capacity—on a trumped-up charge of want of candour. There There
is force in all those arguments, but nevertheless a are men, of course, who will defy their department, and lose more dangerous motion was never put on paper. We say their salaries, and run the risk of a moral accusation, rather nothing, though Ministers will say much, of its unconstitu- than suppress a few inconvenient facts; but Governments must tional character, for the House of Commons is in fact, if not act on the presumption that they are served by average people, in theory, the final authority within the Empire. If it in- and we do not wonder that this year " it has not been neces- sists on controlling all foreign relations directly it ultimately sary to send back a single report." Does Mr. Lowe sincerely will control them, prerogative notwithstanding, for it has believe that this large body of acute controversial thinkers is only to refuse to pay and all constitutional compromises. really unanimous, or is he not aware that he has produced his come at once to an end. What we desire to point out is " happy family," as other showmen do, by cruel pinches, and that direct Parliamentary control over our foreign rela- harsh words, and deprivation of food? He will hardly accuse tions, apart altogether from the constitutional difficulty, Mr. Walter of party animosity to himself, yet Mr. Walter told would and could be productive of nothing but mischief. him distinctly that he had cut out a fact, viz., the success of Indirect control it possesses already to the very fullest a particular school, because it told in favour of the system of extent. The Ministry are responsible for their treaties, and, unoertificated schoolmasters. Facts are not surplusage if if they sign bad treaties they can be dismissed, and knowing they be but true, and to cut out such things shows exactly this, Ministers are anxious to nervousness to keep their diplo- the animus imputed in Lord Robert Cecil's resolution. macy in accord with the well understood sense of the House. as to the precise limit up to which Vienna intends to follow Ber- En ? And if the House has not this information what will the worth of its decision be ? Even if Europe were governed, as it is not, by nations, the intervention of diplomacy would still be as necessary as the intervention of lawyers, to introduce passionless third parties between the passionate or excited clients. Imagine a negotiation going on with the North and Mr. Roebuck making speeches upon it at every step in the proceedings! Long before the debate was over the concessions of Great Britain would have become unpopular, and the con- cessions of the North would seem to Northerners dishonourable, and war would recommence with additional irritation. The House, moreover, in addition to its defect of numbers really does not understand foreign politics except in a very general way. The Ministry are possibly only average men ; but still the mere fact that they are Ministers brings them informa- tion no private member can ever acquire, and without which diplomacy is but a fight with gloves carried on in the dark. To appeal from the Cabinet to the House is on such questions merely to appeal from the instructed to the ignorant, the ignorant being, moreover, utterly divided in opinion.
But, argue the advocates of the " Liberal " theory, the foreign policy of the country would gain both in strength and in consistency, forParliament and the Ministry would be always in accord. So they are now. The Cabinet can catch the sense of the House just as easily as-if they demanded a formal vote, and no Minister nowadays ventures on a foreign policy which Parliament is likely to disapprove. He either keeps in strict accord m ith it, as Earl Russell has done in American affairs, or appeals to the people on it, as Lord Palmerston did in the matter of the Chinese war. The only effects of askingdircetly for a vote would be that instead of hearing the real opinions of members the Foreign Secretary would hear the opinions of members modified to catch their constituencies, and that foreign powers would have a direct temptation to intrigue within the Parliament itself. We have too much of this already. Louis Napoleon is believed to have even now representatives within the walls, and if the House possessed the initiative we should have the scenes of 1687 over again, the Ambassador of France leading the Opposition while the Ambassador of Austria was understood to guide the party which supported Her Majesty's Government. The vote of individual members would become of almost priceless importance, and internal measures would be resisted or supported because they bore on the party alliances of foreign Courts. That is the case at this moment whenever the interests of Rome are in question, and a great Continental State could reward or injure as no Pope has ever been able to do. The theory of responsibility, the safeguard of our entire system, would go at once to pieces, for the Foreign Secretary would cease to be responsible. He would simply, if chal- lenged, have to plead a vote, and would be, in fact, instead of a Minister a mere mouthpiece for the House of Commons and the constituencies. Great men will not accept such a position, and we should either have a Minister who tried to carry out his own views in spite of votes, or a mere clerk whose know- ledge was useless because his only function was to obey orders.
But, we may be told, all that is asked is that Parliament should have the right to approve engagements before they are finally concluded. _ The American Senate has that power, and why not the Englishl No details need be entered into, for Parliament might be asked only for a general approval. Parliament is asked now, and in a much more effectual way. The American Senate, which is a very limited body, not re- sponsible to popular constituencies, and sits on such occasions, like a British Cabinet, with closed doors, can reject a treaty, but it cannot upset the line of policy which that treaty for- mulates. The President can put his country into relations, say with France, which lead inevitably to war without the interference of the Senate, can even, as was done on one occasion, announce that war has commenced, and it is for the Senate by drawing back to trail the nat.onal standard. The Premier can do nothing of the sort. Parliament, instead of selecting particular measures of the wisdom of which it knows exceedingly little, selects a particular man of whom it knows a very great deal. If it distrusts Lord Silmer- ston's general tone, or dislikes the course Earl Russell is taking—and it has plenty of means of ascertaining both tone and policy—it can turn either of them out at any stage in the process. That course is the one universally adopted in England. A. great firm does not demand that its managing partners shall ask consent to every transaction, shall explain why they rejected Smith's account, or chartered Jones's ship, or bought goods on Monday instead of Thursday, but looks to the net result--the general value of the managers' brains, as shown in the ultimate dividend. Imagine the "Bank parlour" under an obligation to consult the Bank proprietary in public meeting before it accepted a new account. Yet that would not be a greater folly than the practice of reducing Lord Palmer- ston's opinion to a level with that of Mr. Darby Griffiths, by subjecting negotiations to the chance of a head by head vote. The theory may be and is different, but the practice in England is that the people shall be represented by the constituencies, the constituencies by the Lower Honse, the House by the Cabinet, and the Cabinet by the two or three men who, if they do not dictate, at least initiate its foreign policy. Mr. Horsman's plan would upset that arrangement which with great drawbacks still works, for another which probably would not work at all, and certainly would work so that those who know least of the difficulties of foreign politics would dictate our course among them. The sailors usually obedient would seize the helm just as the breakers appeared in sight.
Let us see for one instant how Mr. Horsman's proposal would work in the instance to which he has applied it. At present Earl Russell and Lord Clarendon, moved by informa- tion received from a hundred different sources, and with a constant side- glance at English opinion, will at the Con- ference consent to the best annngement they can obtain. The best judgment Parliament can select has done what it deems the best for British interests. Mr. Horsman proposes that their authority shall be rendered null to threaten, or coax, or advise by an order to apply for a previous vote. Nobody knows exactly which way the vote will go, and consequently the Continental diplomatists will have it all their own way at the Council Board. The arrange- ment thus made must either be sanctioned by Parliament, in which case nothing is attained which is not attained also under the present system, or be reversed, in which event either England will be left out altogether, or the whole business must recommence with the English representatives bound to one fixed course of action, and therefore in reality powerless. Mr. Horsman might as well propose that no man should be bound by any act of his authorized agent It would be very little more impracticable than his proposal to turn the House of Commons into a standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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