ENGL-AND AND EUROPE..
IT has boon sought," writes Mr, H. E. Egerton; " without ex- tenuation and without malice, to tell in rough outline the com- plicated story of British polioy in its connexion with European affairs, The story is by no moans one of =chequered success or virtue.. . . Still, upon the whole, England has stood for two principles, both iu themselves sacred, yet often apparently incon- sistent with each other : fidelity to existing treaty undertakings, and sympathy with national aspirations."
If we may in honesty accept Mr. Egerton's judgnunit, we shall re- ceive some consolation for our many blunders. Although we may, in the late Lord Salisbury's words, have often put our money on the wrong horse, "relieve not been dishonest plungers. Our hearts have re- mained in the right place though our 'toads have gone wool-gathering. Our fathers and grandfathers stuck at least to two general and sound principles : that treaties were made to he kept by us—though other nations might tear them up—and that the rights of nations to settle their own destinies have more in them of essential divinity than the ambitions of foreign Prince& For these two principles we have fought for three years, and will go on fighting, if need be, for three years more.
Although again and again, especially under the influence of Queen Victoria, we did our best to fool kindly towards Prussia, we were never under any illusions about her idvariable falsity. Her rulers and Ministers have never in her history hesitated to brook treaties and have never eared two straws for the rights of nationalities other than their own. From the days when Frederick of Prussia blackmailed Maria Theresa and seized her proviuce of Silesia—which he was pledged to eecure for her—until those days when the Belgian Treaty %MS flung aside as a scrap of paper, Prussia has been known to the world as the home of falsehood. We find even Queen Victoria, whose eldest, daughter had been married to the, Crown Prince, writing in 1864 of the Slesvig-Holstein question " Prussia should at least he made aware of what she [the Queen] and her Government and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross and unblushing viola- tion of every assurance and pledge that shoe had given, which Prussia had been guilty of." This was pretty strong for one who had main- tained that there was a better cane for Daniels Slesvig becoming absorhed into the German Confederation than there was for LOta- hardy coming under the rule of the King of Sardinia. Nearly sixty years earlier that grave publication The Annual Register,, reviewing the events of 1806, wrote : " We have hitherto contemplated Prussia unsteady and fluctuating in her policy ; constant only in her duplicity." The Prussian leopard never changes its spots, and never will change them until they are burnt off its dead carcase.
Mr. Egerton's survey is far longer and more detailed than those of .Canon Masterman and Mr. Gooch,' but the method which lie has adopted has gone far to spoil the interest in his story. Be splits up his subject into sections, and constantly 'nuke back chronologically, .110 that wenevor get a continuous presentation of any period. Canon Mestorman attempts to cover a century in forty-one pages, and achieves little more than a bald summary. Mr. Gooch, on the other hand, with sixty-six pages and the throbbing years of the twentieth century for hie subject, takes full advantage of his good fortune, and has given us a really brilliant narrative. He shows us England awakening,-England slowly realising that the policy of "splendid isolation " must give way before the German peril, and England taking all measures, except adequate military preparation, to support .Franco and Russia against the Brigand of Central Europe.
During the greater part of the nineteenth century English Govern- ments suffered from two obsessions. They were frankly afraid of the aggressiveness of Russia, aud, after many rather feeble attempts at conciliation, load come to regard France as hopelessly difficult to live with. It is not for us to blame thorn. Each generation must face out its own problems in its own way. But one must confess that our fear of Russia led us into many queer enterprises. It com- pelled us to back Turkey--Lord Salisbury's " wrong horse "—and to do some deeds for which the epithet " shady " would be mild. We engaged with Turkey and Napoleon III. in the Crimean War against Russia chiefly in order to deprive the Christian subjects of theSultan of the protection of Russia. Thou in 1878, when Russia hall defeated Turkey and was on the point of practically expelling her from Europe, w•e intervened with a threat of war, set up the Turk again on his pedestal, and brought back " Peace with Honour " from Berlin ! Hine illae laehryinae! What oceans of blood and tears have flowed out of that Treaty of. Berlin, of which at the time we were all so proud. The present writer remembers to have sung the Jingo ballad of the period with imineneely patriotic fervour—" The Eiuesians shall not have Conatanti,no-ple." He was very young.
