The Crisis in Persia
By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.
THE assassination of the Persian Prime Minister has brought into relief the unstable nature of one of the important key positions on the edge of the Iron Curtain in Asia. His untimely death is bound to strengthen the forces making for unrest. on which reaction and Communism feed.
Persia is right on the borders of Russian Central Asia and the Caucasus, and hence an excellent place for all forms of Russian intrigue. • Since the war ended many Persians have recognised the need for foreign help in developing the resources of their country. The American Twentieth Century Fund has produced voluminous reports, and this along with United Nations Advisory Committees has finally crystallised in the Five-Year Plan for the economic and social development of Persia. This plan would, if it were carried out, go a long way to increase the natural wealth of Persia and raise the standard of life of the people. But up to date the plan remains on paper only. Its finance could be secured with the proposed new agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. whereby considerable increases of revenue from oil royalties are guaranteed. But the whole scheme is still held up.
Meanwhile, apart from the problem of increasing the national wealth, there is the kindred problem of dividing more equitably the annual income derived from that wealth. When I visited Persia last autumn I spent some time in villages in various parts of the country, and formed the impression that the land-tenure system is a variant of that which exists in a large part of the Middle East. It is based on the division of the products of the soil between landlord, water-owner and peasant. A large number of peasants, however, arc without resources, and consequently a prey to usurers, who may or may not be the landlords. There is no system of cheap credit to assist the poorer section of the peasants. This is partly because there is no system of collecting the savings of the people and investing them in productive enter- prise and development loans, and partly because the landlord and moneylender are quite content that things should remain as they arc. The consequence is that a section of the peasants in most villages struggle along with primitive implements, scratching a bare living from the soil. Except in Azerbaijan and parts of Khorassan, where there is appreciable rainfall, Persian agriculture is dependent almost entirely on irrigation. The water for these irrigation canals comes from the snows of the mountains, and when the snowfall in winter in insufficient, as it often is, the water in the canals fails, and in the absence of resources or cheap credits a section of the peasants starve and flock into the towns, where they live in squalor and beg. A system of agricultural credits, improved implements, seeds and livestock would enable this problem to be dealt with, and all sensible and progressive Persians see the truth of this.
And always there is the example and propaganda of Persia's great northern neighbour. When I was in Soviet Azerbaijan. in 1945, I formed the opinion that the condition of the Moslem peasants there was much better than that of the peasants in the old kingdom of Persia south of the border. The landlords and moneylenders who existed in the days of the Tsar were gone, and the collectivisation of agriculture had not been forced on the peasants in the Caucasus and Central Asia in quite the same Way as it had been in European Russia. In these circum- stances it is impossible to deny that the COmmunist agrarian policy in these parts of the Soviet Union is bound to have a certain attraction for the peasants of Asia in general and of Persia in particular. The development of agricultural research and of tractor depots is far more advanced in Russian Central Asia than in any part of the Middle East. Moreover, the peasants of these parts are not yet aware of the danger that they might ultimately become organised compulsorily into collective farms as the peasants.have been in European Russia.
All these facts have become clear to a few far-sighted Persians in recent years. The growth of industry set up by the late Riza Shah has created a small class of skilled and professional workers, while highereducation, which has made a little progress, has created an intelligentsia in the larger towns. A certain , number of the younger members of the landed nobility, tired of the role their parents expect them to play, are giving their services voluntarily for social work and in Government offices for development and educational schemes. This is one of the most encouraging symptoms of Persian life today. The Shah himself has not been slow to realise that reforms are needed if the Tudeh, or .Communist Party of Persia, is not to win mass adherence. Hence last summer he appointed as Prime Minister Mr. Razmara, a man who had no connection with the noble families hitherto so largely dominating Persian politics. An army man of humble origin, Razmara showed ability as Chief of General Staff and Governor of Luristan. When I saw him last October I formed the impression that he personified the pro- gressive element in Persian life, small as yet, but possessing the confidence of the Shah. I found that both he and his Ministers were working at programmes that would have resulted in the financing of the schemes in the Five-Year Plan, and also had measures for balancing the budget, whereby the big landowners and merchants would for the first time have been made to contribute to the national revenue. Not only was he not selling Persia out to the foreigners, but he was insisting that the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company should contribute funds in oil royalties which would be the principal financial basis of the Five-Year Plan.
As soon as it was clear that this was his aim, the reactionary groups in the Mejlis got to work behind the scenes to obstruct the Shah and the Prime Minister by every means in their power. They have not been without allies. Unfortunately, it seems that increasing popular discontent with the old regime and the danger of Communism spreading out of sheer despair have brought a n'ew and most sinister force into Persian public life—an extreme form of emotional nationalism with a religious bias and with a readiness to use terrorist methods. Deep down in Persian psychology is a fanaticism born of a love of martyrdom. There is a universalism in Persian philosophy which goes back to Zoroastrian and even earlier days. but there is also a narrow strain of fanaticism which comes from the periods during which Persia was temporarily crushed under the heel of foreigners, first the Arabs, then the Seljuks, then the Mongols, and now the threat of Russian Communism. Curiously enough, this movement is directed at the moment more against the West, and especially against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company than it is against Russia. The success of the great oil concern on the Gulf is, naturally, gaffing to the pride of emotional nationalists, and the illogical nature of the whole idea is seen when, instead of welcoming the new oil agreement, which would guarantee the economic development of Persia for years to come, they now demand the driving out of all foreigners and the nationalisation of all oil undertakings. And this with five per cent. of the population literate and no technical college worth the name except the one run by the oil company at Abadan. This terrorist organisation and the ideologically kindred group in the Persian Parliament called the National Front is typical of what is going on in the Middle East today. In the Arab countries it is seen in the Moslem Brotherhood, which has caused such trouble in Egypt. It is a Moslem form of Fascism, and. is a symptom of the profoundtdisturbance in the archaic social system of these countries which are faced with the problem of meeting the demands of the modern world. This extreme form of nationalism in Asia is being exploited for all it is worth by Russia. For although it has not much in common with Com- munism, the Russians tried to direct it against the Western Powers, and then use it as a stepping-stone to secure the advance of Comniunism. There can be little doubt that this is what is happening in Persia today, and that some reactionary interests are prepared to 'sell out to the Russians rather than see reforms and developments on Western lines. But the Western Powers can find plenty of elements in Persian society who understand their point of view and who would like to see Persia develop along Western lines, while retaining the integrity and independ- ence of . this most ancient of kingdoms.
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