In Defence of Munich
Munich : Before and After. By W. W. Hadley. (Cassell. 7s. 6d.)
IN a calm, dispassionate analysis of events before and after the critical moment of September 29th, 1938, Mr. Hadley presents an unapologetic Apology for Munich and Mr. Chamberlain. He has endeavoured to state the relevant facts with perfect candour and without intentional suppression. He goes back as far as Italy's aggression in Abyssinia, finding that the League was not prepared for strong restraining action, while the French Government were very lukewarm. In his references to the Spanish civil war he gives the circumstances under which Mr. Eden felt he could go no further in appeasement of Italy, and resigned. He discusses the beginnings of the rearmament of Germany (of which Mr. Baldwin was aware in 1933), the invasion of Austria in March, 1938, and the movement of German divisions near Czechoslovakia in May, and then Berchtel- gaden, Godesburg, Munich. He calls attention quite justly to the fact that all parties must take a share of responsibility for the failure to rearm after 1933 ; that the country was almost aggressively pacifist in 1935 and even longer. lie makes out a case, relying however too much on quotations from leaders in newspapers, to show that public opinion was with Mr. Chamberlain before and during the Munich crisis, and draws the conclusion that the country would not have approved rejection of the Munich terms at the price of war. Finally, he contends that in 1938 we were not, from a military point of view,-in a position to go to war, and that we gained a year to improve, our defences.
At what precise stage on this slippery slope did the Government go wrong? That is one of Mr. Hadley's questions. Because no step in this long process of running down hill was much worse than any other, he seems to conclude that nothing-was very wrong. The contention of those who fundamentally disagree with him is that the Munich policy can only be fairly judged in the light, of the policy which culminated there. The country was almost insanely pacifist in 1935. Yes, but would it have been if Mr. Baldwin had taken it into his confidence and told all the facts? The League of Nations was weak about Abyssinia, but would it have been if Britain had given it a decisive lead? Mr. Eden realised that there was danger in persisting in a succession of acts of appeasement, and, demanding a halt in vain, resigned. British and French policy gave confidence to Hitler. He was not ready in 1938. The movement into Austria as a military operation was bungled. In May, when
Hitler was preparing to march into Czechoslovakia, he was taken aback by the fact of Czech mobilisation. Mr. Hadley deals too slightly with that supremely important moment. That, not Septem- ber, was the time for an . unmistakeable British pronouncement. When September came it was perhaps already • too late. Mr. Chamberlain may, or may not, have gained a year, but to what military advantage? High military experts have expressed the opinion that Britain, France and Czechoslovakia in 1938 were together less unready to cope with Germany, whose preparations were in- complete, than France, Britain and Poland were in 1939. The latter was Germany's zer.) time. But Mr. Hadley has stated his case ably, and refused to unsay today what he, with so many others, said five years ago. He has the courage of his past convictions.
R. A. SCOTT-JAMES.
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