initiative in the East, so that the resources which are temporarily lost to us not be turned to account by our foes. Unfortunately, rubber pl tions and tin-producing areas are not so easily laid waste as oilfie and thus the Japanese are likely to gain much booty from M- and the Dutch Indies.

In the Mediterranean our Fleet under Admiral Sir And Cunningham, though hampered by the loss of Crete, has c pletely overawed the Royal Italian Navy, whose strength is sk, ebbing. British submarines, aircraft, and light surface forces c tinue to attack convoys proceeding to Libya, few of which through without loss. Of the 19 modern cruisers with which entered the war, no more than nine are believed to survive. Althc 14 are supposed to be under construction, it is believed that shoe of material and labour difficulties have so ,far hindered their c pletion. Nor is the position in capital ships much better.

Of two new and four rebuilt battleships which existed in I 1940, five may still be in existence, after deducting the 'Cont Cavour,' torpedoed and reduced to a wreck at Taranto in No' ber of that year. The Littorio,' considerably damaged on the occasion, reappeared in the Central Mediterranean quite recen only to be torpedoed for the second time. Nothing is known the state of her sister ship, the Vittorio Veneto,' repeatedly pedoed in the opening stages of the Battle of Cape Matapam. it is doubtful if she is yet ready for sea. Two new battleships s'h were launched in November, 1939, and June, 1940, respectively, Impero ' and Roma,' have never been seen at sea, and probably still to be delivered. Of 130 destroyers and large to boats, it is suspected that about 5o per cent, have been accoun for ; while the M.A.S.' (motoscafi antisommergibih), of which much was heard before the war, have failed to achieve any sum Daring attempts were made to carry out torpedo attacks on she in the harbours of Gibraltar and Malta, by means of tiny laun driven by an outboard motor. These little craft had a crew of or two men, and a torpedo lashed alongside. Thanks to so defensive arrangements, none of these attacks accomplished an thing. They are almost the only instances on record of the It Navy exhibiting initiative.

Italian aircraft have made many attacks on convoys Pas through the Sicilian Channel, but except when stiffened by contingent of the Luftwaffe, the results have been poor. Their achievement to date has been to damage H.M.S. 'Nelson rdo hit in the bow, last year. More trouble has been experi- xd from the U-boats which the Germans sent to the Mediter- on towards the end of last year. It was one of these submarines succeeded in sinking H.M.S. Barham,' but measures taken to 1; with these pests are believed to be having a salutary effect. the waters of Western Europe the escape of the battleships durahorst ' and Gneisenau' from Brest to Germany by way of Channel and North Sea may have seemed to be a score to enemy -; but it should be noted that these ships are still under at Kid and Wilhelmshaven, where they are by no means 3 menace as in a port whence egress to the Atlantic was easy.

t Trondheim are the battleship Tirpitz,' sister to the ill-fated

rck ' ; the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer ' ; and the yr cruisers 'Admiral Hipper' and 'Prinz Eugen,' the latter in a aged state. This leaves elsewhere (probably in German ports), other pocket-battleship, the Liitzow ' ; and the three light ers, the Leipzig," Nurnberg ' and Emden.' There is also aircraft-carrier Graf Zeppelin,' supposed to have been corn- ed some time ago, though so far the enemy have made no use her. Undoubtedly the concentration at Trondheim is partly due a desire to interrupt the important convoys that are taking tions to North Russia. An attempt to intercept one of these defeated in March, with the sinking of at least one German over. In light craft Germany's present strength is uncertain, she may possess from 20 to 30 destroyers, 40 to 50 torpedo ti ;mostly of about 600 tons), and a large but uncertain number motor torpedo boats (the so-called E-boats, which the Germans selves refer to as Schnellboote).

ow many submarines there are in the German navy no one say, but a Swedish estimate places the total at about 300. This d accord well with the rate at which U-boats were built and

in the last war. Though their depredations on this side of the

tic have been severely restricted, they have been very busy the American coast for the last three or four months, and have a great deal of valuable tonnage. It is to be hoped that nel Knox's recent declaration that the menace would be over- by May will be justified by events. Though the British Navy facing heavier odds all over the world than at any time in its ory, its courage, determination and efficiency have never higher. It is difficult to believe that these qualities will not • ately open the path to victory.