DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTATOR:1
SIR,—Will you allow me a word as to the relation between desire and volition, with reference to your article on Free-will, in. the current number of the Spectator ? Your reviewer seems to suppose that, on the Determinist theory, volition must invariably be in accordance with some desire, and in the case of opposing desires, in accordance with the intensest of these. But surely the determinist theory is simply that volitions fol- low fixed laws. Now, one of these laws is, that we have a tendency to repeat actions that have become habitual; and this applies not only to particular actions, but to classes of actions. Thus, if a man has acquired a habit of acting conscientiously, he has a tendency to repeat this class of actions, to do any action that is conscientious. In other words, whenever the idea "This action is my duty" occurs to him, he has a tendency to do that action. This tendency is certainly often sufficient to enable an extremely weak, conscien- tious desire to triumph over an intense opposing desire, and may even, perhaps, produce actions not prompted by any desire at all. This seems to me the true explanation of "anti-impul- sive effort." The correctness of my view depends on the answer to this question,—Are "anti-impulsive efforts" ever made until a habit has been acquired of acting conscientiously or prudently ?
—I am, Sir, &c., A DETERMINIST. Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S. TV., April 14th.
[If our correspondent be right, how is the initial act of a habit of restraining impulse ever to take place at all Of course, any true psychology must include, as one of the most active of the desires driving human beings on, the desire or craving,—for it is really a craving,—to act as we have been accustomed to act. We never supposed that the determinist thinks that volition must be in accordance with the intensest of all the desires, but only with the resultant of all the desires, cravings, and driving impulses, habit being, of course, one of the most obvious which act upon the soul. And if the determinist does not believe that, what does he believe P—En. Spectator.]
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