BOOKS.

OUR GREATEST WAR MINISTER.*

Mn. CORBETT'S book serves a twofold purpose. It is at the same time an illuminating study of one of our most glorious wars and a worthy tribute to the great statesman whose energy and genius secured the successes which have rendered that period memorable. The Seven Years' War has never hitherto received from English writers the attention it deserves. True, each of its many-sided aspects has been exhaustively treated by one or more writers : the German campaigns chiefly by Continental historians; the conquest of Canada by English and Canadian chroniclers; the exploits of Clive, Coote, Pocock, and Watson by others ; and the important part played by the Fleet by naval authors. But Mr. Corbett, as far as we know, is the first to take a comprehensive view of the war, and to disentangle the harmonious purpose running through England's efforts. The importance of this broad method to the student of history or of strategy can hardly be exaggerated ; for nothing is so essential to an understanding of success or failure in war as the correlation of all the elements brought into play during a campaign. Too many naval and military historians are apt to forget that the Army and Navy are not the end of a nation's existence, but literally the " services " whereby she attains one of her ends. If Mr. Corbett had done nothing else in these volumes, his ample recognition of this truth would have entitled him to the gratitude of our men of affairs and historical students.

Pitt's war, as Mr. Corbett justly calls the subject of his study, was the final scene in the great struggle between England and the house of Bourbon. William III. and Marlborough had defeated the ambition of Louis XIV. to dominate Europe; Pitt finally burst the bonds with which that house had attempted to strangle our efforts at com- mercial and colonial expansion. During the previous War of the Austrian Succession England had really had the same interests to Bemire as during the Seven Years' War ; but none of our statesmen had grasped the real issues. We then made war piecemeal, defending an interest of minor importance here, attacking an enemy of small

s. * Rut/land in the Seven Years War: a Study in Combined Strategy. By Julian Corbett, LL.M. 2 vols. London: Longman and Co. [21e. net.]

moment there, and wasting our energies in resisting alterations which did not affect us in the map of Germany.

Meanwhile our real points of danger in the West Indies, in America, and in India were neglected during the war and sacrificed at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Seven Years'

War was entered upon in the same spirit. Dreary con- troversies were protracted as to whether Hanover should be defended or abandoned to its fate, quite regardless of any idea as to our ultimate object in fighting at all on the Continent; our fleets lost the advantage of their superiority in numbers by acting chiefly on the defensive ; while even in America, far from adopting the initiative to which our position entitled us, we found ourselves feebly resisting the encroach- ments of the French, who knew what they wanted, and

were gradually attaining it. Pitt on coming into power brushed aside the petty accidentals, heedless whether he pursued the Duke of Newcastle's beloved " Old System " of alliances or not, or even whether his own policy could be reconciled with a rigid standard of verbal consistency; he saw that every means of waging war was good which weakened

the house of Bourbon, and that any other action was waste of time and energy. He did more. Though somewhat neglect- ful of purblind or incompetent colleagues like the Duke of Newcastle or Lord Holdernesse, he at least made the country see what were the issues at stake, and took every care in his

despatches to leave his Admirals and Generals in no doubt as to his ultimate intentions, so that when his own instructions had not provided for some new turn of fortune, they

should not fail from ignorance of the grand objects of the campaign.

This significance of the war, and Pitt's work in seeing and disclosing it, are well brought ot.i, by Mr. Corbett. Perhaps he yields too readily to the temptation to believe that Pitt's genius had from the first formed the great scheme, into which a later generation, informed of all the facts, can

fit the various details of the war. But this is a minor error ; for even if he gradually fitted in new plans to his original conception, the comprehensiveness of his vision and his adaptability to facts remain almost as remarkable. What, however, is incontestably useful in Mr. Corbett's study is his demonstration that incidents which have often been regarded as out of the picture were really an integral portion of the general scheme. Thus he proves by movements of the French regiments and the evidence of French public opinion that Pitt's much-abused raids on the French coast entirely fulfilled his objects of relieving the pressure on Frederick, distracting the enemy's attention from his own aims, and contributing to the impoverishment and discontent of the French people. Again, the relation of the German campaigns to England's war policy in general is very clearly explained, especially for the first few years of the war. Our chief regret in this matter is that some of the later campaigns on the Continent are not described with the same clearness of detail. It is made manifest for the first time in these pages that Pitt by his support of Frederick kept the flower of the French army in Europe engaged in a war much more beneficial to the Empress than to France, while England's almost undivided attention was devoted to the consolidation of trade and a Colonial Empire.

