A BRITISH INVITATION TO RUSSIA.
T"papers of Tuesday published the answer of the British Government to the Russian inquiries about the Allied objects in the war. By far the most important part of the answer contained,' in our opinion, in the last few sentences, which run as follows :- " The British Government heartily join their Russian Allies in their acceptance and approval of the principles laid .clown by President Wilson in his historic Message to the American Congress. These are the aims for which the British peoples are fighting. These are the principles by which their war policy is, and will be, guided. The British Government believe that, broadly speaking; the 'agreements which they have from time to time mado with their Allies are conformable to these standards. But if the Russian Government so desire, they are quite ready, with their Allies, to -examine .and, if need be, revise these agreements."
The. last sentence, in which the British Government invite the Russians to say whether they would like to have -the peace terms of the Allies revised or restated, is obviously of the greatest moment. The proposal is made almost- as a -casual suggestion, but we could wish that it had taken the shape of a formal invitation with " R.S.V.P.," so to speak, printed in heavy type 'at the bottom. We cannot imagine anything more useful than a constant reiteration of the terms of the Allies. If the terms could be made stiffer at every restatement, on the principle of the Sibyl's offers, so much the better, for that would- probably help' to shorten the war. An enemy- who is becoming very doubtful of his success is naturally suseeptible.te- that sort of argument. ',But at all events-lot-the Allies', terms. be restated as often as the; enemy pretends to misunderstand- them or the .onlooking' world se-erns to have forgotten them. The principles ofliberty and nationalityaof reparation and security, which inspire the Allies, do not.admit of very varying terms. They can be applied with something like absolute precision. There is no danger whatever, that we can see, in the Allies applying .and reapplying those, principles to the shifting cir- cumstances of the war. .But hitherto the Allies have acted as though their war objects were the sacred and mysterious name that .must not be mentioned. True, our aims have been stated in general terms on special occasions, and as we think with enormous effect. But the words we have quoted above show that there is no desire to reassert the Allies' aims just now unless Russia presses for a revision. We hope that Russia will press. There are many reasons why we should be anxious for her to do so. Since• the-war aims of the Allies were last proclaimed the Russian - Revolution has occurred, and a -fresh set of principles, has been brought under discussion —the principles represented by the Russian motto of " No annexations and no indemnities." -Plainly the war aims of the. Allies may require restatement in form—though we are convinced that they • will, not require it in principle in any particular—in view of thee-possibility of a misunderstanding of them in Russia. It needs, in fact, to be ascertained whether, when Russian opinion has been consulted, the state- ment of the aims of the Allies will require any modification. Not to admit that is to fail to treat Russia as a sincere. Ally, and that is a situation which we must refuse •even to imagine.
The war has now reached a point at which it is clear to us that Germany cannot win. She may, of course, inflict much more suffering -on us and bring us to the last stages of ex- haustion before she recognizes that her dream of domination is ended. On the other hand, it is conceivable that when she recognizes that she can gain nothing, but rather stands to lose more than ever, by continuing the war, she may call for peace quite suddenly. -We do not expect this, but it may happen, and we shall behave most foolishly if we do not prepare for every event. Suppose that Germany did decide this summer that she must have peace, the German Government might very well argue like this : "'The Allies are at this moment in some cenfusion as their aims. Russia has promulgated a new formula, and no one knows exactly what it would mean when translated into action. If we give them time, Russia arid,her Allies will certainly come to an agreement as to their exact intentions. -If therefore we are. going to make a new and tempting offer of peace within a few months, we had better make it sooner than later. A sudden offer -may be a kind of bombshell. It:may :easily add to the existing eon- fusion, and out of the general -muddle we may be able by shrewd diplomatic strokes -to do -quite well for ourselves after all," That is A possibility: against -which we ought to prepare ourselves with all speed. We must not dream of entering a Peace Conference without having Agreed with Russia and the rest Of our Allies -in every detail -what our terms must be.
