RELATION OF POLITICAL CHIEFS TO 0.B.h.LCIAL DP...PARTIN - TINTS.
WIEEN a Governor arrives in a colony and takes the command, as he often does, of the military service, he goes prepared to carry out a particular policy according to his instructions from the cen- tral Government,—a policy in which he is supposed to concur : he is provided with specific measures to embody that policy in a course of action ; but in most cases he is not acquainted with the details of business in the colony, its topography, the peculiar tem- per of its inhabitants, its special usages, its personnel civil or mili- tary, its local necessities, or the circumstances of the particular day. But he finds officers stationed on the spot who have been there for some time, and who are prepared to report to him the actual state of their own detachments, of their stores, and of the feel- ing in the country, with those practical details that require imme- diate attention. And notwithstanding personal prejudices, it mostly happens, in the military service at least, that habits of disci- pline, of exact reporting, and of official execution, have been en- forced by the penalties for any offence against these military du- ties. With the map of the colony, its affairs are readily explained to the new corner; he is supplied with reports that enable him to adapt his orders to the actual state of circumstances, and his be- hests are carried out into practical results.
The arrival of a new Cabinet Minister at the head of a depart- ment in our country somewhat resembles the arrival of a Governor at the head of a colony with which he has been previously unac- quainted; except that in the case of the Minister he has scarcely any of the facilities which await the Governor. He finds the de- pertinent not so much an organization of servants to execute his will as a corporation of patent craftsmen trained to execute work according to an hereditary pattern, and organized more or less obviously to perform a colourable obedience to him in such a way as to secure a substantial perpetuation of their owb. system. If he requires a person to send about a special mission of inquiry in a particular branch of the business within his department, ten to one he has to intrust the duty to some long-established function- ary whose whole process of inquiry consists in writing letters ac- cording to a long-established form and receiving the answers after a due lapse of time. Thus, with a sufficient expenditure of foolscap, a formal reply is created to a formal question ; and at the end the Minister knows as much about the real facts-as if he had pursued an investigation into the natural history of the unicorn through the Herald's Office. On the other hand, he may be a Minister thoroughly imbued with the necessity of accomplishing a public duty, about which general opinion is perfectly matured ; the per- formance of which the public has been waiting with impatience for a long time ; and the possibility of which is as plain as the cooking of a Christmas dinner, only requiring ingredients to be prepared everywhere and the willingness to set about the business. He finds, however, that he must use, as his handle for moving the whole machinery provided to him, some person who has earned his promotion to a high post by great ability in carrying on in- quiries, but whose capacity and will are as little suited to the pro- cess of execution as a plough would be to reap a field of corn. Yet that person is stationed in the office, and there LS no help but to employ him. The Minister thus finds subordinates obedient, not to him, but to a routine. He cannot select men for their ca- pacity, but must use them as they are distributed to their duties, by principles as independent of the purpose for which they are wanted as if they were born to it through the institution of castes. He has entered office warm with the desire to serve his country and to fulfil a great public good. He is conscious of his own rec- titude and singleness of purpose ; he knows that he understands the subject, though he is not &scalier -with the details of the ma- chinery which he is compelled to use. He fends, however, that his utmost exertions fructify,, not in results Which 'Would be the direct issue of his exertions, but in results though perhaps colour- ably bearing some resemblance, substantially far more like those obtained by the predecessor whom he opposed and superseded.
In contemplating the possibility of an administrative reform, we have adverted to the military organization, not as a perfect model, but as one which would be in many respects an improvement upon the present system ; and we still desire to limit the use of that model to the purpose for which we have employed it,—not as the one which we should necessarily select, but simply as an existing example that a different plan may be better. It furnishes at all events a state of organization in which the officer expects to attain his promotion not by keeping the work about which he is engaged fixed to a certain pattern, in a department where he has no per- manent interest, but by executing that work with the greatest amount of efficiency. If the civil service were organized in this manner, each member of it could be promoted according to his ability and employed according to his capacity ; and the depart- ment would not be clogged with servants incompetent perhaps only because unsuitable to the particular posts. But the officers filling the department for the time being would, by the supposi- tion, be acquainted with its duties, able to report upon its actual condition, f.nd prepared to receive orders from above. The po- litical chief, therefore, appointed to the head of the department, would find it thoroughly prepared to put him in possession of a knowledge of the department, of the state of business in it, and of the means for carrying out the orders which he might give. Ob- vious advantages would present themselves immediately in such a complete state of the office. In the first place, all necessary in- formation upon the practical performance of the duties at the mo- ment would be ready for the Minister on entering office. In the second place, the department would be ready to execute the orders that he might issue; and the working administration would cor- rectly represent the policy that he intended to carry out. But, thirdly, there would be a moral influence not at present in exist- ewe.
With a department thoroughly efficient, a statesman would hesitate to assume the chief command, unless he himself had such general information and such a self-reliance on his own general proficiency, as would not make him ashamed before his subordinates. At present his ignorance is, in the main, so welcome to those subordinates, that they shield him from its consequences, and veil their own sarcasms in obsequiousness ; so that the moral influence of a proper shame on his part for a false position is never realized. That which makes him most respectable in the eyes of the officials is the probability that he will not disturb the nest. If they were endowed above everything with the positive efficiency—if they desired promotion for work done—they would despise an ineffi- cient and inert commander ; and he would hesitate to take the speaking-trumpet if he did not know what orders to give. Our system renders it necessary that political grounds shall be the chief reason for selecting her Majesty's Ministers, and there- fore it would be mischievous to require that the political heads of departments should rise by regular promotion; bat if the depart- ment offered the facilities which we have described, it is most probable, that men contemplating political employment would seek as early opportunities as they could of taking a commission in practical service in order to undergo some degree of drilling; exactly as in past days a nobleman, who did not expect to live by his commission, used nevertheless to serve for some time "in the wars," as a part of his schooling in statesmanship. With a desire to get the work done, arrears would become an intolerable encumbrance upon all the officers ; and a general con- sent would help to clear them away. One essential piece of ma- chinery for that purpose would lie in a regular reporting like the daily reports of a regiment,—on the state of the business, the state of all the men in the office, the fulfilment of the orders last issued. All this ought to be reported, repeatedly and daily, to the chiefs ; and if anything should remain undone today that was not done yesterday, somebody should be called to account for the delay, and be able to show good reason, or be coerced. This constant repetition of arrears in the reports must operate upon the common sense of duty; and a long-standing arrear would either be got rid of by proper execution of the duty, or it would be erased from the tally as a duty not proper to be done in the office. We have kept the subject of organization to a general view, be- cause we have no desire to forestal any suggestions that may be made. We have only endeavoured to show, from practical ex- amples, that it is quite possible to make such arrangements as to avoid the present obstructions in official departments. We believe that political ministers will never be able to do justice to their awn intentions, to their own good fame, or to the interests of their country, until they provide themselves with the machinery for executing in detail those policies which statesmanship has to de- sign in large.
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