Pitt's own share in this war was so large that its history becomes almost a biography of him during the years of his moat fruitful activity. Later as Earl of Chatham he showed

his capacity for statesmanship at a time of peace ; but as a War Minister he thought of nothing but war. In the heat of the battle he cared nothing for finance or Parliamentary

management, or, indeed, for the broadest aspects of a settle- ment after the war. He was one of those

" Bounded by themselves, and unregardful In what state God's other works may be. In their own tasks all their powers pouring, These attain the mighty life you see."

It was well for England that be was. But Mr. Corbett also rightly reminds the reader that a point comes in all wars when it may be more fatal to go on winning victories than to hold one's hand. Purely from a military point of view Pitt was undoubtedly right in wishing to make the first move in the war with Spain in 1761, but it is at least open to question whether it would have been the beet course for the country. There are times when a statesman has to consider the moral effect on the world's opinion of a step, however necessary it may appear to the strategist. From that. standpoint Mr. Corbett does good service in suggesting that Granville, Hardwicke, Ligonier, and Anson were possibly justified in refusing to

support Pitt. But if towards the end of the war the statesman may have been sunk in the great War Minister, in that province his influence was the best that England ever had. If one wants to realise what Pitt did for his country- men, no better illustration can be found than the change of spirit which he introduced among the soldiers and sailors of his day. How instructive, for example, to compare in Mr.

Corbett's book the attitudes of the two Services to one another in the Rochefort and Quebec Expeditions ! In the first, it was all bickering and red-tape; in the second, two short years later, the chief emulation consisted in seeing which of the two, the Army or the Navy, should be foremost to help the other.

As Townshend, who was left in command after Wolfe's death, wrote to Pitt, "it is my duty to acknowledge how great a share the Navy has had in this successful campaign"; and Mr. Corbett again makes plain to this generation how the capture of Quebec was at least as much a naval as a military victory. And that this loyal co-operation was no mere accident is evident from the prominence always given by Pitt in his instructions for amphibious expeditions to the need of harmony between the two Services. In the enthusiastic patriotism, too, which he infused among his younger commanders, so different from the self-seeking querulousness apparent a few years before, Pitt's spirit is also evident. Thus Admiral Osborn writes to acknowledge a formal vote of thanks : " As the House of Commons is so gloriously watchful to encourage the greatest merit by reward- ing the least, England can never want good officers"; while of Wolfe Mr. Corbett can justly say:-

" For all his science, the moral force in warfare was always for him the master element. The desire,' he afterwards wrote to Pitt, to act in conformity with the King's intentions induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a victorious army finds no difficulties.' We can hear the echo of Rochefort in his words. There he had learnt that nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to your undertaking which is not found to be really so upon trial' ; that the want of enterprise ruins troops and that a general should at least attempt what he has been sent to do."

Besides the broad statesmanship of his view, his tactical and strategic acumen, and his appreciation of Pitt's greatness, Mr. Corbett has rendered a great service to military history by the urbanity of his methods. It is a fault not uncommonly found in a certain school of military writers to treat all who hold views contrary to those which they are maintaining almost as enemies to their country. Mr. Corbett, on the contrary, much strengthens his own position by his reasonable appreciation of those from whom he differs. Thus, while disagreeing profoundly with the sentiments of the Duke of Bedford, hitherto generally held up to execration as the author of the Treaty of Paris, he explains the noteworthy considerations underlying his attitude. He remembers, what is often for- gotten, that this Duke in the previous war made good plans for expelling the French from Canada, and that, if he had possessed the force and driving-power of Pitt, Wolfe's great achievement might have been forestalled by thirteen years. Again, he shows a generous appreciation of the skill and valour of the French and of their difficulties, and demonstrates a fact also frequently neglected, that their seamanship was hardly, if at all, inferior to our own. His temptation is rather to be too charitable to the whipping-boys of history. He is very kind to the Duke of Newcastle's measures at the outset of the war ; the most is made of Barrington's somewhat slender claims to distinction ; and Anson is honoured on grounds which may be justified, but which Mr. Corbett does not sufficiently make manifest.

In his use of original materials the author shows himself a scholar, but no pedant. He started, of course, well equipped for his task by his profound knowledge of naval history and science. He also reveals a critical judgment in his apt selec- tion of political events drawn from the memoirs and letters of the day to illustrate his strategic problems. Especially grateful will the student be for his research among the Lansdowne MSS.—of which there is, unfortunately, only an epitome by the Historical Manuscripts Commission—to com- plete the account of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris. There are a few omissions in this book, the most notable being the absence of any allusion to Bute's remarkable suggestion to the French that they should win an advantage over Prince Ferdinand before peace was signed. His style too, is not always on a level quite worthy of the fine treatment of his subject. But as a whole this study of the Seven Years' War is a book of great moment, and deserves the attention, not merely of the naval officers to whom it was originally addressed, but of all serious students of government.