. -It -would be -a gratuitous folly to fail in preparation because we are confident, as we have said on previous occasions, that the Russian :objects and our -objects are exactly the same. You can often draw up sets of abstract -aspirations that look very different, but if you apply practical tests to them you will find that they ,are only different.approaches to the same. end. Let, us eonsider the Russian principle of " No annexations and -no indemnities " together with our own principles of restitution, reparation, security, and the recog- nition of nationality. All that Russia means is that she does not approve Of. landgrabbing, and that she does not want to exact indemnities as -a form of punishment. ' There • we are heartily at One with her. The most obvious case of proposed • annexation " with which Russia is associated is the former Russian -demand that She should have Conatantinople. This demand came from Russia heraelf while the Tsar still ruled. No (Me' forced it upon her: If under her new- democratic Government she sayathat she no longer wants Constantinople, well and good. In-many ways we shall be sorry, for Russia haaalways seemed to us to be in the true Byzantine succession and to be the moat: suitable guardian of the Straits. But if Russia repudiates the idea of, possessing Constantinople there need certainly be' no annexation ", there. The problem will actually be simplified for the-Allies to that extent. They wi}l ,be relieved of the. obligation to place Constantinople in Russian hands, which they regarded as a- sacred obligation. We do not, however, contemplate the possibility -of the Ottoman clan being allowed to stay in .Europe and continually inject poison into its extremities. And this brings us to an examination of- the real meaning of "annexation." ' We take the.Russiansaas we Isave:saidi to mean that there shall. be ,tio -wanton occupation of territory for the mere purpose • of aggrandizement by any Power. We do not understand them to mean that they - are indifferent to the liberation ..of long-suffering peoples from chains . that have bitten into their 'flesh. How could the Russians mean any Such thing ? 'They profess themselves good democrats, and we confidently believe that they are. Russia has long been the champion of the South Slays, who groaned either under the tyranny of Turkey or under the oppression of Austria- Hungary. Does she intend to abandon that part, and say that her kinsmen may remain not only subjected but in a worse position than ever ? We do • not believe it. It is incredible. • What is the war for if not to liberate ? The immediate cause of the war was the generous refusal of Russia to look on while Serbia was victimized- by one of the most harsh and unjust methods known to modern -history. We see, then, that if Russia is truly democratic, as we are certain she is, she is necessarily convinced that people must have the form of government they desire. The best definition of a plan which approaches, but cannot reach, the ideal is that the will of the local majority should prevail. If -we apply this definition go as to produce conditions of tranquillity after the war, we shall and must require certain things of Germany as indispensable. We shall require her to abandon the parts of Northern France which she at present occupies, as well- as Alsace-Lorraine, which she kept after the Franco- German War without the least regard for the sentiments of the predominantly French population. Similarly, she must give up the Danish portion of Schleswig-Holstein. She must of course retire from Belgium and Luxemburg, and she and her Allies from Serbia and Montenegro and Rumania, and must make restitution for the wholesale ruin and loss she has inflicted on nearly all those countries. There is • no question here of payment as a form of punishment. The money is required -to -rebuild and renovate. The thief must put back • the purse. The provinces of Russia must be restored, except Russian Poland, which, together with Galicia and Prussian Poland, will snake up the new Kingdom of Poland. The re-creation of this kingdom is only to right the wrong, far too late, which was committed in Frederick the Great's infamous partition.
The principle of nationality as applied to Austria-Hungary will appeal to the Russians, as good democrats, even more. we think, than in its applications to Germany. The will of the local majority postulates a new Jugo-Slav State composed of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, -Dalmatia, Croatia, and the other .South Slav provinces. Bohemia must also become independent. The Rumanians of Transylvania must be allowed to adhere to their own people. Italy must have the Italian Tirol and such a characteristically Italian city as Trieste, together with those. parts of the ,Adriatic seaboard and the islands which are Italian in feeling or in race. But perhaps satisfaction in the numerous necessary acts of liberation— as different from what is popularly meant by " annexation " as one can conceive—will be most deeply felt by the Russian democracy in regard to the peoples to be saved from Turkey. Russia has been the traditional protector of Armenia, and it is inconceivable to us that she should .grow tepid now that the Russian autocracy is removed. Rather, we expect, her generous care will redouble itself. If she does not -want Constantinople, the Straits may have to be internationalized, but the Turks in any case can no longer' be allowed to mis- govern and massacre either in Europe or elsewhere. 'The Ottomans may be allowed, like the placated Eumenides, a place of residence. There, it may be hoped, their better elements will recover and prosper, but never again must the Arabs who have come into association with more civilized Governments be exposed to that alien despotism.
Our Government would not have the least difficulty in demonstrating to Russia that the disposal of Germany's colonies can be determined only by the same principles: Democracy can have but one answer to all the questions before us. The supreme irony would be if Democracy not discover this for want of asking itself the questio:- s. If the questions are asked anl answered at or ce, the an- at least be no differences of aim between Russia, and oitscivcs..
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