War at Sea
The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1943. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Geoffrey Cumberlege : Oxford University Press. 30s.)
Everyman's History of the Sea War. VoL I. By A. C. Hardy. (Nicholson and Watson. 18s.) CAPTAIN MORISON'S History of United States Naval Operations in World War II has been planned to fill fourteen volumes. The author, who is the Jonathan Trumbull Professor of American History at Harvard, suggested to President Roosevelt early in 1942 that such a history should be prepared, and volunteered his services. The suggestion was most happily approved. Dr. Morison became Captain Morison, U.S.N.R.; he was given full access to all documents, a small staff to assist him and a loving commission to visit the various theatres of war. The outcome, however, is not an official history ; nor is it merely the Navy Department's vers:on of its own activities. The facts, coming as they do from authoritative sources, may be regarded as trustworthy ; but the choice and interpretation of them, as well as the form and style of the work, are matters for which the author takes all responsibility. He may take all credit too unless he tires before completing his massive task, it promises to be super- latively good.
This first volume carries the story of operations in the Arctic, Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean as far as May, 1943. The "short of war" policy, which was developed as Ainerica became increasingly involved in the conflict while nominally remaining neutral, is perhaps the most interesting part of the book. Ingenious arguments were needed to justify the participation of U.S. forces in what were essentially acts of war, albeit defensive ones. After bases had been established, as outposts of Western Hemisphere defence, in Green- land, Iceland and Northern Ireland, "the theory was adopted" that convoys of American vessels could be legitimately escorted to them by U.S. warships and if shipping of other nationalities happened to tag along too, the United States could not be held responsible. Great Britain is here finally cleared of the charge of forcing a reluc- tant United States to develop her major effort in Europe, when her proper policy was to concentrate against Japan. Without any prompt- ing by us, the President, Admiral Stark, General Marshall and the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, had agreed in November, 1940, to the basic strategy of defeating Germany first—a policy con- firmed by the U.S. Joint Army and Navy War Plan of May, 1941.
In the description of events after America's formal declaration of war Captain Morison's task entailed isolating the U.S. Navy's Atlantic operations from events elsewhere, which do not belong to this volume, and from the activities of other armed forces, which it is not his purpose to record. He has managed to do this without distorting the picture unduly or seeming to neglect the achievements of others. He does not hesitate to criticise the Navy Department when occasion warrants, but might have censured more severely its neglected pre- parations for anti-submarine warfare. One feels that it could have benefited more from our practical experience had it been more willing to learn, for we were far ahead in equipment, technique and skill. Captain Morison deserves all praise. What could have been a tedious catalogue of convoy movements and statistics never strumbles into dullness or repetition. From the first' page it is clear that he knows what he wants to say and fully commands the ability of saying it in a concise and readable manner.
Commander Hardy's book, the first of a trilogy, is a vast con- glomeration of facts, interspersed with rather dubious generalisations. It will serve a useful purpose as a reference book, particularly for its copious appendices. The author has obviously laboured hard to gather all this material together, and it is a pity that he has not been able to make better use of it, or to write in a more attractive style.
G. P. GRIGGS.
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