The sheikh-out
ADEN D. C. WATT
Only a remarkable reversal in the present con- stellation of forces will save British policy in Aden from a total disaster. The magical ele- ment involved in fixing a definite date for the withdrawal of the British presence, a magic in whose efficacy Labour policy-makers seem irremediably convinced, seems once more to have failed. Its only effect has been to advance the deadline by which the various contenders for the succession to Britain's presence must be in a position to be sure of moving into power.
At the moment there are three possible con- tenders: FLOSY, the NLF and the Army, each as dangerously unstable as the others. nosy are ensconced in Cairo and Taiz with the radio stations of both firmly on their side. They still retain control of the largely Yemeni labour force employed in Aden's docks. With their Egyptian-trained terrorist organisation, the People's Organisation of Revolutionary Forces, they have an armed force estimated at approxi- mately 300 ensconced in Aden and in Crater. Their strength lies here and in the hold over the Aden trades union world still exerted by Abdullah al Asnag, the former head of the Aden ruc, now one of nosY's two leaders in Cairo, the other being the former premier of Aden, Abdul Kawi Mackawee.
The NLF are still much of a mystery. They are known to be a breakaway group from nosy. It is clear that the conviction that Britain was genuinely going to withdraw aroused in them the idea that this called for a strategy directed less at encouraging that withdrawal than of ensuring that they would be its chief bene- ficiaries. In the last three months they have systematically attacked the most prominent known supporters of FLOSY. In the same time they have built up a network of alliances throughout the statelets of the South Arabian Federation with dissident tribesmen, dis- appointed or dismissed claimants to sheikhly rule, and at least a section of the officers of the armed forces. By now they appear to have taken over all but a handful of the con- stituent sheikhdoms of the Federation, includ- ing that of the redoubtable Sharif of Beihan, one of the few really forceful and commanding of the sheikhly figures. It is now clear, if any- one had ever doubted it, that the native political institutions of the Federation were totally in- capable of supporting the weight of the Federa- tion, and that the persistent British interventions into the sheikhly sphere with the imposition of chosen successors and the removal of un- cooperative rulers had completely destroyed what little command of the loyalties of their armed tribesmen the various sheikhs could dispose of. In a land of unbelievable barrenness, where every man is armed and the blood feud is the principal element in his way of life, the British withdrawal has created a state of Hob- besian chaos, in which the present masters of the jungle have adopted the letters 'NLF' as their slogan. They can scarcely, however, be relied on by the NLF leadership as a weapon against FLOSY'S command of Aden.
This the NLF appear to realise; which is why, both at the political and the military level, they have been trying to pre-empt nosy. The general strike they called earlier this week was intended to challenee nosY's control of the labour force in Men. Their attacks on Da Saad and Sheikh Othman were intended to put them in a position to move into Men itself on the heels of the withdrawing British forces. If they cannot break FLOSY before January they may try to negotiate with Sir Humphrey neve'. yan an agreement which will enable them to do it afterwards. '
There remains the army, hastily cobbled to- gether a year ago, with a British commander, and the only native-based institution over which Sir Humphrey can exert any influence since the ignominious collapse of the Federal govern- ment and the submergence, through justified fears for their own safety, of the moderate Adeni political organisations which played along with it.
The army has been intervening to impose a truce between nosy and NLF forces when it was clear that neither side was winning. It has also issued statements calling for negotiations between the two sides. It cannot be used any more forcefully or it will crack yet again as it did on 20 June. The army has also appealed to President Nasser to use his influence to bring the two sides together. But Nasser has no in- fluence with the NLF any more, who do not seem to have any outside ties at this moment. They seem simply a gang of successful political killers, as if the m had defeated' the embryo government of Southern Ireland before Home Rule was introduced in 1922. It looks very much as if the British withdrawal in January will take place in the middle of a general Donnybrook whose outcome will be at best a state whose politics will outdo those even of Syria as an example of political instability.
In the meantime, and as long as the Suez Canal is closed, this process will be accelerated, the port and wealth of Aden will wither on the vine. Shipping and oil companies will trans- fer their bunkering facilities elsewhere—pos- sibly to Djibouti if Suez reopens, to an East African port if it does not. And the residual British military position will have been trans- ferred to the Gulf. Here the big question must be whether the drive to substitute the effendis for the sheikhs, which is now consuming Aden, will transfer its momentum to the sheikhdoms of the Gulf.
It may not. For the moment, Presi- dent Nasser seems to feel the need to mend his fences with the west. His extremists are muffled, his army leaders in jail, Mohammed Heikal all sweet reason—by his standards any- way. Neither Damascus nor Algiers can supply the drive towards Arab revolution in the Gulf if Cairo will not. Moreover, the number of western educated, or indeed Egyptian educated, persons in the lower part of the Gulf is still fewer than a hundred. This is well below spark point. Lastly, Saudi Arabia under King Feisal is very much in support of the status quo.
Nevertheless, there are three great weaknesses in the British position. The first is that the appearance of a large discontented intelligentsia of modern education in revolt against a system of sheikhly rule that denies them the power and prestige their fellows in the levantine Arab states enjoy is only a question of time. The second is that the native political institutions are no. more appropriate for the development of a larger political organisation than were those of the western Arab protectorate; though the sheikhs have more authority and their subjects are notably less bellicose. The third great weak- ness is that the centre of the British military presence is to be the island of Bahrein. Its ruler is an impossibly benighted old man resistant to all ideas of progress. Its population includes a significant number • of disappointed educated young radicals with a record of agitation of more than twelve years' standing. Bahrein is politically the worst possible place for British military power to be based in the whole Gulf. Yet to Bahrein we are going—to sit once again on the slopes of the most obvious volcano for miles around.
Previous page
