THE FUTURE OF EGYPT.
THE "Egyptian Question " must to-day be pressing upon her Majesty's Government more severely than ever, though the form of pressure may not be precisely that in which the public believes. We doubt the resistance of Europe to any plan of settlement which the British Government may propose and defend with vigour. The rooted idea of European statesmen is that conquest confers rights, only to be disputed when the enforcing of those rights is dangerous to the great States. They dare not depart from that principle, lest they should render war infructuous, and, therefore, interminable. No arrangement we can make for Egypt can be dangerous to any Power, no Power except ourselves cares one straw about the population, and every Power regards Turkey as a dead State, to be distributed by European decree, whenever Europe can agree to pronounce one. Therefore, though France may murmur, and Russia sneer, and Italy grow wrathful, there is no serious danger of European resistance to any reasonable proposal. Nor, as we firmly believe, will any such proposal irritate the British constitu- encies. They are not greedy to annex Egypt, or eager to retire from Egypt, or attached to any one medium plan ; but they are not hostile to annexation, or irritated by the thought of retirement, or indisposed to any working compromise. They think the work had to be done, they think it has been well done, and they will accept any scheme for the future whioh Mr. Gladstone and the Ministry may deliberately support. Nevertheless, the difficulties of the Ministry must be great. They have conquered Egypt, and they must dispose of it. They stand committed, partly through circumstances, partly through pledges to their own people, to Foreign Powers, and to the Khedive, not to cut the knot in the simplest and, as we still think, the most beneficial way, by a direct annexation, and to discover some plan which shall leave to Egypt a native Government, place that Government above the danger of in- eurrection, and enable Great Britain to insist on good internal administration. Those are the three avowed objects, and, as we believe, the sincere objects, of the Ministry ; and to recon- cile them all—to reconcile, that is, Egyptian autonomy with Egyptian good government, and both with the permanent ascendancy of Great Britain at Cairo, which we must have, or we have fought in vain, and shall have to fight again every ten years--is a problem which might perplex the most acute statesman in Europe. When carefully examined, however, with the notion of annexation put aside as a mere counsel of perfection, and that of a return to the status quo, with the Joint Control and all that, dismissed as an anachronism, the problem becomes, if not more easy, at least more simple. Clearly, the instrument to be used in Egypt must be the Khedive, under guidance, be- cause, short of an English Viceroy, there can be no other. A Turkish Pasha is out of the question, a Minister under a nominal Khedive would never be safe from intrigue, and a ruling Chamber, which Englishmen, of course, think of first, would not be controllable. No Chamber really representative, even if one could be elected, which is impossible, would attend to foreign counsels, or tolerate European supervision, or pass laws intended to give the people the benefit of Western ideas of justice and freedom. It would either be a shadow, or an assembly of Mussulman Arabs intent on realising Mussulman- Arab ideas. A deliberative Chamber is, of course, possible ; but the ultimate authority must rest with the Khedive, whom at is possible to advise, to guide, or in certain extreme con- tingencies to dismiss. If that is admitted, and it must be admitted in the end, however warmly doctrinaires may pro- test, the di
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difficulties are reduced to two,—how to re-establish the Khedive's s authority, and how to ensure his attention to British advice. We must not forget that Tewfik is in many respects an exceptional nian or that an Asiatic on a throne k•a
tes alike advice and work, or that a succeeding Khedive may, from religious feeling, personal dislike of the West, or devotion to a hostile Power, become the chief of the Egyptian opposition to Great Britain. Another Khedive is much more likely to resemble Arabi than to resemble Tewffic. It was that difficulty •
'which a hundred years ago broke up the autonomous
native government of Bengal. Clearly, the only way in which all ends could be secured in permanence and in perfection would be by a transfer, not of Egypt, but of the Sultan's suzerainty
over Egypt, , to the British Crown. Under that arrangement, if it Complete autonomy, possible to secure it, Egypt
would enjoy m h continue y, e European Powers would to possess all their rights ; while the British Government, in protecting Egypt, in guiding the Khedive, and. in vetoing revolutionary changes, would have a clear, legal position. Its garrison at Tel-el-Kebir, or in the citadel of Cairo, would be no intruding force. It would have no right, without European consent, to abolish the autonomy of the province, no claim to use its resources for English ends ; but its advice would be authoritative, and supported in grave cases by the right of changing the occupant of the throne. The change would have the great advantage that it would be nearly imperceptible to the body of the people, while the claim of the upper class of Egyptians to careers in their own country would be in no way interfered with or denied. The method of controlling a Native Sove- reign, without impairing his authority or interfering too much with his discretion, is perfectly familiar to English statesmen, who manage a score of kingdc mg in India on these ideas ; while the scheme, bringing, as it does, no new resources to Great Britain, should not excite any jealousy in Europe. The plan is, in fact, that which has prevailed throughout the war, and which, in some informal and, therefore, cumbrous shape, must continue to prevail for many years.
