Chips Down in Suez
BY ANGUS MAUDE, MP IT is difficult, and probably foolish, to pronounce now upon the present situation in the Middle East. For one thing, the situation existing as I write may have changed radically and suddenly before these words come to be read; it is also doubtful whether enough will be known, perhaps for years. about the events of November 5-6 to enable facts and motives to be put in proper perspective. But almost everyone who has spoken or written about this has been concerned to make a case of one kind or another; and there is one case that has not been put and which is in danger of going by default. That is the case of the so-called 'Suez Group' in the Conservative Party. This statement may appear surprising, since many people assume that this case is identical with that of the Government. It is true that the members of the group have confined themselves, certainly since October 29 and in most cases since July 27, to stating and supporting the Government's policy. It is largely for this reason (although political motives have had something to do with it) that both Socialist and Conservative , opponents of the Government's actions are now saying that the Prime Minister 'has tried the policy of the "Suez Group" and that it has failed.' Since this is untrue, and unfair both to the Prime Minister and to ourselves, I believe it to be desirable at this juncture to make quite clear what are the views of at least one member of this group.
It is well known that we bitterly opposed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, under which British troops were progres- sively withdrawn from the Suez Canal Zone. Looking through my speeches at the time, and those of my colleagues, I find the following predictions : that British prestige in the Middle East would suffer to such an extent that our friends in Jordan and Iraq would find it increasingly difficult to stand by us and sur' vive; that the resulting power vacuum would be filled either by America, which would be probably hostile and certainly inept, or by Russia, which was actively malevolent; that nothing effective would stand between Israel and her obliteration by the hostile Arab States; that the security of the Canal would be seriously endangered; and that once out of Egypt we could get back at need only by armed aggression with the weight of world opinion against us. I thought then, and I still think, that if we had been prepared to hold out in Egypt even for six more months we should either have secured a better agreement or have brought down the Egyptian Government; although it is true that our position had already been gravely weakened by our obvious determination to leave.
Having thrown away their strongest cards, the British Government played the rest of the hand in the only possible way. They made an honest and whole-hearted effort to secure the friendly co-operation of Colonel Nasser and to bring to an end the intermittent hostilities between Arab and Jew. Indeed, one of their strongest arguments for withdrawing British troops was that this gesture was an essential foundation for Anglo- Egyptian friendship. Those who now accuse the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of being petulant warmongers conveni- ently ignore the months of patient work, in the face of betrayal, broken promises and insults, which they devoted to the task of conciliating Nasser and trying to convince him of our good intentions. They succeeded only too well; Nasser became con- vinced that the British Government would put up with any- thing, and to this extent the parallel with Hitler in 1936-39 is almost exact. Meanwhile, the build-up of Russian arms, the mounting threats against Israel, and the undermining of British and French interests in North Africa and the Middle East by Egyptian and Saudi agents went on apace.
Then, when Nasser judged the moment propitious, came the `nationalisation' of the Canal. At this crisis the immediate use of armed force to occupy the Canal would have caused com- paratively little stir in the world; confronted with a fait accompli, the Americans would certainly not have gone out of their way to have us ejected. Why it took two months to prepare an expeditionary force is a pertinent question, but this is not Yet the time to ask it. The plain fact is that by the end of October it had become almost impossible to justify its use. In addition, thanks to Mr. Dulles, Nasser's prestige had actually been increased, rather than diminished, in the areas where it mattered most.
When Israel invaded Sinai I believe the British Government were right, to decide that it was essential to occupy the Canal. It was not only that the war might have spread over the whole Middle East. It had by that time become vital to the survival of Western interests that Nasser should be either ousted or visibly diminished in stature. At this point, again, a quick, clean surgical operation would have been immensely effective and relatively easy to justify as a fait accompli. Unfortunately, it took a week for the Malta force to arrive, during which large bodies of opinion were alienated by systematic bombing.
I said that the Government were on balance right to use force, frightful though the risks were. What I now have to ask is whether they were right to do it if they were not determined to go through with it to the bitter end. It certainly was no part of the policy of the 'Suez Group' to stop at Port Said ! In view of the appalling danger of going in at all, were the extra risks involved in total occupation of the Canal so much greater as to justify the chance of a total moral defeat? I simply don't know, but I would very much like to. Are we not now in danger of losing everything we risked without anything to show for it? Even Nasser's prestige is very little diminished among the Arabs. He has explained away his defeat in Sinai and is about to get the Israelis out of it; and he is now laying down the law to the United Nations like a righteous householder telling the police not to walk on the carpets and flower-beds when they come to arrest the burglar.
Many of the Government's supporters are utterly bewildered. We admired the Prime Minister's courage and steadfastness in taking the action he did. Is it all to be wasted? Why did we stop? If it was because of the Russian threat, then Russia will soon be, immovably entrenched in the Middle East. If it was because of an American threat to starve us of oil, then responsi- bility for the ultimate destruction of Western interests in the Middle East—and perhaps of the Atlantic Alliance—rests squarely on Mr. Eisenhower, and we admit to the world that we are now an American satellite.
Is it still too late to save the game? Not only our own interests are at stake, but those of Israel and of our friends in Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Jordan. Can we not even now insist absolutely on remaining where we are (with freedom to advance if necessary) unless and until a really effective UN force is built up? Above all, can we not refuse to move without assurances that the UN force will remain until international control of the Canal is guaranteed? For let us make no mistake about it : if, when the Canal is unblocked, Nasser is seen to be still running the Canal, Nasser will have won, and we shall have sustained a shattering defeat. There is a poker game in progress, and our hand is still not negligible; all that is needed is the nerve to play it. The Russians will bluff to the limit, but the experience of Persia, Berlin, Korea and many other indications suggest that they will not go to war for Egypt. They may send 'volunteers,' but our military advantage, if we care to exploit it, is still considerable. It is nerve that will count. If we lose that we lose everything.
Previous page
