The End of One-man Rule
POLITICAL COMMENTARY
By ALAN WATKINS
IT is not altogether surprising that the last re- shuffle received less attention than it deserved. The changes were announced immediately be- fore the recess; there was a tendency to dismiss them as 'musical chairs'; and since then the politicians and the politician-watchers have been preoccupied with the problems of the wage freeze and of Rhodesia. Yet the re-shuffle may turn out to be rather more important than it was believed to be at the time. For one thing, it is the best re-shuffle we have got or are likely to get, as it appears that the changes promised for the autumn will not now take place. And, for another thing, it may have marked the beginning of a return to Cabinet, as distinct from prime ministerial, government in this country.
Not that there is any rigorous distinction be- tween the two methods. All Prime Ministers have an ascendancy over their colleagues : Mr Harold Wilson appeared to have a greater ascendancy than most partly owing to his skill in in- sinuating himself into the news at appropriate, and sometimes inappropriate, moments. At the same time, Mr Wilson's general policy was to keep one department largely in ignorance of what another was doing; or, if not in ignorance, then in' a .state of hostility. The best-known example was, of course, that of the Treasury and the De- partment of Economic Affairs. Today the two departments remain, but the political reality is different, and it may be instructive to try to piece together the changes that have occurred.
To begin, let us have a look at the current condition of the Treasury and of Mr James eallaghan. I have always had a soft spot for Mr Callaghan as a character on the political scene, and I cannot help feeling that in the weeks im- mediately before and immediately after the re- shuffle he was given a rather rough time both by the press and, more important, by his colleagues in the Cabinet. To some extent, indeed, this hostility inside the Government still persists. It is easy enough to explain, but less easy to justify. After all, what the Chancellor did was to tell not one but several journalists that he would like to leave the Treasury. The timing may have been tactless, and if Mr Callaghan had devoted a few minutes' thought to the matter he would have realised that no Prime Minister, least of all Mr Wilson, could afford to allow his Chancellor to depart at a time of financial crisis. Mr Callag- han can be convicted of an engaging simplicity, but that is about all. To describe his conduct as Machiavellian is to do an injustice to Mr Callag- han and also, incidentally, to Machiavelli.
As it is, there are two broad views about Mr Callaghan's situation. One is that he is bound hand and foot, condemned to sit back haplessly while the unemployment figures rise and his own political reputation falls. The other view—and there is some ground for thinking that it is shared by an optimistic Mr Callaghan—is that come next April we shall all be reflating like mad, at which time the Chancellor will emerge like the flowers that bloom in the spring. Whether this sanguine view turns out to be correct is, however, for present purposes immaterial: the important point is that Mr Callaghan has been relieved of the political presence of Mr George Brown.
I do not suggest that Mr Callaghan is there- fore in a vastly stronger personal position. For instance, in Conservative days the chairman of the Cabinet's economic committee was almost in- variably the Chancellor of the Exchequer. After October 1964 the chairman was Mr Brown. But today the chairmanship has not reverted to the Chancellor. Nor is it held by Mr Michael Stewart. The man at the head of the committee is Mr Wilson—though how long this revived interest in economics will last is another matter entirely.
However, both for policy and for personal reasons (Mr Stewart's appeal to disgruntled housewives to deluge Whitehall with letters is hardly calculated to inspire confidence), the DEA no longer counts for very much. The Chancellor must therefore to some extent be a gainer. At the same time Mr Brown is a gainer. No longer does he have to argue the toss with Mr Callaghan. Such time as he can spare from arguing with the foreigners he can devote to arguing with Mr Wil- son. We can put the whole situation in a slightly different way. Assuming that Mr Wilson carried out his re-shuffle in order to keep Mr Callaghan in his place—a curious reason, admittedly, for carrying out a re-shuffle, but then politics is a curious trade—the following paradoxical result has been obtained : Mr Callaghan has increased slightly in power, and Mr Brown considerably. And this result has been reached by the mere fact of their separation from each other; of Mr Brown's' being moved from the economic sphere.
At the Foreign Office Mr Stewart was con- spicuous for doing what lie was told. He did what he was told by his officials, by the State Department, by Mr Wilson; and he did it very well. The last vice anyone could accuse Mr Brown of possessing is obedience. As we all know, he is ostentatiously independent. Nor does he behave in this way merely for the sake of be- ing awkward, though that aspect is certainly present. Mr Brown is a man with ideas, often of a near-Palmerstonian character. Where Mr Wil- son and Mr Stewart based their entire foreign policy on the Anglo-American affiance, Mr Brown has quite other notions. When he was at the DEA he made no secret of his opposition to the keeping of large forces in the Far East, and he has not changed his views.
In fact, on a whole range of separate though connected questions—on East of Suez, on Europe, on attitudes towards General de Gaulle —Mr Brown holds opinions which are at variance with those of Mr Wilson. Of course we must not over-dramatise the situation. There is not likely to be any violent collision between Mr Wilson and Mr Brown, not at least in the im- mediate future. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the importance of having at the Foreign Office a politician with strong views of his own. Nor should we underestimate the sup- port he is likely to receive from such figures as Mr Anthony Crosland and Mr Roy Jenkins.
After Mr Brown, let us turn to the third, and in some ways the most interesting, member of what can provisionally be called an inner Cabinet —Mr Richard Crossman. When Mr Crossman was at the Ministry of Housing, Mr Wilson rarely asked his advice. At that stage Mr Wilson rarely, asked anyone's advice. Nevertheless, the neglect of Mr Crossman, who had, after all, been a confi- dant, was surprising. Not that there was any coolness between the two: in terms of money allocated, the Ministry of Housing did rather better than most departments, and this was due not only to the Prime Minister's frequently ex- pressed belief in the electoral importance of housing but also to his regard for Mr Crossirian. However, Mr Crossman was not consulted as frequently as he might have been. Today all that is changed. Mr Crossman is at the top as (no disrespect is intended to either party) the Priine Minister's man. If Mr Brown is there to change policy, Mr Crossman is there to project it, and also, at the same time, project himself.
The job of Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House is, like that of a political correspondent, largely what -one cares to make it. In this it differs from the majority of exalted political' posts. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for instance, is important irrespec- tive of the office's occupant' at any given time. The Leader of the House, on the other hand, can be a prominent 'figure like Herbert Morrison or a self-effacing one like Mr Herbert Bowden. We need have no doubts as to which model Mr Crossman will adopt as his own. And here we should remark not so much the power as the in- fluence of the position which any Lord President can occupy if he chooses. Inside the Cabinet he has a unique co-ordinating role. He Serves on several Cabinet committees. He knows, or ought to know, most of what goes on.
Nor is this all. Mr Crossman clearly sees his job as one not merely of co-ordinating the activities of the Cabinet but also of keeping the troops in good heart. His intervention last week, when he said that Part IV of the Prices and In- comes Bill was a step on the road to a planned economy, was good propaganda in that it added to the confusion on the left. And, like all good propaganda, it contained an element of truth— though, as Mr Crossman is perfectly well aware, Part IV is being introduced not to bring the Socialist millennium any nearer but for quite opposite reasons, chief among which is to im- press the distinctly non-Socialist foreign bankers.
The importance of Mr Crossman and Mr Brown and, to a lesser extent, Mr Callaghan is that in their different ways they presage a return to Cabinet government. Indeed there are signs that that return is already under way. It seems that on the Rhodesian question the Cabinet really did come to a collective view. Mr Wilson, in fact, seems to have realised that there are limits to the possible extent of personal rule. This realisation has.come chiefly through the pressure of events, notably. the sterling and Rhodesian crises. It has not come a moment too soon.
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