The object of the German attack is at present obscure.
(1) The movement may be the beginning of a real effort on the part of the Germans, very naturally discontented with the position of stalemate, which is much more dangerous for them than for the Allies, to break through and crush the field armies of the Allies, for that, of course, is their real objective, and not Paris or Calais, or any other geographical point. (2) The Germans may be trying by a " flare-up " at Soissons to divert attention from some movement on their part elsewhere. (3) They may wish to anticipate a general French attack suspected, rightly or wrongly, by them to be imminent. (4) The movement may be made to distract the Allies from undertaking some special action which the Germans have cause to dread in some other part of the field. [If you think a man is going to hit you in the eye, it is an old and very sound plan to punch him first in the ribs.] (5) The German " push " may be merely due to the presence of the Emperor, who dearly likes "to teach the doubtful battle where to rage." One pictures the poor distracted Battle entreating the general to tell it where and how it ought to do its raging. We must leave our readers to take their choice of these five possibilities. For ourselves, we frankly confess our inability to make a clear choice. Still, if compelled, we should be inclined to say that the big German " puah " is not yet, and that the Germans realize that winter weather is not appropriate for the offensive on a great scale.