• When one looks back it is difficult to see anything very heroic about our foreign policy. Wo blustered with Palmerston, senti- mentalized with Gladstone, and had fits of shoddy Imperialism with Beaeonsfield. So far were we from " hemming in " Prussia that much of her expansion was duo to our oornplaceiney. We let her
• (1) British Foreign Policy in Europe to Me End of. the Nineteenth Peninry.13y H. 0. Bgettoo. BOadOn Matadi!. and Co. BSc set.]—(2) A Century of British, Foreign Policy. By G. P. Gooch and oeuen..1.1:1.11, Itsxtr,tatan. Leaden.: ,Caul 1. for the Study of lutornational 1yncbsnx, f2s. devour Slesvig-Holstein and crush France—we did interpose fn 1895 to prevent a second. Franco-Prussian War—and helped her all we could to acquire a Colonial Empire. Our last most notable contri- bution was the cession of Heligoland in 1890, which has proved a most valuable outpost and observation station for the German Navy. The great change in our " orientation " began at the end of the nineteenth century, and was hastened by two striking incidents. These were the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger after the Jameson Raid, and the Fashoda crisis with France in 1898. The intervention of the Kaiser in a domestic affair of our own, and his congratulation to Kruger on repelling the raid " without appealing to the help of friendly Powers," set England in a blaze, and was properly regarded as a Prussian threat to the security of our Empire. Then came Fashoda, and we found ourselves within twenty-four hours of war with France, with whom we had every desire to be friendly. The South African War followed, and cost us the friend- ship of every country in Europe except Austria and Italy, and taught Germany that she could not challenge ors• Empire unless she wore prepared to face US on the seas. She made her choice, passed the Navy Law of 1900, and we awoko to the peril with which we wore confronted. France and Russia were bitterly hostile to us, and were unhappily in contact with us at so many points that oppor- tunities for friction were painfully numerous. It was clear that ors• policy of isolation had failed, and that, if we were to have friends upon whom we could depend in sear, we must accept obligations in time of peace.
Tho first outward and visible sign of the English change of heart was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Russia, our ancient foe, was pressing clown towards China—we had shut her out of Con- stantinople and the Persian Gulf—and Japan could not stop her unless we interposed our Navy to keep the ring clear. War between Russia and Japan followed, and, thanks to our holding of the ring, Japan was successful. In the meantime we set busily to work to compose all our difficulties with France—in Egypt, Siam, Mada- gascar, Central Africa, and Newfoundland. The Anglo-French Agreement resulted, and the Entente Cordiale came. into being. Russia was the ally of France, and we did our beat in the Persian' Agreement to make friends with her also. The German Navy was growing fast, German policy inspired by Prussia had become openly aggressive, war was looming ahead ; the only possible reply to the Triple Alliance was the Triple Entente.
All attempts to introduce a syatein of conciliation in Europe failed. Germany deliberately wrecked the arbitration proposals at the Hague Conference, and refused all our °flora to arrange for a reduction in naval armaments. Her ruling classes believed that we were decadent, crumbling towards a fall, and our, plees for a " naval holiday " added etrongth to this conviction. Had wo been as un- scrupulowias Prussia, had we not been a genuine peace-loving demo- cracy, wo should have fallen upon and destroyed the growing German Navy before its magnitude could imperil our safety. But for us this course wan not possible.
During the ten years before the war Europe lived in a state of nominal peace but actually of imminent hostilities. Again and again Germany did her utmost to cement the tacit alliance against herself. The Kaiser, spurred on by the military party and the Pan-Germans, became the stormy petrel of Europe. His descent upon Tangier brought us to the verge of war, which would have broken out had his new navy been of sufficient growth. The Agadir incident of 1911 set us shuddering, and war would have come then had we not made it plain that wo were to be counted in upon the side of France. The Germans and Austrians worn ready to take on France and Russia, but still feared our overwhelming sea-power. Even in 1914 they would scarcely have risked the final cataclyain had they been sure that we should be among their enemies. Thanks to Mr. McKenna and Mr. Churchill, our Navy was ready. But how slow we were to realize the intentions of Germany may be seen from the outstanding fact that very few of the battleships or battle-cruisers which to-day close the seas to Germany are of older date than 1912. We were just in time, but we ran our luck very fine indeed.
During the nineteenth century our foreign policy was the sport of political parties, but during the past twenty years there hatibeen definite continuity and surprisingly few mistakes were made. Had we again to pass through the years from 1897 to 1914 with our present knowledge, we should find little to alter. Wo should probablyafter the Agadir crisis of 1911 have made our Entente with France and Russia into a definitely defensive Alliance, and load we done so the history of the past three years might have been very different. Yet may bo the course taken was for the beet. We were so obviously driven into war by Germany that all classes were united from the outset in its support ; had we been parties to an Alliance, the outbreak, the inevitable outbreak as we now see, might have come in a fashion less imperative to the mass of the people.
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