THE VINDICATION OF ADMIRAL JELLICOE.
Naval Operations. Vol. III. By Sir Julian S. Corbett. (Longmans and Co. 21s. net.)
IT is fortunate that Sir Julian Corbett lived long enough to add his weighty tribute to the conduct of Admiral Jellicoe during the Battle of Jutland, and thus to relieve him of the unfair strictures passed upon him by the ill-informed. The course of this battle is traced with admirable clarity, and certain points are worthy of attention.
It will be remembered that our battle-cruiser Fleet was turned northward to close the Battle Fleet at 215 p.m. on May 31st: five minutes later, the Elbing,' Admiral Hipper's left-wing light cruiser, and the 'Galatea' on our east flank, chanced to sight the same steamer, and both decided to investigate.
This led to a premature contact of the Fleets. Our battles
cruisers were ordered to alter course in succession to S.S.E. (2.32), and in the action which followed, the distance between the two forces of the Grand Fleet increased in proportion as that between the German forces decreased ; moreover, the enemy advance to the northward was checked. Commenting on this piece of ill-fortune, Sir Julian Corbett says that had the battle-cruisers of both sides continued on their original courses for an hour or two longer, a situation much less favourable to the Germans would have developed ; and, indeed, it is difficult to see how Admiral Ripper's force could then have escaped annihilation.
With regard to the battle-cruiser action, it is open to question whether Admiral Beatty did not throw away the advantage of his heavier guns by dosing the range unnecessarily ; it is certain, at any rate, that the German shooting was far more deadly in the early stages than our awn, and a muddle over the signal for distribution of fire added to our difficulties, and left the Derffiinger ' undisturbed for nearly ten minutes. By 4.26 we had lost the ' Indefatigable ' and Queen Mary,' and seven minutes later the High Seas Fleet was sighted in line of battle, whereupon our ships were swung back sixteen points in succession to N.W. to close Admiral Jellicoe, now unfortunately a considerable distance away.
The next point to consider is the vexed question of the deployment of our Battle Fleet : both the 'Lion' and the Iron Duke' were out of their reckoning, the former's error being nearly seven miles west, the latter's over four miles east, so that Admiral Jellicoe was in total ignorance of the whereabouts of the enemy Battle Fleet until at 6.14 they suddenly appeared out of the mist, not ahead as expected, but on his starboard side. Deployment became instantly necessary, and the Fleet was ordered to form line to port on Admiral Jerram, on a course S.E. by E. "It is scarcely to be doubted," says Sir Julian Corbett, " that the Commander- in-Chief's reasoning was correct."
It was too late to deploy to starboard. Had he done so, Admiral Burney's squadron (the oldest and least powerful) would have been subjected to the concentrated fire at close range of the enemy's best ships and almost certainly a destroyer attack during deployment ; moreover, Admiral Jellicoe would have had to turn his ships at least twelve points to port in the thick of the enemy's fire and well within torpedo range to avoid having his " T " crossed.
As it was, no sooner had Admiral Burney turned his division than he found himself under hot fire at 14,000 yards range ; and our Battle Fleet was safely deployed under circumstances of the highest difficulty and danger, with a fast division ahead and astern, on a similar course to the enemy and with every prospect of crossing, their " T " and cutting them off from their bases.
"Thus," says Sir Julian, "did Admiral Jellicoe attain the tactical position which on his unrivalled experience of manoeuvres and exercises he had regarded as most desirable."
A tribute is rightly paid to Admiral Scheer's masterly handling of the High Seas Fleet during the subsequent stages of the battle : his escape was certainly due to judicious use of the famous " Gefechtskehrtwendung " or battle turn-away, and of destroyer smoke-screens.
The story of the confused night-action is well told, and the remarkable failure of the destroyers of bath sides to achieve what was expected of them brought out. The enemy ships proved to be so well constructed as to be almost unsinkable ; but the appalling extent and nature of the casualties that this 'entailed effectively destroyed their morale, and undoubtedly led to their ignominious surrender two and a-half years later.
The first part of the book deals principally with the last phase of the Dardanelles campaign, and the exploits of the submarines E14 and Ell in the Marmora, and also of Captain num in Mesopotamia, make thrilling reading.
In conclusion, it should be said that the maps which accom- pany this volume are quite admirable.
ROBERT ROOTHBY.
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