16 JANUARY 1869, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE CONFERENCE. THE CONFERENCE. THIS Conference is a comedy, and not an entertaining one, or rather a lever de rideau, played to gain time before the curtain rises on the serious business of the evening. It is almost impossible for any one who studies the proceedings carefully to doubt that a failure has been prearranged, that neither Turkey, nor Greece, nor their respective backers, are sincerely desirous of peace. The Greek Government knew perfectly well weeks ago that its representative would not be admitted to the table with any vote, and the Porte also knew that a simple acceptance of its ultimatum was out of the question. Yet both allowed the Conference to meet, and then each endeavoured to render its meeting useless. At the very first sitting, the Greek representative, M. Rangabe, put in a little, neatly worded, and quite peremptory note, stating that under specific instructions from Athens he was compelled either to obtain an equal vote with Turkey or to retire. Greece "would not accept a position of inferiority." If, he said, Conference admitted only Great Powers, and called Turkey a Great Power, he denied the right of Great Powers to an " exclusive voice" in deciding on their own contests with little ones. Or, if the Assembly was limited to those who signed the Treaty of Paris, he was bound to observe that the subjectmatter of dispute had nothing on earth to do with the stipulations of that Treaty. After which exhibition of Greek acumen he retired and remains in retreat, while the Conference ponders the Sultan's despatch, published, like M. Rangabe's protest, after its meeting. In it the Turkish Government affirm that they expect nothing from Conference, that they adhere to the ultimatum, and that if Conference alters that document or travels beyond it the Turkish representative will also retire. Under this double fire, the diplomatists have only two alternatives. They can, if they are united, pass their own resolutions, and compel Turkey and Greece alike to obey them by setting fleets in motion ; but this they obviously will not do, the Courts having already arranged that they are not bound to carry out any resolutions at which Conference may arrive ! Or they may, if disunited, argue for days about some declaration of principles to which Turkey and Greece, as respectable powers, ought alike to attend, and this we can hardly doubt is what they will do. They must do something, or break up in confusion, and as Greece is not bound by declarations she has not signed, and Turkey has beforehand refused to accept anything except her ultimatum, a dignified invitation to everybody to adhere to the Eighth Commandment will effect neither good nor harm, while its preparation will consume some of the time which must still elapse before action.

Turkey and Greece, it seems clear, mean mischief, and the real question for Europe is whether their backers intend to keep out of the fray. We doubt it very greatly. The moment hostilities commence Turkey will be in a ferment of revolt, and every power except England will be in a measure compelled to defend herself, Russia against the suspicion that she has deserted the Christians of Turkey, Austria against Russian intrigues in the lower valley of the Danube, France against Russian aggression upon Turkey, and Prussia against France. The Powers are too fully armed, too suspicious, and too irritated against each other to allow any great opportunity of strife to pass peacefully away. Their interests, of course, as men on 'Change think, incline them to keep the peace ; but so their interests always do, and men are no more ruled by their interests than they are by their reason. Those interests, moreover, are by no means so strong as usual. They are mainly Treasury interests, and the Treasuries of Europe are groaning under the burden of this armed peace, which is neither peace with its blessings nor "war with its happy chances," till grave statesmen have avowed their belief that war would be more endurable. All the usual preliminaries of a grand struggle have been successfully got through. The principals, France and Prussia, are armed to the teeth ; their a]lies, Russia and Austria, quite as well armed as their finances will allow, and as each other. There is a regular pretext furnished by the attack on Greece. There is the proper meeting of diplomatists, with its carefully arranged failure. There is the regulation rumour that somebody—it is Count Bismarck this time—has made some impossible demand, and there is the regular fusillade going on among semi-official papers, with the Moniteur de l'Arme'e at their head. Marshal Niel there announces that he is ready for anybody, in almost so many words ; while Count von Beast prints despatches de scribing the Prussians as pirates, and Count von Bismarck retorts in articles about the malignant misrepresentations of Count von Beast, and the Russian Government orders its soldiers to be told that Austria is their "natural enemy." These things do not amount to proofs that war is at hand, but they do amount to proof that the half-dozen men who rule Europe are suspicious of each other to a degree which would make war almost a relief.

There is but one peaceful and one pleasant feature in the prospect. The peaceful one is the character of the Emperor of the French. The reluctance of that remarkable man to play for tremendous stakes is perhaps the strongest feature in his character, and this time the stakes involve his throne and his dynasty. Nothing could save either, if France were beaten ; and near as war was in September, he may at the last moment recede from his own design. If he refuses to move, the question may yet be huddled up, for all other powers would, on the whole, welcome a postponement.. The pleasant feature is the character of the British Cabinet. Mr. Gladstone clearly is not going to war if he can help it, and there is therefore a strong chance, to say th.e least, that for once in her history England may be a spectator in a general war. The real quarrel is between North Germany and France, and it is neither the interest, the inclination, nor the policy of this country to take sides.