Adenauer and Schuman
S S long as M. Schuman was at the Quai d'Orsay Franco- German relations were of a peculiar character. Since M. Schuman's reign has come to an end for the time being, it may be useful to analyse the official policy of France in regard to Germany during the last few years. Only on the basis of such an analysis will it be possible to form an opinion on the trend of future events, which is difficult enough con- sidering the unpredictable fluctuations of French party politics. To coming historians the Schuman epoch will appear as an epoch of consistent French distrust and fear of Germany allied with constructive European projects. These projects, such as the Schuman Plan itself and the original Pleven Plan, were launched by France. The strange and contradictory feature about these great plans was that they were meant to satisfy both the French minority of genuine advocates of Franco- German reconciliation and of a European federation and the French majority which, if not strictly anti-German, was and is in favour of the greatest possible safeguards against the rebirth of a strong and sovereign Germany. Thus the Schuman Plan could be interpreted as the first step towards a European federation between equal partners and also as the last desperate effort to " internationalise " the Ruhr. Thus the European Defence Conununity could be taken at its face-value and also as the last means of preventing a German national army. The same is true of the European Political CoMmunity, the pro- visional draft of which was debated in Strasbourg last week.
On this basis it is evident that M. Schuman's foreign policy, as far as Germany was concerned, has always been a case of skating on thin ice. M. Schuman himself has been persistently far ahead of French public opinion and also of his own staff at the Quai d'Orsay. For the French Foreign Minister of the last few years has really been leading the vanguard of true French Europeans. Only in so far as his projects could be made palatable to the majority of French politicians was there any hope of their finding parliamentary approval. It was partly a matter of timing. But above all the " fear the Germans " majority of Frenchmen will only consent to any supra-national authority, which to them is identical with a supra-national system of controlling Germany, if all other means of con- trolling Germany, by the occupation regime or otherwise inter- nationally, are no longer employable. It is a case of Europe as a last resort, not as a principal aim.
It is also a case of what is to be done to avoid the most immediate danger to France at a given moment. When the plan for a European Defence Community was launched, the most immediate danger was a German national army, which at that time was what the Americans wanted. The E.D.C. appeared as the French answer to this danger, as a plan which would in any case delay action considerably. But when the E.D.C. treaty was signed, when ratification approached, the former salvation from the German national army became itself the most immediate threat.
There are always two dangers seemingly facing the French in connection with Germany. One is German national strength. The other is being left alone with Germany in- any kind of international or supra-national organisation. This second danger of a tete-a-tete with Germany may seem extremely irrational, considering the presence of American and British troops in Germany, considering N.A.T.O. and the `system of supplementary alliances. But nevertheless the fear has been the paramount motive in French politics during the last few weeks. It was the .greatest force behind the latest Cabinet crisis, which has proVed to be an E.D.C. crisis. It is useless at present to discuss with Frenchmen what will be the French attitude if, after a possible breakdown of the E.D.C., a German national army appears again on the political horizon. At present the French are not threatened with a German national army but with the E.D.C. which they consider to be a tete-a-tete with Germany. -The majority of Frenchmen seem to be unable to choose " the lesser evil " once and for all. This is apparent both in the choice between a European army and a German national army and in the choice of whom to fear most—the Russians or the Germans.
Now what is the German position amidst this confusion and after the disappearance of M. Schuman from the scene of European politics ? Dr. Adenauer has unquestionably been the ideal partner for M. Schuman's European policy. Dr. Adenauer is himself a great European. His advantage over his Frendh colleague consisted in the faet that his position in domestic politics was far more stable and secure. Dr. Adenauer, too, has been far ahead of public opinion in his country, but he has commanded a safe though small majority in Parliament since 1949. A German Chancellor, according to the consti- tution, can only be ousted by a vote of censure if the majority voting against him at the same time agrees on his successor. This makes any German Government, far more stable, since " negative " majorities cannot, as in France, provoke a Govern- ment crisis.
Dr. Adenauer during the last three years has used his stronger domestic position in two ways in his foreign policy. He has consistently followed in the wake of French initiative in the European field. He has furthermore time and again gone to the extreme limit of " unpopular " concessions to France in the full knowledge that he could take more upon himself than his weaker French colleague. With any German Chancellor but Dr. Adenauer, M. Sunman would probably have failed long ago. This statement is also true the other way round, in so far as Dr. Adenauer knew very well that any. French Foreign Minister succeeding M. Schuman would make a Franco-German rapprochement more difficult. For Dr. Adenauer the best and most progressive European policy was and is at the same time the best German policy. The same identity of purpose as far as European and French policies were concerned was to be found in M. Schuman. The differ- ence lay in the respective strength of domestic opposition. A French Government which* has to look for Gaullist support, a French Foreign Minister who is primarily more French than European, must necessarily change the situation. Dr. Adenauer can no longer look forward to French initiative which makes constructive use of a basic distrust, which, in other words, turns French fear of Germany into European action. He can therefore no longer follow in the wake of a French policy for Europe. He will sooner or later be forced to take the initiative himself. This is extremely difficult, since anything bearing the trademark " made in Germany " is bound to rouse French suspicion from the start. On the other hand Dr. Adenauer cannot allow the,European situation to deteriorate into competitive nationalism. So far official German comment regarding the latest developments in France has been extremely cautious and rather on the optimistic side. But the bitter truth that there has been a setback. for Europe is bound to make itself apparent sooner or later.
To overcome the E.D.C. crisis by amendments to the treaty is a sound idea, as long as the amendments are progressive improvements. But; if the amendments more or less annul the spirit and the true' meaning of a European Defence 'Com- munity, if the amendments virtually reinstate national armies, what then ? This would mean the E.D.C.'s funeral. It would, though satisfying the Gaullists, meet with a new wave of oppo- sition from other French quarters, and would possibly provoke a new French Cabinet crisis. It seems very unlikely that a German nationalist army could be acceptable to either France or Ge'rmany. On the other hand it seems impossible to inte- grate all other armies, to leave the French national army intact and to embody this evident contradiction under the heading of E.D.C.
It must also be considered that this is a year of national elections in Germany. This renders it almost impossible for Dr. Adenauer to make further concessions to France con- cerning both the E.D.C. and the Saar problem, all the more as he has already gone to the limit in giving in to France during the time when M. Schuman was at the helm of French foreign policy. The chances of Dr. Adenauer's coalition being returned to power have not been enhanced anyway by the E.D.C. crisis, which the Opposition interprets as a failure of the Chancellor's foreign policy. The constitutional tangle concerning the E.D.C. and the contractual agreements makes the situation still more difficult.
The German Opposition under Dr. Schumacher and after his death has consistently stated that France was out to gain hegemony in Europe. It will probably be easier during the next few, months to depict French policy as nationalist and anti- European than it has been in the past. Heretofore it has always been possible to point to M. Schuman as the example of a great Frenchman who was also a great European. To whom is one to point now ? Dr. Adenauer has never been in a more difficult position.
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