A Great Peacemaker
The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815. By C. X. Webster. (Bell. 25s.) Jr is now fairly well agreed that Castlereagh was one of' the wisest of British statesmen and that he has been misjudged by later generations. The Whig writers of his time held hire largely responsible for all the mistakes of Lord Liverpoolii Ministry. The Irish, who have terribly long memories, denounced him because, as a young man, he had to induce the Protestant Irish Parliament to pass the Act of Union. Few historians, except Alison, have taken the trouble to examine Castlereagh's true life-work which lay in directing our foreign policy at the close of the long Napoleonic wars and in restoring peace and harmony to a distracted Europe. But now that Professor Webster has completed his study of Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary, and set out clearly the details of long and complex negotiations, there can be no excuse for a repetition of the old partisan libels. In his own sphere, Castlereagh was obviously a great statesman who, while truly patriotic, possessed an international mind, and :strove- earnestly-evert against his.own :Colleagdes, the-Prince Regent, Parliament and the Press—to minimise the penalties imposed on defeated France so that the peace might endure.
. In a previous volume ProfessOr Webster 'treated of the " seven years after the Peace of Paris in 1815, during which the Powers readjusted European differences at successive con- - ferences, while the Tsar's Holy Alliance waxed and waned and France regained her standing in Europe. In his new volume, more important still, perhaps, because the subject has never before been studied So fully and so dispassionately,. tie author deals with Castlereagh's -diplomacy in the very critical years from 1812 to 1815. He had first to form the great alliance which, after Napoleon's Russian disasters, at last brought together overwhelming forces at Leipzig in 1813- ° Russians, Prussians, Swedes under Bernadotte, and Austrians. The outlook in the early months of 1813 was gloomy, even; after Napoleon's loss of the Grand Army. Our resources were strained to the uttermost by the Peninsular War, and by the unhappy war with . the United -States. Prussia was ' fearful of challenging her conqueror. Metternich in Austria was temporizing and ready to make terms with Napoleon. Bernadotte, as Prince Royal of Sweden, was demanding Norway—hitherto a Danish province—and a large subsidy from us as the price of his help. The Opposition at home was clamouring for peace at any price. Castlereagh's resolute attitude saved-the situation. The European Powers slowly realized that the. chance of shaking off French domi- - nation must not be lost, though even after Leipzig Napoleon could have had very.liberal terms, with Metternieh's assent. Castlereagh himself joined the Allied sovereigns at their headquarters in the confused campaign of 1814 in Eastern France, and there had first to restrain the Tsar from marching on Paris as sole victor and then to reassure him when he :talked of retreating after Napoleon's success against Blucher. - '• What Castlereagh has achieved is really wonderful," wrote his brother to a friend ; " But for him I do believe we should have been off, the Devil take the hindmost." The English statesman, keeping his head amid all the confusion and intrigue, persuaded the three Powers to sign the Treaty of Chaumont, by which, in return for immense subsidies from , England, they agreed to pursue the war to its end and after- : wards for twenty years to guarantee the peace. But for
that treaty, the Allies might have quarrelled and Napoleon . • .might have retained his throne.
CaStlereagh had won the first round, but he had harder tasks still in the peace negotiations at Paris that followed Napoleon's fall in 1814, and in those of a year later when the Emperor _had come back from Elba and fought and lost at Waterloo. The narrative is of absorbing interest, especially to a generation that has followed with close attention and not a little concern the proceedings of another European Peace Conference at Paris. It is to be noted that Castlereagh. with a few assistants, conducted the whole business- on behalf of England in 1814, and that a year later, when Wellington was made his colleague, the Duke gave him full and loyal support. Castlereagh had to consult his Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues by letter from time to time, but in the main they accepted his advice, even when the Prince Regent and Parliament were most restive and suspicious. Throughout these anxious months the Foreign Secretary worked untiringly for a moderate peace. England was prepared to give up many-of her colonial conquests. On the Continent she insisted only that the Netherlands, including Antwerp, should be freed from French control. Castlereagh did his .utmost to preserve to France what was truly trench and to preVent annexations of the old kind that must lead to' future trouble. He achieved his purpose in the main by securing the confidence and support of the Tsar Alexander. It was not to Russia's interest that "Prussia should be given unduly large territories on the Rhine, including Luxemburg, and Austria had no wish for Prussia to absorb the whole of Saxony.
Even after Waterloo Castlereagh persisted in his moderate policy. He had no belief in penalties for the vanquished. He would not even have compelled the French Government to restore the art treasures brought to the Louvre from various
capitals LS' by Napoleon and his Marshals, but the and . • Llittmt insisted %Lillis restitution.- .Ceelereagh aid Welling- ton _were fiercely attacked in-the Parisian Press. " There is a delightful irony,"'says Professor Webster, "that the two men who were doing most to save France from dismemberment and ruin should be made the central targets of Parisian hatred at the crisis of their fate." Castlereagh would not, the author thinks, have sent Napoleon to St. Helena, but here again English public opinion was too strong for him. Castlereagh had thought of detaining the fallen Emperor in Scotland. But his chief, Liverpool, " had all along wished him to be tried by the French * Government—and hung or shot by their orders." The Prime -Minister anticipated by a century: the cry of " Hang the Kaiser." Happily, the monstrous and foolish suggestion was put aside in 1815 as in 1919, largely through the good sense of Castlereagh. - His success in bringing about a peace that was on the whole reasonable and ',that lasted for many years was, as the author says, " a victory for character. The other parties to the conference trusted him." Above all, " Castlereagh had the great gift of obtaining what he wanted in such a manner that others came to want it also. He had exactly the same ideal which Lady Gwendolen Cecil attributes to her father : His own conception of a perfect diplomacy was always one whose victories. come without observation.' " . Castlereagh, who had inherited from Pitt the idea of a European settlement guaranteed by the great Powers, would not have been out of his element at Geneva
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