The actual transfer of the suzerainty is an accomplished fact, visible to every one in decrees like that by which the Khedive prohibits the punishment of keel-hauling ; but whether that transfer can be legally accomplished without a convulsion, is known to the Government alone. They are in possession of the ideas of the Powers and of the views of the Sultan, and to reason without those data is almost futile. All that outsiders can do is to point out that the transfer, if practi- cable, would secure all acknowledged ends, while leaving Egypt to itself, and to ask what the alternative can be. Unless we are to be contented with words and promises, we can see but two. One is that the British should supply the Khedive with a "contingent," say, of 3,000 Marines, which should render mutiny impossible, while its withdrawal would shake down the throne. That device would secure ascendancy to British counsels, perhaps, as well as any ; but it would need to be accompanied by some special and acknowledged right of inter- ference, bestowed by Europe upon the British Consul-General, otherwise we might find ourselves guarding a Khedive whom we were unable either to control or to dismiss. The other, and on the whole, the better alternative, is that the British Government should be declared by the Sultan, by the Khedive, and by Europe, Warden of the Canal, with all the rights they, can convey, and specially with the right of garrisoning Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. That con- cession would secure all direct British interests in Egypt, making the route to India permanently safe, and all European interests in the Canal, as the British might be trusted to carry out any European decision as to rights of transit ; to treat the Canal, for instance, as an open seaway, upon which, like Denmark in the Sound, they were authorised to col- lect dues. At the same time, the Power planted upon the Canal and in possession of Ismailia, with access both from England and India, would, merely from its geo- graphical position, exercise an irresistible ascendancy at Cairo, and that not only over the Khedive, but over any hostile or mutinous faction among his subjects. We should he abso- lutely safe, and much more influential than ever, while we should not be responsible for any portion of the Egyptian Administration. The disadvantages of that scheme are, that it would at first irritate France, which, with some reason, believes that Frenchmen have the first claim on the Canal ; that it would involve considerable expense, which there would be no revenue to meet, though the cost might ultimately be pro- vided in part from the Shares in the Canal owned by the British Government ; and that we should possess only indirect means of promoting the prosperity of the Egyptian people, towards whom we have incurred grave responsibilities. Those are difficulties, however, which could be overcome, and the sense of permanent security which would be afforded by our control of the direct water-way to India is well worth both some expenditure and some risk. There may be other alternatives yet, but we do not see them, and we feel a permanent dread lest the Govern- ment, in an enthusiasm of disinterestedness, should claim too little right to benefit the country they have subdued. The success of the Egyptian Expedition will be nearly worthless if, on its termination, we are not masters of the direct route to India, and able to ensure in perpetuity to the people of the
Nile Valley decent administration. Those are not great claims to make, but to secure them we must propose, and, if necessary, insist, that Great Britain shall possess, de jure and de facto, a clear ascendancy in the Khedive's Court.
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